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Fighting for the spoils. 





The Cape of Good Hope was rocked by a period of political turmoil at the end of the 
1770s and beginning of 1780s. Coenraad Beyers published an extensive study about 
this period and labelled the protesters: Cape Patriots (‘Die Kaapse Patriotte’). In his 
view they were pre-Afrikaner burghers who, driven by ideological arguments, opposed 
a colonial VOC tyranny. This thesis aims to revise this analysis, while seeking to 
demonstrate that late eighteenth century Cape society was marked by a complex and 
intertwined network of status groups. 
The burgher protests are used as a case study to illustrate that the Cape settlement 
was part and parcel of the Dutch empire. The protesters emphasised that their 
burgerschap was on par with that in cities in the Dutch Republic. The first part of the 
thesis compares Cape and Dutch burgerschap and argues that the Cape burghers were 
justified in stating that they were burghers of a city belonging to the United 
Netherlands. It furthermore becomes clear that the Cape burghers had developed a 
robust burgher identity. This certainly contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, but 
was not the determining factor. 
Because the Cape settlement was essentially a Dutch city, many elements of political 
and social life derived from the Dutch Republic. One of these was that at the Cape a 
ruling elite consisting of higher VOC officials and prominent burghers had developed 
with close familial and entrepreneurial links between them. Like the Dutch city 
patriciates they guarded access to their inner circle carefully. However this situation 
also provoked challenges. This aspect is investigated in the second part of the thesis. 
This is done by a prosopographical analysis of the protesters, who are compared to the 
rest of the burgher population residing in the Cape District in 1779, as well as a close 
study of burgher officials and entrepreneurs. It is confirmed that the clash of the late 












burghers and one consisting of prominent rural and urban burgher entrepreneurs. This 
tussle for economic and political power followed the tradition of many eighteenth 
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Work for this thesis started in the early 1990s, although I did not know that then. Soon 
after I arrived in Cape Town, I was looking for a way to continue my historical studies. 
After some searching I ended up with Nigel Worden, who, after learning that I came 
from the Netherlands, ever so subtly pushed me towards the eighteenth century 
archival‎records.‎That‎is‎how‎I‎became‎part‎of‎the‎‘Social‎Identities‎in‎VOC Cape‎Town’‎
project, which eventually provided the framework in which this thesis was done. Over 
time the research work was increasingly pushed aside for income-producing business 
and in the end disappeared into the background. In 2008 I had a conversation with my 
sister Lieke Zielhuis and I mentioned to her that it would be nice to get back into my 
historical research. She replied very simply:‎“If‎you‎want‎that,‎you‎must‎do‎it”.‎Not 
wanting my bluff to be called, I again contacted Nigel Worden and he welcomed me 
back into the fold. Therefore I must thank Lieke for the challenge and the push which 
made me pick up where I left off so many years ago. 
The National Research Foundation of South Africa provided financial support, which 
made it possible to take time off from work.  
Much of the research here is based on archival records and we are fortunate enough 
to reside in a city where access to these archives is so readily available. I want to thank 
the staff at the Western Cape Archives and Record Service in Cape Town. I have always 
found it a pleasure to work there and the service provided is commendable. 
As mentioned earlier this thesis is part of the VOC Social Identities project and it has 
been comforting to know that other historians were on hand to provide support when 
needed. I would like to thank Gerald Groenewald, Antonia Malan, Susan Newton-King, 
Nigel Penn, Robert Shell and Kerry Ward. Their feedback, comments, and sometimes 
just plain interest in my work have been much appreciated. 
I studied history in Leiden and a not inconsiderable portion of this thesis is based on 
work produced by lecturers I have had the pleasure of being taught by. There are two I 
specifically want to mention. One of the first classes I had, was taught by Professor 













having the ability to sit for long hours while reading and writing. It is something I have 
never forgotten and have remembered many times while working on this thesis. It is 
fitting‎that‎Professor‎Roorda’s‎thesis‎about‎“party‎and‎faction”‎has‎been‎a‎major 
inspiration for my work. 
In Leiden I was also taught by Professor Robert Ross, who is of course a foremost 
expert on the history of South Africa and the Cape and his enthusiasm and 
encouragement were undeniably a contributory factor in steering me towards studying 
the history of this wonderful country. He may not remember this, but I had the 
impression that he wanted me to do a PhD in Leiden after I finished my graduate 
studies in 1988. Unfortunately I had enough of studying at the time and chose a 
different path. Hopefully I have made up for that decision now. 
I have been fortunate and privileged to have had a supervisor like Professor Nigel 
Worden. One will be hard pressed to find a historical study about the Cape specifically, 
which does not make mention of his support and inspiration. He pushes without 
provocation, teaches without arrogance, and makes suggestions without taking away 
responsibility. On top of that he seems to have endless patience and he has 
undoubtedly a good sense of humour. And being a Dutch Calvinist at heart, I have to 
say that his work ethic is enormously stimulating. I am deeply grateful to him. 
Although far away, my family has been very encouraging and supportive throughout. 
They never failed to ask how the work is progressing. I suspect that a main motive may 
have been that my graduation would give them an opportunity and occasion for 
another visit to South Africa. I do not think I say too much when I say that one of the 
biggest fans of this country was my father, Huig Baartman, who was also very 
interested in its history. Unfortunately he passed away in 2003. I know he would have 
been extremely proud. He is one of my main role-models and I would like to dedicate 
this thesis to him. 
Lastly I want to thank my partner, Garth Jellars. I am sure that at times he must have 
been fed up with these burghers and their squabbles. But he has never uttered a 
complaint about me not giving attention to business or not being able to attend family 

















Dispensier VOC official responsible for purchase and distribution of grain for the 
Company 
Equipage meester VOC official responsible for provisions of the Company 
Gulden   Guilder – Dutch currency unit 
Heemraad  Burger member of rural government (like Burgher Councillor in city) 
Heeren XVII  Board of directors of the VOC 
Kassier VOC official responsible for collection and payment of Company 
money (paymaster) 
Negotie overdrager VOC official responsible for transferring trade bills 
Opgaaf   Annual return of population and production 
Pacht   Lease or tender to supply a product (e.g. meat or liquor) to the VOC 
Pachter   Lease or tender holder 
Plakkaat  Decree or law 
Posthouder  VOC official in charge of a Company post outside Cape Town 
Quotisatie  Tax assessment based on income and possession 
Regent   Member of the Dutch ruling elite 
Rijksdaalder  Rixdollar – Dutch currency unit 
Schelling  Dutch currency unit  
Schepen  Alderman 
Stuijver   Dutch currency unit (farthing/penny) 
















On 20 January 1779 the burgher Carel Hendrik Buijtendag was arrested by the 
administration of the Cape of Good Hope and banished to Batavia, the headquarters of 
the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Asia. The arrest sparked a period of political 
unrest in the Cape settlement lasting well into the 1780s during which Cape burghers 
demanded certain political and economic reforms from the VOC government. These 
protests are commonly referred to as the Cape Patriot movement since the South 
African historian Coenraad Beyers published his study ‘Die Kaapse Patriotte’‎in 1929.1 
Almost forty years later the second, extended edition of this work appeared and the 
term “Kaapse‎Patriotte (Cape Patriots)”‎became‎firmly‎entrenched in South African 
historiography.2 Beyers made an association between the turmoil at the Cape and the 
Dutch Patriot movement as is evident from this term. He used this connection because 
of his desire to place the Cape protests against the background of ‘the history of the 
origin of the Afrikaner nation’.3 In doing so he made them more part of nineteenth and 
twentieth century developments while largely ignoring the role and influence of 
preceding Dutch and Cape history. Beyers’ main focus was furthermore on the 
contents of the documents produced by the Cape burghers rather than on the actual 
people involved in and behind the unrest. The result was a study which explained the 
Cape conflict in terms of pre-Afrikaner burghers who, driven by ideological arguments, 
opposed a colonial VOC tyranny. 
 
The work presented here places the conflict where it belongs, in the eighteenth 
century, and focuses mainly on the decade of the 1770s leading up to its eruption. It 
views the Cape protest movement from the perspective of both Dutch and Cape 
history and concentrates on the protesters rather than the rhetoric. It exposes the 
complexities of the conflict and the more down-to-earth and straightforward 
motivations of the protesters. In so doing this study seeks to re-assess the story of the 
                                                          
1
 C. Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte, 1779-1791 (Cape Town 1929). 
2
 C. Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die laaste kwart van die agtiende eeu en die voortlewing van 
hul denkbeelde (Pretoria 1967). 
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burgher protests of the late 1770s, while shedding some light on the intricate social 
and political world of the Cape settlement in the late eighteenth century. 
 
On the sea voyage between Europe and Asia the Cape was the place where most, if not 
all, travellers spent a certain amount of time. Moreover many explorers made a point 
of visiting the Cape and its hinterland. They have left us with numerous accounts of 
their journeys and experiences.4 Siegfried Huigen writes about these travellers, e.g. 
Sparrman, Thunberg, Le Vaillant and Mentzel: `Everything between heaven and earth 
attracted their interest. They usually published their findings, and in this way they 
sometimes‎reached‎a‎large‎audience’.5 The Cape must have been well-known to a 
wider public during VOC and Dutch rule. Yet until recently the Cape settlement has 
received relatively little attention in the historiography of both the VOC and the Dutch 
empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When it was discussed in 1991 
Robert Ross still noted that the `history of the Cape before 1795 has become 
separated from that of the rest of the Dutch‎empire,‎to‎their‎mutual‎disadvantage’.6 
The Cape was an area which did not really fit in with the rest of the Dutch colonial 
empire and has been described as `something unique – save for short-lived New 
Netherland - in the possessions of the Dutch East‎and‎West‎India‎Companies’7, `an 
atypical‎part‎of‎the‎VOC’s‎empire’8, and in all respects different from the settlements 
in Asia.9 Climatic conditions were ideal and healthy for the residents which was not the 
case in other Dutch Asian settlements and there was no serious threat from a large 
local population or from neighbouring European nations – in short, despite challenges 
experienced by the earliest settlers, there was not as much hardship and conflict to 
write about as there was for other parts of the empire. The Cape also did not offer the 
lucrative spices and other trade goods so essential to the financial well-being of the 
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 An overview can be found in: M. Barend-Van Haeften en B. Paasman, De Kaap: Goede Hoop 
halverwege Indië. Bloemlezing van Kaapteksten uit de Compagniestijd (Hilversum 2003). More recent, 
more comprehensive and containing an excellent bibliography of these texts, is: S. Huigen, Knowledge 
and Colonialism: Eighteenth-century Travellers in South Africa (Leiden 2009). 
5
 Huigen, Knowledge and Colonialism, vii. 
6
 R.‎Ross,‎`The‎First‎Imperial‎Masters‎of‎Colonial‎South‎Africa’,‎in:‎South African Historical Journal 25 
(1991), 177-183, 178. 
7
















VOC and could thus by some be regarded as less important than the Asian settlements 
of the Dutch empire. But without the Cape as a welcome stop-over where VOC 
personnel could recover from the harsh conditions at sea, the mortality rate of men 
aboard the VOC ships could possibly have been much higher than it was in the 
eighteenth century.10 The Cape was for that reason alone of major significance to the 
success of the Company. Nevertheless it seemed to have been problematic for 
historians to give the Cape its due as part of the Dutch empire and may therefore not 
have been given the attention it deserves. There were some notable exceptions. In his 
study The Dutch Seaborne Empire, published in 1965, C.R. Boxer dedicated a chapter to 
developments at the Cape of Good Hope, although it must be noted that it was a 
separate one.11 Also the Dutch historian Gerrit Schutte paid particular attention to the 
Cape and especially the conflict between burghers and VOC in his work De 
Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën.12  
 
In South Africa itself the VOC period of the Cape was studied extensively by mainly 
Afrikaner historians as witnessed by a steady stream of publications which appeared 
especially throughout the twentieth century. `However this work was studiously 
ignored by‎Anglophone‎South‎African‎historians’,‎according‎to‎Nigel‎Worden,‎who‎
describes and explains these differences in his article on ‘New approaches to VOC 
history in South Africa’.13 This started to change in the late 1970s and 1980s when the 
eighteenth century history of the Cape began to receive attention among a wider 
group of researchers and in 1979 one of the major works on South African history 
since 1652 was published: The shaping of South African society 1652-1820.14 Despite 
its important contribution to the historiography of the Cape settlement one has to 
note that it was ‘remarkably‎peripherocentric’.15 It included more chapters on the 
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 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 274-275. 
11
 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 273-301. 
12
 G.J. Schutte, De Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën. Een onderzoek naar hun denkbeelden en 
optreden, 1770-1800 (Groningen 1974). 
13
 N.‎Worden,‎`New‎Approaches‎to‎VOC‎history‎in‎South‎Africa’,‎in:‎South African Historical Journal 59:1 
(2007), 3-18, 5. 
14
 H. Giliomee and R. Elphick (eds), The shaping of South African society 1652-1820 (Cape Town 1979). A 
revised and extended edition appeared in 1989: H. Giliomee and R. Elphick (eds), The shaping of South 














outer districts of the Cape than on the urban centre itself. This can be explained by 
considering the South African context where much emphasis was placed on the rule of 
white settlers over others and a lot of research was done on the history of groups like 
the slaves, the Khoi, the San, and other indigenous peoples, and the influence this had 
on South African society. Hand in hand with this development went the trend that not 
much attention was given to the urban environment of Cape Town itself, because 
more focus was placed on the rural areas and the frontiers of the Cape colony.16 Quite 
rightly Robert Ross asked the question: ‘can we understand the nature of frontier 
expansion, the reasons for the subjugation of the Khoisan, and especially the 
characteristics of Cape rural slavery, if we do not know a lot more about the economic, 
administrative and social core of the colony,‎which‎was‎located‎in‎Cape‎Town?’17  
 
The answer to this question came in the form of the Cape Town History Project 
launched in the 1990s, which focussed on the urban history of the “Mother City” and 
culminated in the publication of Cape Town. The making of a City.18 It furthermore 
became increasingly appreciated that although Cape Town was a small place it was 
also a city full of different people with diverse backgrounds, who classified themselves 
and each other in terms of gender, race, class, occupation, legal status, religion, 
nationality and many more criteria. All these varied classifications led to different 
hierarchies and networks, which were by no means coincident and resulted in a 
complex society. The Cape Town History Project was followed by the VOC Social 
Identities Project, which tried `to understand the complexities of Cape colonial society 
in a much more nuanced way’.19 
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 Other studies were published following this trend: R. Elphick, Kraal and Castle Khoikhoi and the 
founding of white South Africa (New Haven 1977); N. Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa (Cambridge 
1985); R. Shell, Children of bondage (Johannesburg 1994); S. Newton-King, Masters and servants on the 
Cape Eastern frontier, 1760-1803 (Cambridge 1999); N. Penn, The forgotten frontier: colonist and 
Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern frontier in the 18
th
 century (Cape Town 2005); W. Dooling, Slavery, 
emancipation and colonial rule in South Africa (Scottsville 2007) and L.J. Mitchell, Belongings. Property, 




 N. Worden, E. van Heyningen, V. Bickford-Smith, Cape Town. The making of a City (Cape Town 1998). 
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Despite the fundamental changes in the historiography of the Cape settlement in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Cape was generally still seen in isolation of 
the rest of the Dutch empire. It must be acknowledged that Beyers was one of the few 
Afrikaans historians who made the link between the happenings in the Cape and those 
in the Dutch Republic and made good use of Dutch historiography. He even went to 
the Netherlands during the 1920s to study his subject. However Beyers could for a long 
time be regarded as an exception and even the 1989 edition of the Shaping of South 
African Society only included two chapters which viewed the Cape in a wider context. 
Robert Ross writes about the Cape of Good Hope and the world economy and Gerrit 
Schutte about Company and colonists at the Cape. Schutte concluded his chapter with: 
`The settlement at the Cape was, after all, only one of the territories of the VOC, and 
the VOC formed part of the Republic of the United Netherlands. This means that Cape 
structures and events should be seen in the context of the Netherlands and of 
common Dutch colonial‎patterns.’20 This is a significant observation, because it simply 
will not do to deny the fact that by its position alone Cape Town was placed at the 
centre of the major parts of the Dutch seaborne empire in Europe, Asia and America. 
More and more this is now being realised and a major contribution made towards this 
development was made by the Contingent Lives conference in 2006 and the 
accompanying book which appeared in 2007.21  
 
Contingent Lives contains a number of notable examples of studies which look at the 
Cape less as an island but rather as part of larger and wider structures. In 2005 it was 
determined that The National Archives in London housed some 38,000 Dutch private 
and commercial letters from ordinary people based in places like Batavia, Colombo, 
Paramaribo and Cape Town. This find indicates that residents of various parts of the 
Dutch empire corresponded with each other and must have exchanged news and 
ideas. It means that we do not only have to rely on the official correspondence going 
back and forth between the Dutch Republic and the overseas settlements to form an 
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 G. Schutte, `Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795’,‎in:‎Elphick‎and‎Giliomee,‎The Shaping of 
South African Society, 283-323, 317. 
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idea of daily life in the overseas territories, while at the same time being able to make 
comparisons between the various settlements based on private letters.22  
 
A well-known addition to Cape society came at the end of the seventeenth century in 
the form of the immigration of a large group of French Huguenots. Maybe less familiar 
to South African historians is that the Huguenots also emigrated to North America. This 
opens the door to some intriguing comparisons. Thera Wijsenbeek concludes that the 
Huguenots lost their identity during the eighteenth century both in the American and 
Cape melting pots.23 
 
Only recently it has been established that increase in ship traffic on the Cape trade 
route definitely had a positive effect on the growth of the economy of the Cape 
settlement, most notably on wine and wheat farming close to Cape Town and the 
tertiary sector (accommodation of ship crews).24  
 
Particularly groundbreaking has been the work of Kerry Ward, who has placed Cape 
Town firmly in the ‘networks‎of‎empire’‎and‎shown‎how‎the‎slave‎trade,‎as well as 
religious and political exile and punitive transportation of people to and from the Cape 
had its influence on the shaping of status, religion and ethnicity in Cape Town.25  
 
These are just a few of the many links and comparisons that are now made between 
the Cape and other parts of the Dutch empire, and indeed other parts of the world, 
and  illustrate how the Cape was very much a part of international structures and 
events. It must be pointed out that various studies produced by historians on places 
like Batavia, Galle, Fort Cochin and New Netherland have made it possible to compare 
the Cape settlement to those in other parts of the Dutch empire and the world.26 The 
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 R.‎Van‎Gelder,‎`Letters,‎journals‎and‎seeds:‎Forgotten‎Dutch‎mail‎in‎the‎National‎Archives‎in‎London’,‎
in: Contingent lives, 538-545. 
23
 T. Wijsenbeek, `Identity lost: Huguenot refugees in the Dutch Republic and its former colonies in 
North America‎and‎South‎Africa,‎1650‎to‎1750:‎a‎comparison’,‎in:‎Contingent Lives, 91-109. 
24
 W.H. Boshoff and J. Fourie, `The significance of the Cape trade route to economic activity in the Cape 
colony: a medium-term‎business‎cycle‎analysis’,‎Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers 23/2008. 
25
 K. Ward, Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company (Cambridge 2009). 
26
 See for example comparative studies like: R.F. Betts, R. Ross and G.J. Telkamp (eds), Colonial cities: 












Cape was not isolated and the shaping of Cape and South African society and its 
residents was influenced by intercontinental configurations. 
 
Even though the work on Cape history by researchers is rich and diverse, there is still 
much focus on social groupings like slaves, convicts, free blacks and common VOC 
personnel (soldiers and sailors). There has been less interest in the elite of the Cape 
settlement, although admittedly the groups that formed part of this elite, the (free) 
burghers and the higher VOC officials, were not totally ignored. In the early 1980s 
studies about the Cape gentry by Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell and by Robert Ross 
appeared.27 Schutte wrote about the VOC personnel at the Cape in his above-
mentioned chapter in The Shaping. More recently exciting and important work has 
been done by Gerald Groenewald on the world of the burgher entrepreneurs in Cape 
Town and the complex network of relations which existed among them as well as 
between them and VOC officials. One of his findings is the importance of kinship and 
social capital to the creation of a burgher elite at the Cape.28 
 
This thesis has many elements of the recent trends described so far: it focuses on Cape 
Town and its elite groups and views events in the Cape in a wider, albeit mostly Dutch, 
context. There is a long tradition in the Netherlands of the study of the patriciate and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Indies: a history of creolisation and empire, 1500-1920 (Singapore 2000); L. Blusse, Visible cities. Canton, 
Nagasaki, and Batavia and the coming of the Americans (Cambridge, Massachusetts 2008); and J. 
Jacobs, Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1999). 
Then there are various studies on single settlements: J.G. Taylor, The social world of Batavia: European 
and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison 1983); L. Wagenaar, Galle, VOC-vestiging in Ceylon. Beschrijving 
van een koloniale samenleving aan de vooravond van de Singalese opstand tegen het Nederlands gezag, 
1760 (Amsterdam 1994); A. Singh, Fort Cochin in Kerala 1750-1830. The social condition of a Dutch 
community in an Indian milieu (Ph.D. thesis Leiden 2007); J. Venema, Beverwijck. A Dutch Village on the 
American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Hilversum 2003).  
27
 L. Guelke and R. Shell, `An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-
1731’,‎Journal of Historical Geography 9:3 (1983), 265-286;‎R.‎Ross,‎`The‎rise‎of‎the‎Cape‎Gentry’,‎
Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1983) 193-217. 
28
 G. Groenewald, `A Cape bourgeoisie?: Alcohol, entrepreneurs and the evolution of an urban free-
burgher‎society‎in‎VOC‎Cape‎Town’,‎in:‎Worden, Contingent Lives, 278-304; G. Groenewald, `An early 
modern entrepreneur: Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and the Creation of Wealth in Dutch Colonial Cape 
Town, 1702-1741’,‎in:‎Kronos: Southern African Histories 35 (2009), 7-31; G. Groenewald, Kinship, 
Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Alcohol Pachters and the Making of a Free-Burgher Society in Cape 












elite, the so-called regents (regenten), in Dutch cities.29 An enormous amount of 
research has been done and published from the 1980s onwards.30 There is also a 
considerable amount of material available on burghers and the concept of burgerschap 
in the Dutch Republic.31 The Dutch research has been used extensively by Ad Biewenga 
in his study about the Cape.32 Even though he is focused on the rural areas surrounding 
Cape Town, he shows that many Cape institutions and aspects of society were 
replicated from the Dutch Republic. As a Dutch historian he is well aware of the body 
of material available and used much of it as a source of comparison. With the veritable 
riches available it is difficult to understand why historians in South Africa generally 
show so little interest in these works and the application of the existing theories on the 
political and social history of Cape Town. A reason for this is likely the lack of 
familiarity with Dutch historiography and, perhaps more importantly, with the Dutch 
language, which is a barrier I do not have as a native Dutch speaker. 
 
It is my argument that, despite the many influences from the European, Asian and 
African worlds, Cape Town of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was 
essentially a Dutch city, especially with regards to the political-administrative 
organisation and institutions. This came about mainly because of the connections and 
similarities between members of the Cape elite and their counterparts in patria. 
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 This goes as far back as the early twentieth century with works as: J.E. Elias, De vroedschap van 
Amsterdam 1578-1795, 2 volumes (Haarlem 1903-1905) and P.D. de Vos, De vroedschap van Zierikzee 
(Middelburg 1931). 
30
 There are numerous studies of individual places and towns in the Dutch Republic. I can only list a few 
of these here: L. Kooijmans, Onder Regenten. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700-1780 
(Amsterdam 1985); J.J. de Jong, Met goed fatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Gouda 1700-1780 
(Amsterdam 1986); M. Prak, Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700-1780 
(Amsterdam 1986); J.C. Streng, Stemme in staat. De bestuurlijke elite in de stadsrepubliek Zwolle, 1579-
1795 (Hilversum 1997). A comprehensive bibliography is available on this website: 
http://home.tiscali.nl/~t845911/republic/regents.html (last accessed 7 October 2011). 
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The first section of this thesis sets out this argument by using the case study of the 
burgher protests which rocked the Cape at the end of the 1770s and early 1780s. 
Chapter 1 gives an overview of what happened during the turmoil in this period and 
introduces some of the main role-players. It furthermore illustrates in what way the 
protesting burghers placed themselves opposite the VOC administration and how they 
continuously emphasised their unique position as burghers and highlighted their 
burgher rights. 
 
The protesting burghers at the Cape certainly regarded themselves as being equivalent 
to burghers in Dutch cities. The background behind this reasoning and the question 
whether this is a justifiable standpoint is investigated in the second chapter. It 
examines the history of the position of cities and burghers in the Dutch Republic during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and shows their paramount importance to 
the political and social world of the Republic at the time. This is then related to other 
countries and parts of Europe. But more importantly connections are made between 
the way Dutch cities and overseas settlements were set up, not only in the physical 
sense, but more specifically in the way the overseas settlements became governed.  
 
Dutch administrative practices found their way all over the empire via the big Dutch 
trading companies, the West India Company (WIC) and the VOC. One of these was the 
institution of burgerschap, which was exported to New Netherland in America and to 
the Asian settlements. It is important to explore and establish how and to what extent 
Dutch burgerschap was used as a frame of reference by both administrators and 
burghers. This is done in various ways. Firstly the practical formalities surrounding 
burgerschap in Dutch cities and Cape Town are compared by looking at the various 
ways in which one could become a burgher, the actual burgher oath one had to swear, 
and the advantages one gained by becoming a burgher. Secondly the burghers need to 
be compared to other groups, e.g. free blacks, living in Cape Town in the eighteenth 
century. This should provide insights into the level of self-awareness and identity 
which existed among burghers, but also into the criteria used for access into the 
burgher group. In the Dutch Republic having burgerschap meant possessing a special 












position in Dutch society.‎This‎made‎one’s‎status‎more‎important‎than other criteria 
(e.g. individual position, class or race). The question is if Cape society in the eighteenth 
century, like Dutch society, was based on status rather than based on race as often is 
presumed.33 Lastly Cape burgerschap is compared to Dutch burgerschap according to 
the manner in which burgher protests were undertaken and how the authorities 
responded to it in the eighteenth century. The burghers in the Dutch Republic had over 
time developed a well- established manner of protesting. Similarities between the 
protest practices in Cape Town and cities in the Dutch Republic would further 
strengthen the argument that Cape Town was very much a Dutch city. 
 
This first part of the thesis deals more with the ideological side of the burgher protests 
of the late 1770s and seeks to determine whether the Cape burghers were indeed 
justified in taking the position that they were on par with burghers of Dutch cities. It 
cannot be denied that this is a significant part of the story of the burgher protests and 
the shaping of Cape burgher identity in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless one of 
my arguments is that the emphasis placed on the ideological motive of the protest 
movement in South African historiography has clouded the view on other intentions of 
the protesting burghers and aspects of Cape political and social life at the time. This is 
for the most part due to the historian Coenraad Beyers, whose study of the protest 
movement has remained largely unchallenged, and who labelled the protesters ‘Cape 
Patriots’.‎‎The‎opening‎lines‎of‎the‎second,‎extended‎edition‎of‎his‎work‎are: 
`The researcher of the history of the origins of the Afrikaner nation will 
especially find that his attention is involuntary captivated by the ongoing 
agitation and turmoil which is detected among a considerable portion of the 
colonists of South Africa during the last quarter of the 18th century; namely, 
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predominantly among those burghers who commonly called themselves 
Patriots.’34 
The first part of this remark - which is one of the central arguments of his book - that 
the burgher protests were the first stirrings of Afrikaner nationalism, will be 
commented on later. The second claim, that these protesting burghers called 
themselves Patriots35, is crucial to my research which aims to shed light on who these 
burghers actually were and what motivated them. There can be no doubt that Beyers 
argued that the Cape protesters were the same kind of Patriots as the Dutch ones and 
not some separate or different kind of Patriots. He made this clear when he quoted 
the Dutch historian Nicolas Japikse while commenting on his work: `The Cape also had 
its‎Patriot‎movement’.36 However there are several arguments which can be made 
against Beyers’‎claim. 
 
The timing of the Cape and Dutch protests was completely different. The Patriot 
Movement was a Dutch phenomenon which occurred in many cities in the Dutch 
Republic in the 1780s. It was essentially a protest movement of Dutch burghers against 
the position and centralist rule of the Stadholder, the Prince of Orange, and the 
oligarchy of regents. It pleaded for political reforms, more rights for the burghers and 
for a restoration of the local autonomy of the cities.37 Even though the unrest in the 
Dutch Republic had been brewing since the appointment of Willem V as Stadholder in 
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1747 and increased ever since, the Dutch Patriot Movement only started to become 
active after 1780, a fact on which most historians agree, placing it in the period 1781 
to 1787. Some link it to the start of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in December 1780, 
but more often the publication of the inflammatory pamphlet  ‘Aan het volk van 
Nederland’‎(‘To‎the‎people‎of‎the‎Netherlands’)‎in September 1781 is mentioned as 
the starting point. Then ‘After a period of politicization and initial mobilization 
primarily in opposition to the Prince of Orange (1782-1784), the Patriots only gradually 
radicalized their demands and challenged the old-regime‎oligarchy‎…‎(1784-1786)’.38 
The Cape protests began in 1778 and were therefore well underway by the time the 
uproar in the Netherlands really started.  
 
One of Beyers’‎arguments‎in‎favour of his argument that the Cape Patriots were 
associated to the Dutch Patriots was that the leaders of the Cape protesters linked up 
with prominent Patriots in the Netherlands and sought their support.39 However all the 
material he used to support this claim referred to the second delegation of Cape 
burghers, which was sent to the Dutch Republic in 1784 as response to the decision of 
the VOC Directors in 1783, and not to the first one. Also most comments made by 
contemporary Dutch publicists about the troubles at the Cape of Good Hope started to 
appear after 1783 and looked back in hindsight while trying to find similarities 
between the Cape protests of 1778/79 and what the Dutch Patriots stood for in the 
1780s.40 Beyers failed to note the significance of this. The Cape movement after 1783 
was a different one from the 1778/79 protests. Beyers examined the 1783 movement 
and may very well have been right in stating that it was inspired by the Dutch Patriots, 
but then he made the error of transplanting his findings to the earlier movement 
without really having anything to support this or making a proper comparison of the 
people involved in both protests. He regarded the protests from 1779 to the late 1780s 
as one ongoing movement. I argue that the burgher protests at the Cape came in two 
waves: the first one of 1778 had an economic character with different groupings 
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fighting for control, whereas the second one, which began in 1784, was indeed more 
ideological and therefore could more justifiably be named the Cape Patriot movement. 
 
In none of the documents, pamphlets, letters and requests, which they produced 
during the first years of the political turmoil at the Cape, did the burghers use the term 
“Patriots”‎to‎describe‎their‎movement.‎The‎first‎time‎one‎comes‎across‎the‎word‎
Patriots is in a letter from the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, Baron Joachim Van 
Plettenberg, to the Heeren XVII dated 1 April 1780 where he refers to the protesting 
burghers as ‘the so-called Patriots, or the actual disgruntled’.41 The next time is on 20 
March‎1781‎in‎the‎Governor’s‎official‎response‎to‎the‎burgher‎complaints: ‘that those 
residents of this settlement, who have showed their dissatisfaction for a while now, 
appropriated the honourable name of Patriots’.42 Van Plettenberg clearly was unhappy 
that the protesters dared to call themselves patriots. This is somewhat surprising, 
because it would assist his cause if the Cape protesters were similar to Dutch Patriots, 
who fought against everything that he represented as nobleman and regent. He was 
after all a high official of the VOC and appointed in that position by the 
‘opperbewindhebber’‎(supreme‎governor)‎of‎the‎Company, the Stadholder Willem V. 
The Governor would have wanted to portray the protesters in a negative light and 
being like a Dutch Patriot would assist his argument. Yet he used the words 
“honourable”‎and‎“Patriots”‎in‎the‎same‎sentence and therefore must have thought it 
was something positive. It is thus more probable that he used the term in the meaning 
of‎one‎who‎loves‎and‎supports‎one’s‎country and did not refer to the Dutch political 
protest movement. In contrast to Beyers’‎claims, the Cape protesters of 1778/79 never 
called themselves or were called Patriots in the meaning of the Dutch protesters of the 
1780s. 
 
Lastly, the Cape protesters of the 1770s seemed more likely to be against the Dutch 
Patriots and it was Beyers himself who illustrated this point. He described how the 
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troubles at the Cape started in May 1778 when mysterious packets appeared one 
morning in the streets of Cape Town.43 The packets contained a letter, which accused 
the VOC administration at the Cape of trampling on the rights of the burghers and 
called on them to defend these rights.  The letter was accompanied by a pamphlet 
entitled ‘De magt en de vrijheden eener Burgerlijke Maatschappij verdedigt door de 
gevoelens der voornaamste Regtsgeleerden, opgedraagen aan ‘t oordeel der Caabsche 
Burgerij’ or ‘The power and the liberties of a civil society defended by the foremost 
legal‎minds,‎consigned‎to‎the‎judgment‎of‎the‎Cape‎burghers’.44 Beyers explained that 
this pamphlet was practically word for word copied from a work which first appeared 
in the Dutch Republic in 1754 entitled ‘Het Gedrag der Stadhoudersgezinden verdedigt 
door Mr. A. V. K. Rechtsgeleerden’ or ‘The behaviour of the supporters of the 
Stadholder,‎defended‎by‎Mr.‎A.‎V.‎K.,‎lawyer’.45 This was written by the lawyer, printer, 
publisher and writer Elie Luzac, who was an outspoken supporter of the Orange 
Stadholder.46 The pamphlet maintained that if it so happens that the people were not 
satisfied with their situation they could appeal to their government to redress the 
state of affairs, but this had to be done in a lawful and legal manner. Significantly it 
ended with the burghers reserving the right to present their case directly to ‘the 
honourable gentlemen of the States General of the United Netherlands, who are, next 
to God, the only ones we recognise as our sovereigns, and in particular His Royal 
Highness’ and with the motto of the United Netherlands: ‘Eendragt maakt magt’‎(in‎
unity is strength).47 The contents of these publications made it clear that the Cape 
protesters had nothing in common with the aims of the Dutch Patriots. On the 
contrary, they were anti-Patriot in the sense that they recognised the authority of the 
Stadholder and the sovereignty of the central political bodies of the Dutch Republic – 
as opposed to the independence of local governments. Yet even though Beyers was 
well aware that the pamphlet was copied from the Orangist Luzac, nowhere in his 
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study did he acknowledge the implications for the political views of the burgher 
protesters of 1778/79, namely that these were not based on Patriot principles. 
 
The Cape protesters were not Dutch Patriots or Cape Patriots. Then why was Beyers so 
adamant that they were? Beyers was guided in his views by his over-arching desire to 
see the burgher protests as the first stirrings of Afrikaner nationalism. His view was 
that just as the Dutch Patriots stood up to, what they considered to be, an oppressive 
regime, did the Cape burghers, as forerunners of the Afrikaners, oppose the tyrannical 
colonial rulers. Beyers left no doubt about this claim as he concluded: 
`This way of thinking at the Cape became most apparent among those burghers 
who chose to call themselves Patriots. It is also among them that we discover a 
pure unfolding of the national consciousness which saluted South Africa as its 
own, beloved fatherland. We further note that from among their ranks later the 
noble person of Piet Retief and even later the unforgettable son of South Africa, 
the State president of the former South African Republic, Stephanus Johannes 
Paulus Kruger, emerge.’48 
 
Another historian who discussed the Cape burgher protests was George Frederickson, 
who did so in his comparative study of white supremacy in America and South Africa.49 
On the one hand he suggested that the protesters might have been influenced by the 
enlightened views of the American Revolution and the natural right of burghers to 
stand up against their government if it failed to carry out its duty, which ideas were 
part and parcel of the Dutch Patriot movement. But he also stated that the demands 
made by the burghers in 1779 were nothing more than ‘a catalogue of practical 
complaints and proposals that amounted primarily to a demand for free trade as a 
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cure for economic privation’.‎He‎acknowledged that the Cape burghers, especially 
those who travelled to the Netherlands to plead the burgher cause, may have been 
influenced by the ‘new language of democratic rights and popular sovereignty’, but at 
the same time he was ‘doubtful if such notions penetrated deeply into the 
consciousness of the ordinary burghers at the Cape’.‎Despite‎his‎misgivings‎he‎still‎
used the‎label‎“Cape‎Patriot‎movement”‎to‎describe‎the‎burgher‎protests. 
 
In his biography of the Afrikaner people Herman Giliomee described the turmoil at the 
Cape as ‘the struggle of the Cape Patriots between 1778 and 1787, which in turn drew 
inspiration from the Patriot movement in the Netherlands during this period’.50 
Giliomee followed in the footsteps of Beyers by treating the burgher protests of the 
late 1770s and those of the 1780s as if they were all part of the same movement, by 
linking them to the Dutch Patriots, and by labelling the whole movement as “Cape‎
Patriots”.‎His argument is weakened when he makes the mistake of quoting from a 
‘1784 document of the Cape Patriots’,‎which‎actually‎was‎produced‎by‎a‎group‎of‎
wealthy farmers among whom was Hendrik Cloete, who was candid about his loathing 
of the protesting burghers and was anything but a Cape Patriot.51 Then, despite 
Giliomee depicting the Cape protesters as having grand ideals and aims, he stated that 
‘although they quoted from or circulated documents by Enlightenment thinkers, the 
Cape Patriots were preoccupied with local concerns’.52  
 
The Cape protesters as described by these historians emerge as a group of burghers in 
two minds. On the one hand they credit them with lofty ideals and on the other they 
claim that their demands were mundane and down to earth. This divergence stemmed 
from‎the‎need‎of‎wanting‎to‎show‎the‎“Cape‎Patriot”‎movement‎as‎the‎embryonic 
beginning of Afrikaner nationalism. Giliomee ended his section on the Patriots with the 
words: `It was here that the model of a racially exclusive white burgher community 
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with special political and social privileges crystallized’.53 But it is impossible to marry 
the dawn of Afrikaner nationalism with the straightforward demands of the Cape 
burgher protesters, because they were completely different movements, which will 
become clearer in the second part of my thesis. The outcome of trying to force two 
different matters together is this contradictory view on the burgher protests. The 
‘Patriot’‎label‎introduced‎by‎Beyers‎and‎the‎excessive‎prominence given to the 
ideological arguments of the protesting burghers must be regarded as fundamentally 
flawed. In this thesis the protesters are therefore named precisely what they were: 
protesters. 
 
A feature of labels is that they tend to stick - useful in most cases, but unfortunate in 
this‎one.‎Since‎the‎appearance‎of‎Beyers’‎work‎the‎burgher‎protests‎of‎the‎late‎1770s‎
and beyond have been lumped together and consistently labelled in South African 
historiography‎as‎“The Cape Patriot movement”‎without‎much‎questioning by 
historians. Furthermore, because of the highlighting of the‎‘Patriot’‎label a simplified 
picture of this political conflict has often been presented in South African 
historiography. The protests were reduced to a struggle between two clear-cut parties, 
burghers and VOC, and have been described as a fight for the rights of burghers 
against an autocratic and absolute VOC government. This was certainly the case in the 
earlier mentioned work of Frederickson and Giliomee.54 In his chapter in the Shaping 
of South African Society Gerrit Schutte discussed the protest movement of the late 
1770s as one of the conflicts between ‘freeburghers‎and‎VOC‎officials’‎and‎described 
the protest leaders as a ‘colonial elite that came into conflict with officials from 
abroad’.55 More recently Yvonne Brink wrote about the role Afrikaans played ‘in 
empowering the burghers and thus enabling them to resort to overt action against 
VOC oppression in a rebellion known as the Patriotbeweging’.56 The consequence of 
this basic and uncomplicated view on the burgher protests is that the role-players, 
                                                          
53
 Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 57. 
54






VOC‎rule’,‎in:‎Worden, Contingent lives,.414-427, 426. See also Y. Brink, They came to stay. Discovering 
meaning in the 18
th












both the protesters as well as the ruling elite, have not been studied in detail.57 Even 
Coenraad Beyers did not go much further than a short description of the ‘men at the 
top of the Burgher movement’.58 Other South African historians have not done better 
since then.  
 
The second part of this thesis therefore seeks to research the people and groups 
involved in the protests in detail. While the first section deals with the comparison of 
administrative institutions and burgerschap between Dutch cities and Cape Town and 
seeks to illustrate that Cape Town was a Dutch city in many respects, the second part 
aims to show that the parallels ran deeper and went further in the sense that the 
resulting political practice was also similar. This is based on the argument that the 
burgher protests of the late 1770s were an expression of long established Dutch 
customs and practices of political rule and conflict and thus more a fight between 
factions than purely an ideological uprising against the VOC administration. More 
down to earth political-economic motives were behind the protests. 
 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Dutch cities were governed by regents, 
who formed networks of power in order to stay in control. These networks, or factions, 
functioned through a give-and-take exchange between patron and clients and were 
founded predominantly on kinship relations. There often were disputes between 
factions for political control of the cities and the regents then called on their clientele 
of burghers for support. The system of patrimonial rule and faction conflict is 
introduced in chapter 3.59  
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That the Cape was no stranger to the Dutch way of political life is demonstrated by the 
story of the W.A. van der Stel affair which took place at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. The administration of Governor Willem Adriaan van der Stel was 
an almost typical example of patrimonial rule. He built networks based on family links 
and mutual interests and to a large extent abused his power, but thought nothing of it 
because he had an ingrained sense of entitlement as a regent. The resulting conflict 
has been described by Hermann Giliomee as ‘a feud between two sets of elites who 
had‎fallen‎out‎in‎a‎fight‎over‎the‎spoils’.60 And in his description of the Van Der Stel 
affair Nigel Penn several times named the opposing parties the ‘Van der Stel‎faction’‎
and the ‘anti-Van‎der‎Stel‎faction’.61  
 
Networks were operational throughout Cape society and not restricted to the political 
world. Danelle van Zyl describes how the faction and clientele system featured in the 
personal letters written by Cape residents at the end of the eighteenth century. They 
were careful to cultivate their networks based on personal and especially familial 
relationships. They had no hesitation in offering and seeking reciprocal favours via 
their networks.62 
 
Because this was the accepted norm in the eighteenth century it is all the more 
surprising that this has not received more attention. Despite his above-mentioned 
view on the Van Der Stel affair, Giliomee continued to describe the conflict mainly in 
terms of an uprising of burghers against VOC officials. Some historians will concede 
that other eighteenth century political conflicts at the Cape had elements of a faction 
fight.63 But yet when they get to the protests of the 1770s they‎fall‎back‎on‎Beyers’‎
view that these were a case of a suppressed burgher minority fighting in unison against 
the VOC for political liberation and democratic rights. It would make more historical 
sense to assume that the well-established political routine of Dutch and Cape history 
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would continue throughout the eighteenth century and accordingly to also regard the 
conflict of the 1770s as a faction dispute. 
 
To be able to determine if this was indeed the case, it is necessary to examine the role-
players in the political turmoil in closer detail. The manner in which this is done is 
described from chapter 3 onwards. Fortunately the protesters themselves are easily 
identifiable because of a protest petition signed by 404 burghers in May 1779. These 
protesters need to be compared to the rest of the burgher population of 1779, so that 
certain questions about their background, relationships and circumstances can be 
answered. There is no burgher list available for this period and therefore one was 
compiled using primary sources available in the Western Cape Archives and Record 
Service in Cape Town. This has led to the building of a database of burghers living in 
the Cape District (and to some extent also the Stellenbosch District) between roughly 
1773 and 1785. The database provides all kinds of information on the burghers – from 
personal data to facts about their occupation, possessions, administrative and militia 
functions - and is used to perform a prosopography of the burghers involved in the 
protests. With the help of the database chapter 3 determines the size of the group of 
protesters in relation to the rest of the burgher population, and draws conclusions on 
the social and economic status of the protesters. Members of the VOC administration 
tried to portray the protesting burghers as a small, unimportant, lowly and 
misinformed section of the burgher population and it would be appropriate to see if 
the actual data support this notion. A further reason is that according to the Dutch 
experience of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries burgher protests were largely 
undertaken by burghers from the higher and middle strata and not exclusively by the 
lower ranked people. If Cape Town was a Dutch city, as has been discussed in the first 
part of the thesis, it could very well follow that the Cape protests likewise involved 
higher ranking burghers. 
 
The final three chapters seek to substantiate the above claim by looking in detail at 
some major actors in the protests: the Burgher Councillors, the burgher militia and the 
burgher entrepreneurs. The institutions and functions of the Burgher Councillors and 












will be discussed is the importance of these institutions for the shaping of burgher 
identity. Particular attention will be given to the important aspect of patrimonial rule. 
The individual backgrounds and alliances of the Burgher Councillors and officers of the 
burgher militia will be identified and examined in detail resulting in the emergence of 
an intriguing and highly developed complex of networks based largely on family 
connections. The question whether this also meant that opposing factions were 
instrumental in the conflict is a vital aspect of this investigation. All the Burgher 
Councillors and militia officers belonged to the most prominent section of burgher 
society and greatly depended on the goodwill of the VOC government. Assuming that 
some of them were indeed at the forefront of the protest movement, then the 
question why they chose to oppose that same government will need to be answered. 
 
The chapter on the burgher entrepreneurs tries to dig deeper into the motives behind 
the burgher protests. It discusses various kinds of entrepreneurs, both those based in 
the rural areas surrounding Cape Town as well as in the city itself, like meat pachters, 
wine farmers, alcohol pachters, bakers and smiths. My argument is that as 
businessmen this group of wealthy farmers and urban based traders and craftsmen 
was unlikely to be driven by lofty liberation ideals (with which the Cape protesters 
were often credited), but far more by their own personal business interests, while 
exploiting a general feeling of f ustration among burghers. This finding would make the 
two conflicts on opposite ends of the eighteenth century - the W.A. van der Stel affair 
and the burgher protests of the late 1770s - in actual fact very similar fights between 
two factions for economic and political control. Even Governor Van Plettenberg had to 
admit this was probably the case when he shed his light on the true reasons for the 
burgher protests, which were according to him: `the overbearing views of some, and 
the self interest of others, while playing on the dissatisfaction with, and the aversion to 
some Company Servants, which has smouldered for some time and has captivated the 
feelings of many Residents.’64 
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Cape Town was not an island, but an integral part of the Dutch empire. Even though it 
was in many respects a cosmopolitan city, the major Dutch influence on its 
administration and residents during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cannot 
be underestimated. This thesis uses the political unrest of the late 1770s as a case 
study to draw lines of comparison between Dutch and Cape burgerschap and burgher 
identity (chapters 1 & 2). The Dutch background and history had consequences for the 
way politics were practised at the Cape. Governor Van Plettenberg has not received 
many positive reviews as governor of the Cape. As a result of the burgher protests he 
is seen as an administrator who did not control his officials properly and handled the 
unrest with little fortitude. The above quote however displays that he had a good 
insight into the political scene of the Cape. He realised that people and their 
relationships, which were often based on personal interest, had more impact on the 
Cape political landscape than ideological rhetoric. This aspect of the burgher protests 
is investigated in the remainder of the thesis, which focuses on the role of factions in 
the burgher protests. First the protesters are compared to the general burgher 
population (chapter 3) and then some of the main role-players are closely examined 
(chapters 4, 5 and 6). In‎the‎end‎we‎may‎agree‎with‎Van‎Plettenberg’s‎view‎on‎the‎
political conflict and conclude that it was all about people fighting for the spoils. In that 
sense the burgher protest of the late 1770s followed the pattern of similar tumultuous 












1.  The burgher protests 
 
During a May night in 1778 a number of packages containing a letter and a pamphlet 
were distributed in the streets of Cape Town.1 The pamphlet2 argued that it was the 
highest duty of every individual to improve the welfare of himself and his fellow 
human beings to the best of his ability and knowledge. A government was an 
instrument in the hands of the people designed with the specific purpose to achieve 
this goal. The government was supposed to look after and improve the general well-
being of the population and safeguard the individual liberty to enable every member 
of society to look after his own interests. But it did not mean that, just because this 
task was delegated to the government, the individual could relinquish his 
responsibilities. The people would have to make sure at all times that the government 
executed its given tasks properly. Should this not be the case and ‘when a nation sees 
its citizens deteriorate and decay and be submitted to the most extreme danger, all 
signs of a bad delivery, and everybody is being hurt, a total destruction is sure to 
follow’3, then the people had the right and duty to stand up and protest. This should 
not happen in a violent manner, but follow the laws and rules of state and country.  
 
The letter accused employees of the ruling Dutch East India Company (VOC) of running 
businesses and shops and owning farms, which were in direct competition with those 
of burghers. It was a practice which was a contravention of the orders of the Company 
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dating back to 17064. This was much to the detriment of the burgher trade, because 
these Company servants used their positions and privileges to squeeze out the 
burghers and position themselves as ‘Masters of the Trade’.5 The burgher businesses 
suffered greatly and many burghers lost their source of income and had no other 
choice than to look for financial support from church and charity. This situation clearly 
went ‘against the will of the Company and the privileges granted to us’.6 The burghers 
were called to stand up and defend their rights, and ‘Those who will be the most 
zealous in this matter will earn our respect and esteem, and will be named protector of 
the Burgher Liberties’.7 The documents concluded with an appeal to the Cape burghers 
to sign a petition in which the Governor and the administration were asked to address 
the adverse conditions for the burghers. Should that not have the desired effect then 
the burghers would look for recourse from higher authorities and present their case 
directly to the Dutch States General and the Stadholder ‘who are, next to God, the only 
ones we recognise as our sovereigns’.8 
 
Government officials were shocked at the content of these documents, which were ‘so 
full of malicious and rebellious language that one had to regard it as the filthiest libel’.9 
At the time they did not discover who was behind the distribution of the pamphlets. It 
was not until 5 February 1795 that some clarity was obtained about this, when a letter 
appeared in newspapers in Amsterdam. This letter was written by Johannes Henricus 
Redelinkhuijs and in it he made an extraordinary statement. He claimed that he had 
been ‘the instrument of the first Revolution in my native Country’‎in 1779 together with 
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Barend Hendrik Taute.10 What did he mean by that and why did he not write 1778? To 
answer these questions it needs to be pointed out that Redelinkhuijs published two 
versions of his pamphlet. The first one was in Dutch and in this version the year of 
Redelinkhuijs’‎involvement‎in‎the‎burgher‎protests‎was‎printed‎as‎1779.‎A‎few‎weeks‎
after the Dutch version an English translation of the letter was published and there the 
year of his involvement was given as 1787.11 That was a big difference and the year 
1787 definitely seemed out of place. The confusion can be explained by the fact that in 
the English version a printing error was made and the last two numbers of the year 
were mistakenly turned around. Thus it actually meant to read: 1778. Redelinkhuijs 
may have wanted to correct the year of his involvement in the English translation, but 
unfortunately a new mistake was made. If that is indeed the case then his claim about 
being the instrument of the first revolution begins to make sense, because he may 
have wanted to indicate that he was behind the distribution of the (rather 
inflammatory) documents in May 1778. 
 
This is substantiated by the fact that in June 1778 several secret burgher meetings 
were organised in Cape Town. One of the conveners of these meetings was Barend 
Hendrik Taute, of whom a personal invitation has been recorded in the collection of 
documents regarding the Cape burgher protests.12 Taute invited the burghers to a 
gathering held on 24 June 1778 in the garden Domburg belonging to one Jacob 
Schreuder13, where about two hundred burghers met ‘to discuss measures to be taken 
to protect their burgher rights’.14  
 
Indications are that Redelinkhuijs and Taute worked together to start some kind of 
“revolutionary”‎movement‎at‎the‎Cape‎in 1778. Judging by the pamphlet distributed 
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by them in May 1778, their movement had an ideological character and was motivated 
by a desire to protect burgher rights. In 1795 Redelinkhuijs still had the same opinions 
when he wrote his letter to the Cape burghers‎and‎called‎on‎them‎to‎‘break the chains 
by which you have been tied down ever since the beginning of the Colony’.15 But their 
revolutionary tendencies did not resonate with the Cape burghers at all and most did 
not agree with the two men. A high-placed Company official commented that because 
‘the opinions among them [the burghers] were at the time divided these meetings were 
severely disrupted’.16 Apparently not all the burghers agreed on the course to follow 
and the movement seemed to lose momentum. Nothing concrete resulted from the 
meetings and the government thought that the burgher efforts had come to naught. 
The Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, Baron Joachim van Plettenberg, reported to 
his superiors, the Heeren XVII, that these ‘unusual gatherings gradually stopped and 
we thought that peace and quiet had returned’.17 The government and the Cape 
settlement settled back into their normal routine until in January 1779 a violent 
incident disturbed the supposed calm and laid bare the essence of the difference of 
opinion about burgher status and rights between burghers and the administration. 
 
At the centre of the commotion was the ‘beast‎of‎the‎Bokkeveld’18, the burgher Carel 
Hendrik Buijtendag, a man with a bad reputation and violent temper, who, after many 
years of conflict and argument with neighbours and authorities, was banished from the 
Stellenbosch district to Cape Town where in February 1777 he bought a house and a 
plot. It could be that ‘the transition from Bokkeveld farmer to Cape Town burgher [was 
not] an easy one for Buijtendag and he must have taken out some of his frustrations 
on‎his‎wife‎and‎children’19 and possibly also on other town residents. When eventually 
his wife laid a complaint against him on 5 or 6 January 1779 the Independent Fiscal 
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decided that enough was enough. He brought the case before the Political Council on 
20 January and requested that Buijtendag, because of his ‘continuous improper 
behaviour’20, be taken into Company service and banished from the Cape. The Council 
agreed and decided that Buijtendag should be arrested, recruited as a soldier into 
Company service and sent to Batavia. Boers wasted no time in executing the 
sentence.21 The same day the geweldiger22 Hendrik Matthijsen appeared on the 
Buijtendag doorstep and demanded that Buijtendag come with him to the Fiscal. 
Buijtendag was not at home at the time and the geweldiger left. However the two men 
ran into each other in town and Buijtendag promised that he would go to the Fiscal, 
but he first wanted to go home to change and have something to eat. While Buijtendag 
was enjoying his lunch, Matthijsen again came to his house and this time he was not 
prepared to listen to any more excuses. He grabbed Buijtendag, threw him violently 
against the floor and ordered his Caffers23 to tie him up. They then dragged Buijtendag 
through the streets of Cape Town to the harbour accompanied by his wailing 
daughters, while ‘his hands were tied and the Caffers ushed, shoved and punched 
him’.24 Buijtendag was placed on board the ship Honcoop, which left for Batavia that 
same day. 
 
Upon hearing about Buijtendag’s arrest the Burgher Councillors - Cornelis van der Poel, 
Christiaan George Maasdorp and Gerrit Hendrik Meijer - immediately went to see 
Governor Van Plettenberg to protest against his ill-treatment.25 They pointed out to 
the Governor that Buijtendag was ‘a burgher by birth’26 and by virtue of that status he 
was not allowed to be treated in such a violent manner, certainly not by the Caffers, 
who were Company employees and not burgher law enforcement. His privileged 
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position and honour as a burgher was severely compromised. They furthermore 
claimed that the Burgher Councillors should have been consulted about the decision 
by the Political Council, because this case involved a burgher. But the Governor 
countered that the Cape burgerschap grant contained as one of its conditions that a 
burgher could be taken back into Company service if he misbehaved. The Company 
therefore acted well within its rights. Buijtendag was no longer a burgher, but now a 
Company servant and subject to the rules of the Company. The Burgher Councillors 
warned that this set of events would lead to great unrest among the burgher 
population. Van der Poel stated that ‘what had happened to Buijtendag today, could 
happen to somebody else, even to him, tomorrow’27, pointing out the complete 
arbitrariness that the burghers were subjected to by the Cape government. None of 
the arguments persuaded the Governor and the Burgher Councillors left without 
achieving anything. 
 
Governor Van Plettenberg later had to admit that the Burgher Councillors had been 
right. The arrest of Buijtendag led to renewed commotion among the burgher 
population.28 Again meetings were organised, but this time the movement seemed to 
be more widespread and it reached further than just Cape Town. On 30 March 1779 
the Burgher Councillors and the Heemraden of the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein 
District, with the backing of some 400 burghers, submitted a request to the Governor 
and Political Council. They asked for permission to send a delegation of burghers to the 
Dutch Republic to ‘present the condition of the burghers of this colony and the violence 
caused to the burgher Carel Hendrik Buijtendag, which had violated the rights of the 
burghers’‎to‎the‎directors‎of‎the‎VOC.29 In their answer to the burgher request of 
March 1779, the Governor and Political Council pointed out they were surprised that 
the burghers wanted to bypass the chain of command and go directly to the Directors 
with their complaints. After all, they were the appointed government of the Cape, 
which was there to look after the interests of the entire population and any grievance 
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should be addressed to them first. And even if there was anything that they could not 
deal with, then it was still only up to them and nobody else to refer the matter to the 
higher authorities. The request was subsequently denied.30 
 
But the burgher movement was at full steam and unstoppable. The request was 
followed by a petition - dated 7 May 1779 and signed by 404 burghers - to send a 
delegation of four people to Holland ‘to submit to the judgment of the Lords Directors 
the current disputes and the concerns of the burghers as well as the fair accusations 
against the government and certain other people’.31 The four people elected to 
represent the burghers were the former Burgher Councillor Jacobus van Reenen, the 
former Lieutenant in the burgher militia Barend Jacob Artoijs, and the burghers 
Tieleman Roos and Nicolaas Godfried Heijns. 
 
At the time nobody was allowed to leave the Cape and travel to Holland without 
permission of the government. Therefore the four delegates had to inform the Political 
Council of their travel plans and ask for passage on one of the ships returning to 
Holland. Each of the delegates submitted their own separate requests.  
 
Barend Jacob Artoijs had asked to be relieved of his burgher duties and for his 
resignation as Lieutenant of the burgher Cavalry as early as 1 December 1778, because 
he wished to return to Holland in the following year. He gave no specific reason for his 
trip. The Political Cou cil granted his request and gave him permission to travel on one 
of‎the‎Company’s‎return‎ships‎for‎the‎normal‎fee.32 
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For Tieleman Roos the matter was more problematic. He asked the Political Council 
permission to go to Holland on 19 January 1779. He stated that he had recently started 
to plant tobacco and he wanted to take a few specimens to Holland to get the opinion 
of some experts, while at the same time trying to gain knowledge on how to prepare 
the tobacco.33 The Political Council however replied that they were aware that 
Tieleman Roos was a troublemaker in the parish of Drakenstein and one of the people, 
‘who continuously fans the fire of discord in that parish’.34 The Council thought that the 
tobacco story was just a cover-up and he would go to Holland to take his issues with 
the Drakenstein church council to the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church and 
maybe even the Directors. Therefore they refused his request. On 6 April 1779 Roos 
tried again to get permission to go to Holland. This time he solemnly swore that he 
would not go to the Church authorities with any issues concerning the Drakenstein 
parish, nor would he make trouble ‘about other matters concerning the Colony’.35 After 
he made this promise the Council had no further valid reason to refuse his request. 
 
Jacobus Van Reenen en Nicolaas Godfried Heijns asked for consent to travel overseas 
on 13 April 1779 in separate requests without offering a specific explanation for their 
trip and both were given permission to do so.36  
 
The delegates did their best not to raise any suspicion about the main reason they 
were travelling to Holland. As was apparent from the case of Tieleman Roos, 
permission to travel was not automatic and if they were known to be rabble-rousers 
the administration would surely have refused their requests. Based on the provided 
information the Political Council had no choice but to allow the delegates to leave the 
Cape.  However the members of the administration were not ignorant of what was 
going on and suspected ulterior motives. Therefore the Governor wrote a letter to the 
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Directors on 22 May 1779 about the agitation among the burgher population and his 
misgivings regarding their plans.37 
 
Eventually the delegates made it to Holland. Artoijs left the Cape on 3 March 1779 on 
board the Amsterdam, which arrived in Holland on 3 July 1779.38 The other three 
sailed together on the Morgenster. Once in Holland the delegates first made sure that 
they were officially recognised as representatives of the Cape burghers by handing 
over the proof of their election as delegates - the petition of 7 May 1779 – to mayor 
Temminck of Amsterdam, who submitted this to the VOC Chamber of Amsterdam on 
27 September 1779 to have it recorded.39 The four men then set out to prepare their 
Memorie to be presented ‘at the meeting of the Seventeen in Amsterdam’40 and 
finalised it on 9 October 1779. On 12 October they submitted it with supporting 
material to a notary public in Amsterdam, Kier Van Der Piet, and the next day they 
swore an oath to the truth of these documents before the town council of the City of 
Amsterdam. After all these formalities the big day arrived on 16 October 1779: finally 
the four delegates appeared in person in the meeting of the Heeren XVII. They 
informed the meeting that they had come ‘to expose the miserable state of the Colony 
and the maltreatment of the burghers by certain Company servants’.41 They presented 
the Directors with ‘a bulky Memorial and appendices’.42 
 
In the introduction to the Memorie the Cape delegates wrote that ‘as representatives 
of the entire burgher population’‎*of‎the‎Cape‎of‎Good‎Hope+43 they wished to set out 
to the Directors firstly the ‘legitimate complaints about the deteriorating state of the 
burghers and free colonists and [secondly] the fair objections against the oppression 
and illegal trade of certain Company servants’44; and lastly they wanted to propose to 
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the Directors ‘the best and most necessary means to improve the situation’.45 
Accordingly the Memorie consisted of three parts.46  
 
The document started with a description of the adverse economic situation of the 
burghers at the Cape.47 The fertility of the soil at the Cape had enabled the farmers to 
produce enough grain, wine and other produce to supply the Cape settlement and the 
ships of the Company as well as to fulfil the demand from Batavia. The prices for their 
produce paid by the Company were good and costs relatively low. Farming proved to 
be a profitable business and more and more burghers went into agriculture, so that it 
spread quickly from Cape Town and surrounds far into the outer districts. After a while 
the Company began to lower prices paid for agricultural produce. The farmers were 
not concerned about this in the beginning, because they were promised that all their 
produce would be bought. However these conditions changed. The demand from 
Batavia diminished, the costs of material increased, and the number of farmers kept 
growing. Besides all this there were unstable trade circumstances. These were better 
when a lot of foreign vessels visited the Cape, but declined when there was no such 
trade. And while the prices paid for farm produce decreased further, the Company 
demanded a high tax.  
 
The burghers in Cape Town itself made their living from trade. They sold agricultural 
and fresh produce to passing ships and bought European and Indian goods from the 
sailors, which in turn they sold to the residents in town and the farmers in the outer 
districts. Company employees were supposed to leave to the burghers ‘this way of 
making a living as a privilege’.48 This was according to instructions of the Directors 
issued in 1706: no Company servant was allowed to engage in trade of grain, cattle or 
wine. They had to be satisfied with their salaries and could not interfere with the 
privileges of the free burghers. The Memorie pointed out that despite these orders 
there were several powerful VOC officials, who dominated the most profitable trade 
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with the passing ships while using their influence and access to warehouses, boats and 
slaves of the Company. The burghers were then forced to buy the most essential goods 
from these officials against high and unaffordable prices. The VOC officials took the 
bread out of the mouth of the burghers and this meant that ‘they will be reduced to 
extreme poverty’.49 
 
The Memorie continued: ‘the signs of the state of decay of the free colonists are 
evident’.50 In the town many houses were standing empty, because two or three 
families were forced to move in with each other. In the country many farmers pulled 
out of agriculture and started to try their hand at cattle-farming. They moved further 
from Cape Town and lived under harsh and dangerous conditions, while they eked out 
a meagre living from the supply of cattle for slaughter and the sale of butter and soap. 
From their little earnings they had to pay a high rental for their farms to the Company 
and prices for their material soared. The situation had grave consequences. The 
farmers hardly had money to feed and clothe their families. Many families shared one 
dwelling and pooled their earnings and costs. The children did not get a good 
education, because the parents could not af ord proper teachers. Perhaps one of the 
worst results, according to the burghers, was that the young men had to remain 
unmarried ‘or dwell with the Hottentots and this mixing will lead to an offspring which 
should be feared more than the Bosjesmans Hottentots are now’.51  
 
Thus the Memorie presented a picture of declining trade leading to a surplus of 
produce, and low prices in combination with high costs which were determined by the 
Company. These conditions lead to increasing poverty and growing discontent among 
the burgher population. Whether the conditions described by the protesting burghers 
in their Memorie were as bad as they portrayed will be commented on in chapter 6. 
For the moment what needs to pointed out is that there was an apparent perception 
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that things were bad among some burghers and the resulting disgruntlement could 
very well have fuelled the protest fires. 
 
The dire economic situation was exacerbated by the oppression and undesirable 
behaviour of certain Company servants, according to the Memorie, and that was the 
topic of the second part of the document. This section consisted of 16 articles in which 
the burghers complained about several VOC officials, who abused their position to 
harm the burgher population.52 The writers made a point of stating that they wanted 
to avoid being accused of jealousy or personal gripes, but that they exposed these 
Company servants ‘forced by the utmost distress and out of love for their fatherland 
and fellow burghers’.53 They undertook to present the plain and simple truth and 
refrain from abusive remarks. 
 
It is noteworthy that the burghers did not say anything about Governor Van 
Plettenberg. In none of the protest documents he was accused of any wrongdoing. 
This could be attributed to the fact that the burghers thought rather positively about 
him. In the letter which was distributed in Cape Town in May 1778 he was referred to 
‘as a gentleman who is known to be polite and friendly and who will surely do his duty 
and give us satisfaction’.54 It is however more likely that not criticising the Governor 
might have been a strategic move on the part of the protesters. He was after all the 
personification of the Company and the highest representative of the Heeren XVII, the 
governing board of the VOC, and to offend him would certainly not have helped the 
case of the protesters. It is furthermore an indication that the protesters wanted to 
show that they had no intention to overturn the government of the Company, which 
they accepted as the lawful one. They merely wanted to expose what they considered 
to be the objectionable behaviour of certain individuals. 
 
The first VOC official about whom the burghers complained was the Independent Fiscal 
Willem Cornelis Boers. ‘In the execution of his duties as Fiscal he is so arbitrarily 
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oppressive and irresponsible towards the burghers and settlers, that anyone with the 
least sense of liberty, cannot think about this without getting emotional’.55 The 
burghers stated that because of this the settlers were not free as they were supposed 
to be, but virtually equal to slaves – a status which was considered far below the one 
of‎burgher.‎The‎Fiscal’s‎behaviour‎flew‎in‎the‎face‎of‎the‎privileges‎and‎security of the 
burghers. The Memorie provided a number of examples of this, the most important 
being the arrest of Carel Hendrik Buijtendag. Besides this Boers fined the burghers 
excessively for minor offences and went as far as confiscating their goods, even though 
they were sometimes innocent of any offence. In those cases he blackmailed the 
burghers into paying him a bribe while threatening that he would punish and publicly 
shame them. To be tried and punished in public was a tremendous humiliation to the 
burghers in Cape society and something they wanted to avoid at all costs.56 It was 
furthermore alleged that Boers made sure there was some financial benefit in it for 
him, and that is why he was much more lenient towards slaves, because they did not 
have any money.57 
 
The Memorie continued to target several other Company officials. Most were accused 
of arbitrary behaviour towards the burghers and trying to make as much money as 
possible by forcing the burghers to accept lower prices or taking kickbacks for using 
their services or the right to sell their products to the Company. There were several 
high VOC officials who owned farms and gardens - the burghers mentioned the 
Secretaris Oloff Marthini Bergh, the Dispensier Adriaan Van Schoor, the Kassier Gerrit 
Hendrik Cruijwagen, the Negotie overdrager Jan Fredrik Kirsten and the Landdrost of 
Swellendam Daniel Van Rijneveld - where they grew vegetables and fruit, which they 
sold to burghers and visitors to the Cape. Some of these men owned cattle and wine 
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farms and they sold meat and wine ‘even per bottle in public wine-houses or so-called 
shops’.58  
 
One of the biggest culprits was the Kassier Gerrit Hendrik Cruijwagen. He was in 
partnership with several other Company officials, like the Posthouder at False Bay 
Christoffel Brand, the Boekhouder in the Company warehouse Hendrik Justinus De Wet 
and the Boekhouder in the Company Cassa Abraham Chiron. Their partnership was 
known‎as‎the‎firm‎“Cruijwagen en Compagnie”,‎which‎‘dominated the local as well as 
the foreign trade’.59 Cruijwagen himself was the biggest and richest trader in Cape 
Town, who openly had a warehouse where he kept all kinds of goods, which he would 
sell in the smallest quantity possible.60 Christoffel Brand used his position as 
posthouder at False Bay to buy the best and most profitable goods from the passing 
ships‎there‎and‎then‎he‎used‎the‎Company’s‎carts‎to‎transport‎them‎to‎Cape‎Town‎to‎
deliver them to his partners.  
 
Another official who abused his position was the Equipagemeester Damiaan Hugo 
Staring. He was the only person allowed to visit ships which harboured in Cape Town 
during the first three days and he would use that opportunity to buy whatever he 
could from the crew. He did this together with the Boekhouder Hendrik Moller and the 
former Burgher Councillor Jacob Alexander La Febre. Together they were partners in 
the‎firm‎“La‎Febre‎and‎Co”.‎The‎burghers‎had‎no‎choice‎but‎to‎buy‎whatever‎they‎
needed from this company at high prices or go without.61 
 
And so the complaints continued. Company officials were accused of abusing their 
position to their own financial advantage. Time and again it was made clear that these 
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officials were openly breaking the rules of the Company by owning land and property, 
by selling their produce and engaging in private trade, and by undercutting the burgher 
artisans by using the services of craftsmen of the Company for private work. The 
burghers felt that the Company officials in so doing caused great harm to their 
financial well-being and interfered with privileges exclusively meant for them. 
 
The last part of the Memorie consisted of recommendations to improve the situation 
for the burghers.62 These proposals and requests were concentrated around two main 
topics: firstly the economic and secondly the judicial and administrative position of the 
burghers. 
 
Foremost for the burghers was that the Heeren XVII should renew the orders dating 
back to 30 October 1706, namely that no Company employee, from the highest to the 
lowest and without exception, was allowed to engage in any form of private trade 
either directly or indirectly and neither for themselves nor on behalf of others63, that 
no Company employee would associate or go into business with each other or with 
burghers, and that no Company employee was permitted to own or rent land in their 
own name or use another person as a front. The burghers made a number of requests 
which focussed on cutting out the middleman - i.e. an official buyer from the VOC - and 
to deliver their products and farm produce directly to the Company themselves. They 
did not want any involvement from Company officials in the trade, because this led to 
higher costs as they had to pay fees and in many cases they had to grease the palm of 
the official to be able to deliver their produce. The control over the delivery and 
distribution of products should rather be transferred to burghers. The Company could 
still determine the prices it paid for the products, like wine and grain, but because the 
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high costs of having to pay many employees and feed and clothe slaves would be 
reduced, it was expected that these prices would be reasonable and to the satisfaction 
of all concerned. The burghers furthermore requested that they would be allowed to 
freely sail to Dutch and foreign vessels in the harbour and sell their fresh produce 
directly to the crew. But they would only do so if there was a surplus after the 
Company was sufficiently provided. It was also suggested that the burghers should be 
allowed to have their own ships with which they could import products from Europe to 
be sold on auctions to the highest bidder, while they could use these ships as well to 
send their produce to Europe and the Asian settlements, again after first having 
satisfied the demand of the Company at the Cape. 
 
Regarding the position and rights of burghers the Memorie referred directly to the 
case of Carel Hendrik Buijtendag. It asked that no burgher would be arrested by the 
Geweldiger en Caffers, who were in the service of the VOC, but only by other burghers 
and that he then ‘by virtue of the Burgher rights’64 would be kept prison at the Burgher 
watch house and not in the VOC Castle. It should be prohibited that any burgher, both 
those born as burgher and those having gained burgher freedom after serving out their 
contract with the Company, could be forced to (re-)join the Company or be banished 
to Batavia ‘because that was contrary to the Burgher rights’.65 Should it be necessary 
to banish a burgher, then he should be sent directly to Holland, but only after a full and 
proper investigation by the Burgher Councillors. Another suggestion was that the 
Council of Justice should consist of an equal number of burghers and Company 
employees, while the longest serving Burgher Councillor would be vice-president of 
this body. With these proposals the burghers aimed for more influence over and 
greater burgher participation in the judicial processes concerning burghers. 
 
It was furthermore proposed that there would be seven Burgher Councillors (instead 
of three) and that only two of these would resign every year to allow for greater 
consistency and stability. The Burgher Councillors would then freely elect two 
replacements, whose final appointment would still be subject to approval by the 
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Governor. More importantly the seven Burgher Councillors would be allowed to take 
part in the meetings of the Political Council - an exclusive VOC domain - when this 
body discussed burgher affairs or matters regarding the general welfare of the Cape 
settlement. The rank and status of burgher officials should be of the same level as 
comparative VOC employees, e.g. a Burgher Councillor would have to be equal to a 
Koopman, which was the second highest rank in the VOC hierarchy.  
 
After the presentation of the Memorie to the board of directors of the VOC the 
chairman replied that the complaints would be investigated.66 The documents were 
handed to the Chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland, which would head the 
investigation. A letter was sent to the Cape administration asking the Governor and 
various officials to reply to the accusations and proposals made by the burghers. But in 
December 1780 the fourth Anglo-Dutch war broke out, which led to delays in 
correspondence between the Cape and the Republic. Besides that the administrative 
processes of the VOC did not move fast and therefore it was only in December 1783 
that the official decision by the Heeren XVII reached the Cape.67 
 
In this decision the accused Company officials were largely acquitted of the charges 
brought against them. Very few other changes were announced. A major one was that 
the Council of Justice would consist of six Company employees and six Burgher 
Councillors and that the Deputy Governor would be the chairman. VOC officials would 
thus still be in the majority. Members of the council, including the Burgher Councillors, 
would be appointed on a permanent basis and no longer be changed annually. But a 
free election of the burgher representatives was out of the question. The Directors 
also maintained that the burghers had the right to appeal sentences by the Council of 
Justice in Batavia and not in the Republic as the burghers had wanted. 
 
Regarding the trade and economic proposals of the burghers the Directors decided to 
confirm the 1706 orders, which placed restrictions on the partaking of individual VOC 
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officials in economic life. However the burghers were not given more control and 
conditions of trade remained the same. Any further decisions were postponed until 
after the end of the Anglo-Dutch war. 
 
The burghers were not satisfied with this reply, because few concessions were made 
by the VOC. In the meantime political turmoil had erupted in the Dutch Republic in the 
form of the Patriot movement. In 1784 some Cape burghers decided to take the 
struggle for their rights further and organised themselves in a body called the 
‘appointed‎people’s‎representatives’,‎which‎in‎February‎1785‎selected‎four‎new‎
delegates to go to Holland: Martinus Adrianus Bergh, Johannes Roos, Johannes 
Henricus Redelinkhuijs and Johannes Augustus Bresler. These delegates linked up with 
the Patriots in the Republic and actively sought their support.68 It was therefore this 
renewed Cape burgher movement which could more rightly be called the Cape Patriot 
movement. 
 
As a consequence of the burgher unrest several VOC officials, even though they were 
vindicated by the Heeren XVII, decided to leave the Cape. One of the first to offer his 
resignation was Governor Van Plettenberg, who wrote to the directors on 20 April 
1781‎that‎‘the current division among the countries Residents, sooner and better will be 
stopped and abated by anothe  Governor than the undersigned’.69 Van Plettenberg was 
however asked to stay on until the end of the Dutch-English war and he was replaced 
by Governor Cornelis Jacob van de Graaff on 14 February 1785. Other VOC officials 
who asked for permission to leave the Cape were the Equipagemeester Damiaan Hugo 
Staring and Independent Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers. They left in 1782 and 1783 
respectively.70 Therefore even if the Cape protesters were not successful in their 
attempts to change economic and administrative rules and regulations significantly, 
they did have an impact on the composition of the local government. 
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The Cape protest movement of the late 1770s and the documents it produced 
illustrated that to be a burgher was an essential aspect of the protests. The protest 
documents, from the 1778 letter and pamphlet to the 1779 Memorie, were 
interspersed with references to the unique position and identity of burghers. The 
complaints were made on behalf of the ‘entire burgher community’.‎Mention‎was‎
made of the special burgher privileges and prerogatives. Several times it was stated 
that the situation for the burghers at the Cape ‘was contrary to the burgher rights’. 
Clearly having burgher status was important to the protesters and they perceived it to 
be special and different from other groups in Cape society. This perception was based 
on the Dutch background and history of the Cape. The next chapter will investigate if 












2.   The Dutch connection with Cape burgerschap 
 
‘Will our wives and children not have reason to accuse us of being cowards, if we allow 
our laws and privileges to be raped and we forget that we are free Burghers of a colony 
belonging to the liberated united Netherlands, which owes its being and reputation to 
its heroic burghers’.1 With this statement contained in the letter dropped secretly in 
Cape Town in May 1778 the protesters expressed two things which were important to 
them: firstly that they were burghers and secondly that their status was the same as 
that of burghers of cities in the Dutch Republic. Not only did they underline their 
burgher identity and position, but apparently this status derived its standing from a 
comparable institution in the United Netherlands. Burgerschap was not a Cape 
invention nor was it a uniquely Cape phenomenon. Its roots were based in a long 
Dutch history and tradition. Because this was a main argument in the burgher protests, 
it is imperative to examine this Dutch background and connection more closely before 
making comparisons between Dutch and Cape burgerschap to ascertain if the 
protesters were indeed making their claims rightfully. 
 
Simon Schama wrote: ‘At the center of the Dutch world was a burgher, not a 
bourgeois’.2 He went on to state that the Dutch resident was a citizen or burger in the 
political and legal sense first before being a homo oeconomicus despite the Dutch 
being famous for their trading empire. The upshot of his statement is that in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Dutch world became increasingly and highly 
urbanised3; that burgerschap was an official status and had taken on a specific 
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meaning; and that it was the burgher who completely dominated public affairs. In 
everyday‎life‎the‎concept‎“burgher”‎had‎a‎specific‎political-legal meaning and burgher 
rights provided tangible economic, political, legal and social benefits. Not everybody 
could call himself a burgher, at least not until the end of the eighteenth century. 
Burgerschap was associated with and reserved for city residents, thereby excluding the 
rural population, and within the cities it was intended for a privileged minority.4  
 
Dutch towns were of overwhelming importance to Dutch economic, social and 
cultural life in the new political reality that had come into existence at the end of the 
sixteenth century: the Dutch Republic, a unified federation of seven provinces in the 
Northern Netherlands.5 The governing body within the Republic was the States-
General, which had an executive council, the Council of State. The States-General 
derived its authority from the provinces. Each of the seven provinces was represented 
and they all had one vote irrespective of size or population. The presidency of the 
States-General rotated among the provinces. The provinces had their own provincial 
‘Staten’ or States, in which the various towns and cities in that province were 
represented. The cities were key political players simply because they had significant 
financial and economic power and could therefore not be ignored. Though they were 
never politically independent, the complex interplay between the various political 
structures within the Republic made the period between 1580 and 1800 ‘the period of 
the urban domination of the state which made the Dutch Republic so unique in 
Europe’.6  
                                                                                                                                                                          
thirty City-State Cultures (Copenhagen 2000), 343-358, 343; W.W. Mijnhardt, `The Dutch Republic as a 
Town’,‎in:‎Eighteenth-Century Studies, 31, 3 (1998), 345-348, 345. 
4
 Mijnhardt,‎`The‎Dutch‎Republic’,‎347;‎E.‎Kuijpers‎and‎M.‎Prak,‎`Burger,‎ingezetene,‎vreemdeling:‎
burgerschap‎in‎Amsterdam‎in‎de‎17e‎en‎18e‎eeuw’,‎in:‎J. Kloek and K. Tilmans (eds.), Burger. Een 
geschiedenis van het begrip ‘burger’ in de Nederlanden van de Middeleeuwen tot de 21ste eeuw 
(Amsterdam 2002), 113-132, 113. 
5
 Information on the Dutch Republic can be found in: S. Groenveld, H.L.Ph. Leeuwenberg, N. Mout and 
W.M. Zappey, De kogel door de kerk? De opstand in de Nederlanden en de rol van de Unie van Utrecht 
1559-1609 (Zutphen 1979); J.I. Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness and fall 1477-1806 (New 
York‎1995);‎M.‎‘t‎Hart,‎`The‎Dutch‎Republic:‎the‎urban‎impact‎upon‎politics’,‎in:‎K.‎Davids‎and‎J.‎
Lucassen, A miracle mirrored: the Dutch Republic in European perspective (Cambridge 1995) 57-98; M. 
Prak, The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century: the golden age (Cambridge 2005); A.T. Van 
Deursen, `The Dutch Republic, 1588-1780’,‎in:‎J.C.H.‎Blom‎and‎E.‎Lamberts‎(eds.),‎History of the Low 
















Notwithstanding the fact that the organisation of the United Provinces formed a new 
political constellation, the architects of this ‘political‎freak’7 found it imperative that 
old, trusted practices were retained or returned after the upheaval of the uprising 
against the Spanish rulers. It resulted in a mix of old and new customs and institutions 
and meant that many old terms remained in force even though they sometimes were 
given a new meaning. This restorative conservatism contributed strongly to the 
prominent position of cities and burghers. Urban autonomy dated back to the 
medieval period and it was not deemed necessary to break with this tradition. Age old 
privileges were maintained or revived and any attempt to limit the powers of the 
autonomous cities was met with fierce resistance. The Dutch cities each had their own 
concerns and only worked together because it was beneficial to them as parts of 
economically-based networks. They would support the new political set-up, because 
the relative political unity of the United Provinces provided a stable structure in which 
they could further their own interests while maintaining their autonomy. This political 
reality prompted at least one contemporary observer to describe the Republic as a 
federation of ‘about fifty republics, all very different the one from the other’.8 
 
In the complex political world of the Republic the burghers of the cities were the 
smallest but definitely not the least components. The term burger came from the 
Latin concept civis, which meant being a member of an established political 
community or civitas. From the early medieval period onwards regional rulers started 
to award privileges to communities – like the right to a certain political and judicial 
autonomy – in return for, among others, the duty to pay taxes and tolls, which the 
rulers needed to finance their administration. Gradually the need to highlight the 
difference between privileged and non-privileged people and to associate it with a 
circumscribed space, like a city, became stronger. Hand in hand with this 
development went the increasing desire of cities to assert their autonomy. It was in 
this time that the inhabitants of cities received their own designation. At first they 
were called poorters, which came from the Middle Dutch word port, meaning city. The 
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term burger only later found its way into the Dutch language and meant resident of a 
burcht (castle or stronghold) or city. What is important to remember is that being a 
burgher developed into a defined status linked to certain privileges.9 
 
Because of the prominence of autonomous cities in the Dutch Republic and the fact 
that burgerschap was tied to residency of these cities, there was no such thing as a 
national Dutch burgerschap or citizenship; on the contrary, burgerschap was a local 
phenomenon. Even though many of the settlers inhabiting the overseas territories 
came from an area known as the United Dutch Provinces, which was referred to them 
as ‘patria’,‎this‎common‎origin‎was‎still‎very‎much‎a‎work‎in‎progress.‎Besides the 
local character of burgerschap there were many different languages, different 
customs, different dress and different systems of coinage and measures. Therefore it 
is‎arguable‎if‎there‎was‎something‎like‎a‎unified‎“Dutch”‎culture.10 Another point to 
be kept in mind is the question to what extent the Dutch overseas settlements could 
be‎called‎“Dutch”.‎Many‎of‎the‎employees‎of‎the‎two‎most‎important‎Dutch‎trading‎
companies, which founded the majority of these settlements: the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) and the Dutch West India Company (WIC), were from other European 
territories like the German countries, Scandinavia, the Southern Netherlands and 
Switzerland. Despite this it must be recognized that there was some sort of common 
background: most settlers were Protestant and northern European and shared ‘the 
same social system‎with‎the‎same‎norms‎and‎values’.11  
 
The residents of the overseas settlements, whether they were Dutch or from other 
European countries, came from a similar city-state culture which was not only well-
developed in the Netherlands but was also found in large parts of Germany, 
Switzerland and Italy.12 The cities in these countries looked at each other for examples 
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and inspiration. The Swiss tried to copy Dutch army reforms and Venice was an 
important role-model for Dutch republican theories.13 The resemblance between the 
European‎cities‎and‎overseas‎settlements‎becomes‎clear‎from‎Lauro‎Martines’‎
portrayal of daily life in Italian Renaissance cities: 
‘...a space in which the power of the state was omnipresent. Here, every 
resident was touched, and touched daily, by decisions that had been made in a 
government palace never more than a few hundred metres away from most 
citizens. The sights and sounds of that authoritative presence were 
everywhere - in trumpeting heralds, uniformed guardsmen, court summonses, 
resounding official bells, grand arrivals and departures, and the livery of 
rushing officials and messengers. In addition to the property taxes and 'forced 
loans' paid by citizens, all contracts and comestibles carried a tax; dress of the 
more expensive sort was regulated by law; every night brought curfews; 
torture was common; capital punishment was knowingly turned into a public 
spectacle; and the intrusiveness of government couriers put much of the 
private business of families into the eyes or ears‎of‎neighbours.’14 
It is as if Martines is describing eighteenth century Cape Town. Many elements of this 
description were found to be relevant and applicable to the daily life of the residents 
of places like Batavia and Cape Town, where the rituals and show of power and status, 
public punishment and sumptuary laws were very similar.15 
 
Even the physical environment that the settlers with a European background 
encountered in the Dutch territories was familiar to them. The eighteenth century 
traveller Francois Valentijn wrote about Fort Cochin in Kerala, India: ‘because of high 
buildings,‎churches‎and‎towers,‎it‎resembles‎a‎European‎city’.16 Similarly there are 
many specific references‎to‎the‎typical‎“Dutch”‎appearance‎of‎these settlements. A 
visitor to the Dutch settlement Zeelandia on Formosa (Taiwan) in 1670 described it 




 Lauro Martines, April Blood. Florence and the plot against the Medici, (London, 2004), 4. 
15
 Worden, Cape Town, 72-73; R. Ross, `Structure and culture in pre-industrial Cape Town: a survey of 
knowledge‎and‎ignorance’,‎in:‎W.G.‎James‎&‎M.‎Simons‎(eds),‎The Angry Divide. Social & economic 
history of the Western Cape (Cape Town 1989), 40-46, 41. 
16
 A. Singh, Fort Kochin in Kerala 1750-1830. The social condition of a Dutch community in an Indian 













with‎square‎bricks…’.17 The rice paddies and sugar cane fields around Zeelandia were 
called polders. The‎town‎of‎Batavia,‎the‎VOC’s‎headquarters‎in‎Asia,‎was‎‘laid out as a 
Dutch [town], with houses in a row and manifold canals bordered by shady trees’.18 
Cape Town developed just like that with ‘a strict grid pattern of streets with regular 
square‎‘blocks’‎occupied‎by‎dwelling‎houses’.19 And when one compares maps of 
Batavia and Cape Town of the eighteenth century one is struck by the similarities 
between the two cities: the VOC castle built on the coast line with the even house 
blocks and streets behind it. Even the way in which mountain streams were channelled 
through Cape Town resembled the Dutch urban canals and they had the same names: 
Cape Town had its Heerengracht just like Amsterdam. And these were not the only 
names which were copied overseas. The Dutch colonists in New Netherland named 
their outposts after Dutch places: Nieuw Amsterdam, Beverwijck, Haerlem, 
Breuckelen, and Amersfoort. 
 
It was not a coincidence that many of the Dutch settlements had a similar appearance. 
Their descriptions give an impression of orderliness and were part of the notion of the 
‘ideal‎city’,‎which‎became‎known‎and‎widespread‎in‎seventeenth‎century‎Holland‎and‎
had made its way there from Italy. At Leiden University an influential course on 
fortification and town development was taught. The newly acquired knowledge was 
applied by town planners in the extensions and new quarters of Dutch towns: streets, 
canals and houses were built in a rectangular chessboard pattern.20 The same was 
done in overseas settlements. Ron van Oers studied Dutch town planning overseas in 
the American, African and Asian territories and concluded that the Dutch were less 
concerned with having elaborate status buildings - like big churches or government 
palaces - and more with making their settlements as cost-effective as possible, which 
meant among other things that they had to be easily defendable and well-organised. 
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The strict geometrical design fitted this purpose. Van Oers furthermore stated that this 
design was ‘symbolic of an ordered, well-managed society, hierarchical but 
democratic,‎it‎was‎emblematic‎for‎the‎hard‎working‎god‎fearing‎Dutch‎Calvinists’.21  
 
What he implied with this statement was that the Dutch did more than make their 
overseas territories look like cities in the Dutch Republic, but that they also wanted to 
show and instil their values. There was an obvious link between the fatherland and the 
overseas territories, which was witnessed by certain physical resemblances. But these 
there were not the only ties with patria. The economic relations as well as the personal 
links of settlers with family and friends back home must have played a role in the way 
these settlers experienced and set up their overseas settlements. They did not just let 
go of their Dutch legacy and even though situated on a remote corner of the African 
continent, the society and political life of Cape Town and other overseas places were 
not so far removed from the Dutch and European heritage.22 Donna Merwick 
remarked that the first Dutch settlers, who arrived across the Atlantic in Nieuw 
Nederland in the early seventeenth century, ‘did not act out of universal rules, but out 
of seventeenth-century‎Dutch‎culture’.23  
 
The pre-eminent position of the cities in the United Provinces also permeated the two 
Dutch trading companies, the WIC and VOC. Both were organised in chambers, each 
of which were based in a Dutch city or area. The VOC had six chambers: Amsterdam, 
Zeeland, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. Of these Amsterdam and Zeeland 
were the most important and these were the chambers where the administrative 
apparatus of the VOC was based. Even though the bewindhebbers or directors in 
these chambers mostly came from the name-giving cities, they both had 
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representatives from other cities as well. In the Amsterdam chamber the cities of 
Haarlem and Leiden, which had significant interests in the overseas trade, managed to 
acquire a seat on the board after 1645. It was the original intention when the VOC 
was founded in 1602 that the appointment of new directors in the chambers would 
be the responsibility of the respective Provincial States. But almost immediately the 
province of Holland transferred this authority to the cities, while the same thing 
happened in Zeeland in 1646 after a fierce battle between the Provincial States and 
the cities. The close connection between the cities and the companies was 
furthermore strengthened by the fact that many company directors had one or more 
functions in the administration of the participating cities. Only twenty years after the 
forming of the VOC the following complaint was heard: ‘if we complain to the regents 
and‎the‎magistrates‎of‎the‎towns,‎there‎sit‎the‎directors,‎…‎if‎to‎the‎admiralties,‎there‎
are the directors again. If to the States-General, we find that they and the directors 
are‎sitting‎there‎together‎at‎the‎same‎time.’24 This did not change as time went on: 
throughout the period of activity of the WIC and the VOC the vast majority of the 
directors were recruited from the regenten, the Dutch ruling elite. Only two of the 
twenty-nine men who were directors of the VOC chamber Delft since 1750 did not 
have a position in the city government. And the directors of the chamber Rotterdam 
each had on average about ten functions in the city administration in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. 
 
Thus neither the WIC or the VOC were strangers to the city-based nature of Dutch 
society and it follows that elements of that basis were prevalent in the overseas 
settlements. In the same vein one could argue that, because these places were 
established, governed, and to a considerable extent inhabited by Dutch people, it 
would be reasonable to assume that the Dutch heritage played an important role. 
Besides the extensive powers that both trading companies were invested with they 
had the authority to exercise judicial and administrative functions in their settlements. 
‘In their overseas possessions the Dutch replicated all the well-developed municipal 
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institutions of their burgher society in the home country, such as town halls, hospitals, 
courts‎of‎justice,‎churches,‎reformative‎institutions,‎and‎alms‎houses.’25 The ideas and 
practice around the burgher concept and the special status of burghers were part and 
parcel of this. Before focussing on the Cape, we will have a look at the practical 
implications for other Dutch overseas settlements. 
 
In New Netherland the WIC gave up the monopoly on the fur trade in 1639, which was 
followed by an influx of colonists. Many of these were not employed by the WIC, but 
free residents, although the settlement was still governed by and under control of the 
WIC appointed governor-general and his council. The government stamped its 
authority on the settlement by asking the residents to take an oath of allegiance to the 
Dutch States-General, the Prince of Orange, the WIC and the local administration. In 
return the residents were given certain rights. One of these was the privilege to 
exercise a trade or a craft, which anybody who had not taken the oath could not do. 
The residents furthermore seemed to have a judicial advantage. The administration of 
New Amsterdam declared that the property of a resident who had taken the oath 
could not be confiscated to pay a debt. The status these residents had was comparable 
to that of Dutch city burghers and they were sometimes referred to as such, but it was 
not until 1657 that New Amsterdam established a formal burgerschap. The direct 
motivation for this were complaints about the so-called ‘schotse’ merchants, who 
operated during trading season and were able to keep their costs low, because they 
did not own property in the town, did not pay taxes, and did not contribute to the 
defence of the settlement. By keeping their expenses low they could trade their wares 
cheaper, which put the permanent residents at a serious disadvantage. The WIC 
directors acknowledged that there was a problem and looked for ways in which to 
rectify the situation. They fell back on customs which they knew from the Dutch 
Republic and introduced a formal burgerschap. In fact, they even went as far as 
adopting the Amsterdam system of having a ‘klein’ (limited) and ‘groot’ (extended) 
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burgerschap.26 Limited burgher right was awarded to all residents of New Amsterdam 
who had lived there for one year and six weeks, everybody born in the city, everybody 
who married a burgher daughter who had been born in the city, and to all those who 
wanted to keep an open shop or exercise a trade, thereby linking burgerschap to an 
economic advantage. The new burghers had to pay twenty guilders for this right and 
were obliged to pay certain taxes and perform burgher watch duties. This dealt with 
the itinerant merchants, who were from now on required to become ‘klein burgers’‎if‎
they wanted to do business. Extended burgerschap entitled the residents to be eligible 
for functions in the city government and be exempted from guard duties and the 
‘groot burger’‎could‎not‎be‎arrested‎by‎the‎lower‎courts‎of‎justice.‎This‎type‎of‎
burgerschap was awarded automatically to all members of the provincial government, 
burgemeesters and schepenen, ministers and the highest officers of the burgher 
militia. Others had to pay fifty guilders for great burgerschap and it was declared 
hereditary along male lines.27 
 
Besides the fact that Dutch tradition was followed in the regulation of burgerschap and 
burgher rights, a further typical Dutch development was the distinction that was 
created between insiders and outsiders. Burgher rights became exclusively associated 
with residency of New Amsterdam. In 1664 the burghers of New Amsterdam 
successfully petitioned for the uling that merchants of Nieuwer Amstel, one of the 
other settlements in New Netherland, first had to buy burgerschap of New Amsterdam 
before they could sell their goods in the city. A few months before that the burghers of 
Beverwijck made sure that everybody, who did not own property there, had not lived 
in the place for more than a year and six weeks or had acquired burgher rights there, 
was excluded from trading with Christians. There were other ways in which cohesion 
within the burgher communities of the various places in New Netherland was 
promoted. The burghers were obliged to serve in burgher militia as part of taking 
responsibility for the common welfare. The militia derived directly from the 
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schutterijen (civic militias) in Dutch cities and had similar rules and regulations. There 
are no clear records that regular social events were held by members of the burgher 
guards in New Netherland, but it is likely that there were events like militia meals and 
shooting contests and once a year there was a grand parade in which the various 
burgher companies marched together. Other common and social festivities made their 
way across the ocean from the Dutch Republic to the American colonies. With the 
introduction of burgher rights and the burgher watch grew a sense of local pride and 
sentiment. Dutch local patriotism, so prevalent in the Dutch Republic, had found its 
way to the settlements of New Netherland.28 
 
It was evident that the WIC and its directors and local administrators took cognizance 
of well-established practices in the cities of the Dutch Republic around burghers and 
burgerschap and introduced these in the North American Dutch settlements. However 
by 1664 New Netherland was taken over by the English and became anglicised. Even 
though New Netherland can serve as an example of how Dutch practices made their 
way overseas, it is virtually impossible to determine how Dutch burgerschap would 
have developed further and can be compared with the strong burgher identity among 
the burghers of the Cape of Good Hope. It may be more useful to look for similarities 
with the Asian territories of the VOC of which the Cape was after all an integral part. 
 
In Batavia, the headquarters of the VOC in Asia, and in other Dutch settlements in Asia 
the establishment of a burgher group preceded the one at the Cape. The first burghers 
in Asia were given their freedom in 1616 in the eastern part of the Indonesian 
territories: the Moluccas, Ambon and Banda. Once Batavia was firmly in Dutch hands 
(after 1619) most burghers chose Batavia as their place of residence.29 The city grew 
steadily and by the second half of the seventeenth century Batavia was a city with 
many different inhabitants: Company employees from various parts of Europe (except 
for the highest who were mostly Dutch); free burghers; mixed people; Asians; Chinese; 
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and many slaves. The city began to expand beyond its walls and officials had ‘to devise 
laws‎and‎institutions‎that‎could‎control‎the‎city’s‎inhabitants.‎Quite‎naturally,‎the‎
model they chose was that of the Dutch municipality, just as in the design of the 
earliest buildings and layout of the city they strove to recreate the appearance of a 
Dutch‎town.’30 However the Dutch laws had to be changed and adapted to local 
circumstances and a mix of inhabitants for which there was no precedent in the 
Netherlands. This became apparent in the way the VOC administration dealt with the 
burghers (and other inhabitants for that matter).  
 
As far as economic policy was concerned the VOC followed a different path to the WIC 
and never abandoned its trade monopoly. In the early years the burghers still enjoyed 
some freedom with regards to maritime trade, but from 1632 this became increasingly 
limited. Eventually the VOC Directors decided that they did not want to establish 
colonies of burghers in the East Indies, which would have meant that they had to be 
given a share of the lucrative trade and would have competed with the VOC monopoly. 
The burghers were then only allowed to engage in such business as the Company 
permitted. Subsequently the lucrative trade with the Moluccas, India, China and Japan 
was closed to the burghers and goods such as textiles, diamonds and spices became 
the exclusive domain of the VOC. Simultaneously many high Company employees set 
up their own trading businesses, which was officially not permitted, but condoned by 
the VOC. It was an unequal struggle for the burghers and some returned to the 
Netherlands while others rejoined the service of the Company. The burghers who 
stayed in Batavia tried to eke out a living supplying the Company headquarters and the 
town with produce, which again was difficult because most of the land around Batavia 
was owned by high VOC officials, who leased it to Chinese cultivators. For some the 
only thing left to do was to join the service sector as innkeepers, shopkeepers and 
artisans. In fact, in 1674 the vast majority of burghers declared that they made their 
living in this way and only a minor group described themselves as free merchants.31 
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In the settlements of Galle and Colombo in Ceylon the economic opportunities for 
burghers were even more limited than in Batavia. In Colombo the Company held the 
monopoly on the most important trade with India and made sure that burghers were 
excluded. The small amount of trade allowed to them - mainly in rice, textiles and 
saltpetre – was gradually lost to indigenous traders with whom burghers financially 
could not compete.32  
 
On the political field the VOC similarly wanted to protect its own interests. This meant 
that it was not inclined to set up independent town councils, like the ones in Dutch 
cities, because these could be a threat to its commercial power. The burgher 
community in Batavia was subject to strict control by the VOC government. On 
obtaining their freedom from the Company the burghers had to swear an oath of 
loyalty and obedience to the laws of the Company, they had to perform military duties 
in burgher militia, and they could not marry or return to Holland without permission. 
And if they did not behave they could be punished or taken back into the service. The 
Batavian burghers were however given certain functions in the administration of the 
town. They could be appointed‎to‎the‎aldermen’s‎bench‎(schepenbank). The council of 
aldermen was established as early as 1620 and consisted of burghers and Company 
men. But the president always was a high Company official and member of the Political 
Council, the VOC government. Its duties were to collect taxes, maintain the canals, 
organise fire prevention and other functions like these. Aldermen typically were 
appointed for two years. Burghers could also get the positions of heemraad, orphan 
master (weesmeester), weigh master (weegmeester) or church warden (kerkmeester). 
These functions derived directly from similar institutions in Dutch cities, but only in 
name; the burghers of Batavia never had the same authority or status as the burghers 
of towns in the Dutch Republic. Batavia was and remained firmly in the grip of the VOC 
and its officials.33 
 
The Batavian burghers attempted to redress the economic and political restrictions 
placed on them. In 1649 they requested that a vroedschap or town council be installed 
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with the aim to have their interests represented properly and without interference 
from Company officials. They sent the request directly to the Dutch States-General and 
thus bypassed the Governor-General and the Heeren XVII. The burghers of Colombo 
likewise frequently tried to get greater privileges from government. In these cases the 
officers of the militia acted as spokesmen. The first petition was submitted in 1678 
when there were just over one hundred burghers living in Colombo. They claimed that 
they were in a desperate state, because the Asian merchants had managed to wrest 
lucrative trade from them. The burghers, because they were Dutch or from Dutch 
descent, thought themselves entitled to preferential treatment. This petition was 
followed by many others, but seldom did the VOC give in to their demands. The Heeren 
XVII stressed that the Company had to remain in control even if it meant that the 
burghers would decide to leave. If they wanted to stay, they simply had to show 
obedience and no change in their circumstances was brought about.34 
 
Because of the economic and political restrictions placed on them and their inability to 
compete with their Asian competitors, burgerschap of Batavia and other Asian 
settlements was not very appealing and the number of burghers remained low 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The number of burghers in 
Batavia remained largely stable at around three hundred.35 It was the more sizable 
group of Chinese inhabitants who came to offer the necessary skills as craftsmen, 
fishermen and farmers and they were allowed to trade freely with areas which were 
outside the control of the Company. They actually fulfilled more the traditional role of 
burghers, but did not have any political power. This situation ended when they were 
almost completely wiped out in the massacre of 1740. 
 
Burgerschap was a concept which was exported from the Dutch Republic to the 
overseas settlements. An important difference was that the places and cities overseas 
were not governed by a town council formed by regents who originated from the 
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burgher population, but by officials representing large commercial enterprises. 
However these officials did have links with and were rooted in the Dutch regent group 
and political world. Both the WIC and the VOC looked at the example of Dutch 
burgerschap for ways of dealing with people released from their service and adapted it 
to the local situation. A crucial aspect of burgerschap was burgher identity. The 
burghers in New Netherland never had much of a chance to develop their identity, 
because Dutch administration was short-lived. The burghers in Asia were economically 
and politically suppressed and failed to develop a self-conscious identity. From the 
Cape protest movement at the end of the 1770s we can conclude that the situation 
there was different and that a burgher identity indeed developed over time. 
 
The Cape settlement was established in 1652 as a place where VOC ships travelling 
between Europe and Asia could be repaired and the ship crews could recover. The 
Cape did not produce any profitable spices like the Asian settlements and soon after its 
establishment it became clear to the VOC officials that the Company itself could not 
deliver enough fresh produce and meat to satisfy the demand of the passing ships and 
Batavia. In other words, running a station like the Cape could be a costly affair without 
lucrative trade possibilities and while having to maintain a large and expensive VOC 
work force. For the solution to the problem the VOC directors did not have to look far: 
they followed the example of the Asian settlements and from as early as 1657 
Company servants were released from their duties and settled as free residents. The 
burgher group was created. The burghers were supposed to focus on agriculture and 
provide the fresh produce and meat needed for the settlement and the passing ships 
of the Company. It would be cheaper for the VOC to have burghers working for 
themselves and paying their own costs than having to pay for VOC labour and keeping 
of slaves. Besides this the burghers were expected to contribute to the military 
defence of the settlement and were organised in burgher militia, which meant that the 
Company garrison and military expense could be reduced. Of course there were 
expenses incurred in settling and governing the burghers, but these could be offset 
against the various taxes which could be collected from them. From early on the 
burghers did not limit themselves to the agricultural sector. A number of them settled 












they traded in all kinds of products; many burghers were craftsmen, like bakers, 
bricklayers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, painters and carpenters; a large number 
provided lodging and catering for seamen.36 
 
The climate at the Cape was healthier for the burghers and because they were given 
more access to land and experienced no competition from a local population, 
conditions were generally better than in other parts of the Dutch Asian world. The size 
of the burgher group increased steadily. These burghers did not have much of a 
burgher role-model to look up to in the American or Asian settlements, but there was 
one present and available in the Dutch fatherland. By the time that the conflict in the 
1770s erupted burghers had developed a notion that they were awarded burgher 
rights of Cape Town and that these were linked to certain privileges, which could and 
should not be undermined by arbitrary decisions of Company officials. They had a 
specific view on their position, which they regarded as a special status comparable to 
that of burghers in the Dutch Republic. Independent Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers, one 
of the highest and most influential VOC officials at the Cape at the time, made clear 
what he thought of this claim by stating that ‘one makes a big mistake if one wants to 
compare the residents of a settlement like this with the privileged burghers of our great 
cities in the Republic’.37 Boers voiced the opinion of the VOC administration that the 
burgerschap of Cape burghers was definitely not the same as that of Dutch burghers. 
Was this difference of opinion between the VOC officials and the protesting burghers 
merely one of semantics, in other words a difference in interpretation of the concept 
‘burgerregt’ and tied to that burgher status and identity, or were there more concrete 
reasons for the Cape burghers to argue that their status was special? To be able to 
answer this question one needs to compare the Dutch and Cape practice around 
burgerschap. The following section aims to illustrate that Dutch burgerschap and 
status was a relevant frame of reference for the protesting burghers at the Cape by 
studying the practice of Cape burgerschap in greater detail while comparing it to 
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burgerschap in Dutch cities. This will be done by looking at the ways of becoming a 
burgher; the burgher oath; the advantages of having burgher status; and by comparing 
burghers to other status groups in the city. 
 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were four main ways to 
become a burgher in the United Provinces: birth, marriage, purchase and grant. 
 
To attain burgher status by birth was not as straightforward as it seems, because 
different cities applied different rules. Until the end of the eighteenth century the city 
of `s Hertogenbosch applied quite broad criteria: all people born or even just baptised 
within the town automatically received burgerschap and could never lose it. 
Amsterdam and Deventer were more restrictive: only legitimate children of burgher 
parents were assured of automatic burgerschap in these cities. Either way, 
burgerschap acquired by birth had to be confirmed at a later age. This registration 
process‎involved‎being‎able‎to‎prove‎that‎one’s‎father‎was‎indeed‎a‎burgher‎followed‎
by the swearing of a burgher oath.38 
 
The situation in Cape Town seemed to be the same as in Amsterdam, i.e. children 
born to burghers automatically inherited burgher status: Carel Hendrik Buijtendag 
was a born burgher, a fact to which the Burgher Councillors testified in their 
complaint to the Governor when Buijtendag was arrested. That burgher status was 
hereditary is also apparent from requests of sons of burgher families who went to 
work for the Company and wanted to be restored as burgher after the end of their 
contract. One of the sons of Heemraad Hendrik Cloete, the assistent Pieter Laurens 
Cloete, started to work for the Company in April 1781, but requested in March 1787 
to be restored to his ‘previous burgher freedom’,‎because‎he‎wanted‎to‎assist‎his‎
father in his business.39 Another example was Johan Meijndertz Cruijwagen junior, the 
son of Burgher Councillor Cruijwagen. He entered Company service in 1777 and was 
promoted to assistent in 1779. By 1789 he was too busy with his business affairs and 
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requested the Political Council for his release from the service and to restore him to 
his ‘inherited burgher right’.40 What follows from the above is that apparently being a 
VOC employee and burgher was incompatible. Even though one was born as burgher, 
one would lose this status on entering the Company service and had to officially 
request the administration to get it back, although it did not seem problematic. The 
point is that one could not be both VOC employee and burgher. The fact that there 
was a clear distinction (but not an impenetrable wall) between status groups in Cape 
society will become evident more often later in this chapter. 
 
Marrying a burgher daughter meant that the husband was in a position to acquire 
burgher rights in most cities of the Dutch Republic. Many men were therefore looking 
to marry into a burgher family and the standing of burgher girls and women on the 
wedding market was considerable. The rules in Amsterdam stated that the newly 
wedded husband, if he wanted to become a burgher, had to register as such within 
two weeks after the wedding. If he died unregistered within that two week period any 
child conceived and later born would not be recognised as burgher. This implied that 
burgher rights were not transferable through the mother even if she was a burgher 
daughter.41  
 
In Cape Town there was also a connection between marrying a burgher woman and 
becoming a burgher. There are numerous examples of Company employees who 
married into a burgher family and applied for burgher rights at more or less the same 
time. Willem Cornelis Arendsz became a burgher on 30 July 1774 and married his 
burgher bride Maria Maasdorp on 28 August 1774. Andries Willem Beck became a 
burgher on 11 October 1779 and married Maria Cecilia van der Merwe on 31 
October.42 However even though marrying a burgher daughter must have opened up 
the possibility to attain burgerschap, there are no indications that these events were 
automatically linked. This is illustrated by the fact that many higher VOC officials were 
known to be married to burgher women but remained in Company service. These 
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higher ranking officials were aiming to make a career in Company service and did not 
want to become burghers, but they may have wanted to marry into a wealthy and 
connected burgher family for personal gain. However in case of lower-placed VOC 
employees without many career prospects within the Company, marrying into a well-
off burgher family meant that they had the opportunity to settle and try their luck 
outside the service as a burgher. For both the higher and lower VOC employees 
marrying into a burgher family was a way to gain access to a potentially useful kinship 
network. Another argument for the fact the marrying a burgher daughter and 




If one could not find a burgher bride, there was always the possibility of buying 
burgerschap. The purchase price varied from city to city and was often determined by 
the market. Burgerschap of Amsterdam was hugely desirable in the Golden Age and 
the city fathers could therefore ask the hefty sum of fifty guilders, part of which went 
to the city orphanage and care for the poor.43 Nijmegen was not far behind with forty-
eight guilders, but in most Dutch towns modest amounts in the order of ten to twenty 
guilders were paid for burgher rights. The majority of Dutch cities allowed most 
people to buy burgerschap. There were a few cities, like Deventer and Nijmegen, 
where only members of the Dutch Reformed church were able to purchase 
burgerschap.44  
 
At the Cape neither the requests for burgher rights nor the letters of grant issued by 
the administration mentioned anything about costs, but there are indications that 
there was some payment involved. The Resolutions of the Political Council mentioned 
that Haije Jansz Swarsenburg (or Swartzenberg) was restored to his former burgher 
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rights in 1770.45 It was the specifically recorded that Swarsenburg was too poor to be 
able to afford the costs of a new vrijbrief (letter of freedom) and therefore the Council 
decided that the original letter of freedom issued to him in 1762 would do.46 It is 
however not stated how much he would have had to pay for a new vrijbrief. A copy of 
the minutes of the Political Council referring to their decision to release an employee 
from Company service had to be attached to the vrijbrief. The burgher normally had 
to pay for this copy as well, which was recorded in the Resolutions in 1780 when the 
procedure to be followed by people who obtained burgher freedom was outlined. The 
new burgher had to register himself with the Burgher Councillors and as proof he 
needed an extract of the minutes of the Political Council. This copy could be obtained 
against a payment of stamp duty of six stuijvers.47 Thus getting the burgher rights of 
Cape Town was apparently not free, but the total cost is not clear. 
 
In some cases burgerschap was granted to outsiders. This happened to ministers of 
the Dutch Reformed church on entering the service of a local parish, but also to 
groups of refugees, especially when they had skills which could be useful.48 The Dutch 
were more pragmatic than principled with regards to their burgerschap admissions. If 
it was beneficial to the city community to welcome outsiders, they would do so. A 
well-known example of this practice in the Cape settlement was the granting of 
burgerschap to the French Huguenots, who arrived at the Cape at the end of the 
seventeenth century and were in demand for their knowledge of wine farming and 
brandy distilling.  
 
The granting of burgerschap to outsiders did not always go without opposition and in 
those cases burgerschap became an instrument of social regulation. Fees could be 
raised to a level that would make it difficult for outsiders to acquire burgerschap, 
which would prevent a city being flooded by poor people and beggars placing a heavy 
burden on welfare institutions. Sometimes specific groups were targeted. The 
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shopkeepers of `s Hertogenbosch complained in 1775 that they were disadvantaged by 
the illegal practices of aliens, particularly Jews, who they accused of not paying taxes 
and selling stolen goods. The shopkeepers demanded that Jews would be banned from 
burgerschap and in 1777 the city council gave in to this demand.49 
 
At the Cape it was the financial assistance and certain privileges (e.g. the right to have 
their own church) granted to the Huguenots which eventually lead to resentment 
among other burghers and in 1700 it was officially decided to stop the Huguenot 
immigration.50 Almost eighty years later the protesting burghers at the Cape felt that 
their livelihoods were threatened by some other groups and they specifically 
requested in their 1779 Memorie that no English, French or other foreigners, 
presumably from European origin, should be allowed to own houses, engage in any 
burgher trade or become burghers without first having been in Company service.51 The 
protesters seemed to have wanted to make sure that there was a level playing field: 
either‎one‎inherited‎burgher‎status‎from‎one’s‎parents‎or‎one‎arrived‎at‎the‎Cape‎from‎
Europe as a Company employee and then asked for burgher rights. The reason for this 
request may have been that they wanted to make sure that any foreigner settling in 
the Cape settlement had some loyalty towards the local Dutch administration. But it 
was more likely that the protesting burghers wanted this condition to make sure there 
were‎no‎“freeloaders”‎benefiting‎from‎their‎burgher‎privileges‎or‎muscling‎in‎on‎their‎
territory. There had to be some control. This request resembles the situation in New 
Amsterdam, where burgerschap became an official status after complaints by the 
permanent residents about the itinerant or schotse traders. 
 
If a person wanted to buy burgerschap or married into a burgher family and wanted to 
become a burgher, it was practice in most Dutch cities that a certain procedure was 
followed. This started with a request to the city administration. The same was the case 
in the Cape settlement, although the difference was that here the prospective 
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burghers were in most cases Company employees. The process of becoming a burgher 
began with a request to the local VOC government. In the archives of the Political 
Council many of these requests can be found. The vast majority of these are set up 
according to a fixed formula, which did not change much throughout the period of 
VOC rule. A Company employee would introduce himself, state where he came from 
and when and in what capacity he arrived at the Cape. He continued by declaring that 
he had now reached the end of his contract and he thought that he would be able to 
make an honest living in his craft or trade outside the Company service in Cape Town 
or elsewhere in the settlement. The last sentence would be the humble request ‘to 
release him from the service and favour him with the Burgher rights of this place’.52 The 
phrasing of asking for burgher rights of this place, meaning Cape Town, is quite 
significant. The applicant did not ask for a general Dutch burgerschap, but for a specific 
local burgerschap. We saw earlier that in the Dutch Republic burgerschap was a local 
phenomenon and this apparently had made its way to the Cape as well. It would be 
fair to say that the new burgher became part of the Caabsche burgerij. It is likely that 
this would have contributed to the perception among the burghers that they were 
granted similar burgher rights as burghers in Dutch cities. 
 
In most cases the requests were granted and an official letter of grant, the vrijbrief, 
was issued to the new burgher. These letters again were set up according to the same 
blueprint.‎They‎would‎state‎that‎the‎request‎‘to be placed as Burgher’53 was approved 
and the applicant would be allowed to engage in all permitted burgher trades. But the 
grant also stipulated conditions: the new burgher was not allowed to make any 
applications for land belonging to the Company, he could be re-enlisted in the 
Company service should he be needed or misbehave, and he was subject to all rules 
and laws pertaining to burghers.  
 
At first glance there seems to be a difference between the request and the letter of 
grant. A person would ask ‘for the burgher‎rights‎of‎this‎place’‎(Cape‎Town)‎and‎he‎
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would then be ‘placed‎as‎burgher’‎on‎certain‎terms‎and‎conditions,‎which‎reflected‎
that the applicant was subject to strict control by the VOC government. That there was 
not such a distinction, but merely a difference in choice of words, becomes clear from 
this‎statement‎in‎the‎Resolutions‎of‎the‎Political‎Council:‎‘Dirk Groeneboom ….. on the 
20th of August of this year [1776], is favoured with the burgher rights of this place on 
his written request therefore…’.54 The semantics did not negate the fact that the 
burgher rights were given in return for duties and obligations. Freedom had its 
limitations and was conditional. Again this was not unlike the practice in Dutch cities, 
where one could be removed from the burgher register if one misbehaved or was 
found guilty of a crime.55  
 
There are several examples of instances where the Company enforced its rights of 
punishing burghers by applying the condition of the vrijbrief. In 1770 Haije Jansz 
Swarsenburg applied to the Political Council to be restored to his burgerschap. The 
first time he received burgher rights was in 1762. But he had lost these in 1765 as 
punishment for repeated drunkenness and consequent bad behaviour, which caused 
that he could no longer be tolerated as a member of the burgher community. He was 
conscripted into Company service for five years and banished to India.56 Banishment 
from the city or district was a punishment which was used in Dutch cities as well as at 
the Cape as the Swarsenburg case and the Buijtendag incident illustrated. Another 
case was the one of Michiel Engelhard, who became a burgher in 1776, but was taken 
back into Company service and banished from the Cape in 1778 for bad behaviour.57 
Therefore what had happened to Buijtendag and others was not exceptional or even 
unusual. The VOC government exercised its rights and followed a custom accepted 
throughout the Dutch empire. Banishment from the Cape did not happen very often 
and it seemed to have been a last resort for the government in cases where other 
penalties did not manage to get a specific burgher back on the straight and narrow. In 
the period 1738 to 1778 the government banished thirty-three individuals, which was 
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less than one per year. What irked the burgher protesters of 1779 was that there was a 
marked increase in banishing since Governor Van Plettenberg and Independent Fiscal 
had taken office in 1774. The previous Governor Tulbagh only banished ten burghers in 
the twenty years that he headed the Cape; Governor Van Plettenberg in contrast sent 
away eighteen burghers in less than eight years.58 This indicates that the Cape 
administration under Van Plettenberg and with Boers as prosecutor was considerably 
harsher towards the burghers than previous governments had been.  
 
The process of becoming a burgher or the confirmation of it as an adult if one was 
born as a burgher would involve the swearing of a burgher oath. In most Dutch cities 
these oaths included swearing allegiance to the Dutch States-General and the 
Stadholder, but in all of them the new burgher promised to obey the local government 
and laws, preserve the peace and to support and protect the city and fellow burghers, 
if necessary by military means. The oath was a contract between the city and the 
burgher – the burgher became part of an exclusive and privileged community in 
exchange for financial, political and social support till ‘death‎us‎do‎part’‎as‎the‎
burghers of `s Hertogenbosch promised. The burgher oath furthermore stressed the 
importance of local allegiance as opposed to national identity.59  
 
In the Cape settlement the burghers took a similar oath to the one in Dutch cities. They 
promised allegiance and obedience to the Dutch States-General, the Stadholder, the 
directors of the VOC and the governor, magistrates and authorities of the settlement. 
They also swore to defend the United Netherlands and ‘this‎city’‎(‘deese Steede’)‎to‎the‎
utmost even if it would cost them their life.60 The oath was taken once a year in 
October or November at the same time that all burghers came together for the annual 
burgher militia exercise. The oath was taken by burghers who had received their 
letters of grant in the previous year and by residents who were born as burghers and 
had reached the age of sixteen, which was the time when they were required to 
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become members of the burgher militia. The significance of this oath is that it 
reflected a clear link between the Dutch Republic and the Cape settlement and the 
burghers in both territories. This was apparent from the strikingly similar wording of 
the burgher oaths in Dutch cities and Cape Town and from the promise that Cape 
burghers would be loyal to the authorities of and protect the United Provinces. But 
perhaps an even stronger connection was that the Cape burgher oath unmistakably 
referred to events in the Dutch Republic itself. The oath of 1725 differed from the oath 
of 1748 in that according to the first one the Cape burghers did not swear allegiance to 
the Stadholder, while from 1748 onwards the people and institutions being sworn 
loyalty to included ‘his illustrious highness the Lord Prince of Orange and Nassau as 
Stadholder’.61 The Dutch Republic did not have a Stadholder between 1702 and 1748, a 
time known as the Second Stadholder-less period. It was clear that if the Cape burgher 
protesters of the late 1770s had to put their lives at risk for the Republic and its 
authorities, then they wanted to have their status placed on par with the one of 
burghers in Dutch cities. 
 
At this point it may be opportune to pay some attention to the position of females in 
Cape burgher society, which seemed to have been somewhat ambivalent. Women did 
not serve in the burgher militia and thus did not take a burgher oath. Women who 
were married to a burgher, would be part of the burgher community and were 
counted as such in the annual tax returns or opgaaf. Yet there were female burghers 
who did not derive their status from men. They were not married, divorced or 
widowed. In the deeds records they were even called ‘burgeres’‎and‎this‎also‎showed‎
that they could own property.62 In the next chapter we will find a number of these 
women on tax lists, which illustrates that they were not exempt from paying taxes. 
Some women owned businesses and were active in the entrepreneurial world of the 
Cape. It was quite acceptable in Dutch society for widows to continue the business of 
their husband after his death.63 Female burghers thus seemed to have rights and 
duties which were on par with their male counterparts. However women were 
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excluded from political rights and were not eligible for office, nor were they allowed to 
exercise their voice in specific protest options and one of these was the opportunity to 
sign political petitions. Accordingly, the May 1779 petition of the Cape protesters was 
only signed by men. Therefore the focus of this thesis is of necessity on male burghers. 
 
In the Netherlands as well as at the Cape the tangible benefits of burgerschap were 
likely to be a big drawing card for people wanting to become burghers. Burgerschap 
provided legal, economic, political and social privileges. 
 
First and foremost most people would have economic reasons to become a burgher of 
a city. These could be as basic as exemption from payment of certain tolls and taxes 
or the right to graze ones cattle on meadows owned by the city. But probably the 
most important one would be that to be able to practice a craft or trade in a particular 
city one had to join a local guild in which burghers, who were occupied in the same 
business, were organised. One could not become a guild member if one did not have 
burgher rights and therefore anybody who was not a burgher of that city was 
excluded from the burgher trades. Being a burgher was therefore crucial to economic 
survival for some.64 Although there is no evidence of guild practices at the Cape, it is 
clear that an important reason for people to apply for burgerschap was that they 
wanted to have the freedom to ply their trade or craft for their own benefit. This 
desire was expressed in the requests for burgher rights and acknowledged in the 
letters of grant. It was also a right the burgher protesters of 1779 wanted to protect 
by trying to exclude foreigners from the burgher trades.65 
 
A further significant advantage that burghers had over non-burghers was that they 
could only be tried by a local court consisting of their peers or in other words: 
burghers of their own city. This meant that even if a burgher of a city committed a 
crime somewhere else, he could escape justice by proving his burgher rights of the 
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city he came from and prevent extradition.66 It was this burgher right which according 
to the protesting burghers at the Cape in the late 1770s was one of the most 
endangered by the VOC administration. In the 1779 Memorie they explained that 
burghers should only be arrested by fellow burghers and banishment from the Cape 
should only happen after a proper investigation by the Burgher Councillors.67 The 
burghers complained that the sentence of banishment was issued without 
consultation of the Burgher Councillors. In the Buijtendag incident the Burgher 
Councillors seemed to have been taken by surprise. Likewise Burgher Councillor Gerrit 
Hendrik Meijer declared in a supporting statement to the Memorie that he knew 
nothing and was not consulted about the banishment of Michiel Engelhard in 1778.68 
The protesting burghers wanted more say in the judicial processes concerning 
burghers. Although it was not mentioned in so many words, the Memorie seemed to 
aim for the establishment of a so-called schepenbank, a separate (non-VOC) court 
through which burghers administered justice over fellow burghers. These institutions 
were well established in Dutch cities as well as in Batavia. According to some VOC 
officials at the Cape this was exactly what the Cape protesters wanted and they were 
not in favour of this.69 
 
There was also the political advantage of burgerschap: an important burgher right was 
the right to be elected to political office: member of the vroedschap or city council, 
schepenbank or council of justice and burgemeester or burgher councillor.70 The 
burghers of the Cape settlement had this right as well with the one difference that 
burghers could not be elected to the Political Council, the highest policy making body 
at the Cape, which was exclusively reserved for the highest-ranked Company officials. 
The uppermost office a burgher at the Cape could achieve was that of burgher 
councillor and as such he was part of the Council of Justice, but only when it handled 
cases which involved burghers. A burgher could furthermore be appointed as orphan 
master or commissioner of civil and marriage affairs. Similar functions did exist in 
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Dutch cities, but there the various boards and councils would consist only of burghers, 
while in the Cape settlement VOC employees would take up half or more of the seats. 
It was one of the ways the Company aimed to stay in control of the settlement. The 
protest movement of the late 1770s wanted to change this. The Memorie proposed an 
increase in the number of burgher councillors, who would also be allowed to take part 
in meetings of the Political Council when burgher affairs or matters regarding the 
general welfare of the Cape settlement were discussed.  
 
Lastly burgerschap had certain social advantages. A number of Dutch towns had 
special orphanages for the children of burghers. The Burgerweeshuis (Burgher 
orphanage) in Amsterdam provided a better diet and training to become a craftsman 
and thus set up orphaned burgher children with a relatively good start in life. Social 
welfare of the burghers also included care for the elderly in old-age homes and 
almshouses.71 At the Cape care for the poor was entrusted to the deacons of the Dutch 
Reformed Church and orphans were cared for by the orphan chamber, which was 
modelled on similar institutions in Dutch cities. With regards to poor relief burghers 
did have an advantage over other groups, because for instance, at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century it was determined that the financial assistance given to free blacks 
was half of that provided to burghers.72  
 
Overall in Dutch cities a registered burgher had an exclusive and first-rate status. In 
this light it is importa t to note that not all people living in Dutch cities were actually 
burghers. Besides temporary visitors or foreigners there was also a second legal 
category: the established residents without burgher rights or the so-called inwoners 
or ingezetenen. These inhabitants were not legally protected in the same way as 
burghers were, they could not be elected to public office, and they did not have 
access to guilds and could therefore not operate as an independent craftsman or 
shopkeeper. In all Dutch cities they could however own property and their property 
rights would be respected. They also had access to basic juridical procedures. The 

















major advantage of burgerschap therefore seemed to have been the economic one of 
membership of the guilds and related to that the possibility of building up a relative 
independent economic existence and this was probably the main reason for 
inhabitants to want to become burgher. This became clear in Amsterdam after about 
1680 when most guilds issued strict rules against accepting ingezetenen in their ranks. 
As a result the number of inhabitants decreased dramatically, while the number of 
burghers increased. People were now forced to buy burgerschap if they wanted to 
survive economically.73 
 
Despite the Cape being a VOC controlled settlement, the burghers there still had a 
privileged status as the only group allowed to be part of the administration. Because of 
their Dutch (and European) background the burghers in the Cape settlement were 
probably familiar with the legal category of ingezetenen. At the Cape they were 
confronted with many different types of residents: foreigners, Asians, and Africans and 
this provoked a reaction by the burghers. The protesters of the late 1770s wanted to 
make sure that the advantages linked to their status as burghers were protected in this 
complex society. Earlier it was mentioned that the burgher Memorie proposed that no 
foreigners from other European countries should be allowed to engage in burgher 
trade or become burghers without first having been in Company service. This article 
was followed by one that stated that Chinese, Javanese or convicted criminals 
(bandieten) should not be permitted to live among the burgher population, trade or 
have shops, because -among other reasons- they were ‘buyers of stolen goods and 
would tempt slaves to become thieves’.74 
 
These proposals reflected how burghers saw their own status and identity in relation 
to other groups at the Cape. Because the vast majority of burghers were of European 
descent many historians have tended to see the burgher group as one to which access 
was based on race. This becomes problematic when one considers the position of one 
of the groups to which the burghers referred in their Memorie and which was known 
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as the free blacks: ‘individuals born in slavery and later freed, either through their own 
efforts‎or‎at‎the‎behest‎of‎an‎owner‎or‎purchaser’.75 Not all free blacks were ex-slaves; 
there were also a small number of (ex-)convicts, men who were banished to the Cape 
from the Dutch Asian territories for committing a crime, and even the ‘occasional free 
immigrant’.76 They were a small group77 and were mainly concentrated in Cape Town. 
Like the burghers the free blacks were not in Company service and were not slaves, 
they could own property, including slaves, and engaged largely in comparable business 
ventures and craftsman-ships. From June 1752 they also had to pay taxes, because 
according to the statute ‘they enjoyed all the privileges of burghers’.78 There were 
differences: the free blacks could not be elected to public office and they did not have 
representation on the Council of Justice as did the burghers. Apart from the economic 
aspect, the free blacks in Cape Town therefore showed remarkable resemblance to the 
ingezetenen in Dutch cities.79 
 
What is clear from the above is that there was a difference between burghers and free 
blacks. The question is if this was a matter of race or of status. Some have argued that 
the distinction between the two groups was based on race. Rob Shell and Richard 
Elphick write that in the second half of the eighteenth century Cape laws were no 
longer colour blind. They use two examples to illustrate their point. The second one is 
a law of 1771 against the buying or bartering of clothing belonging to slaves or 
convicts. According to Shell and Elphick the punishment for ‘whites’‎was‎a‎fine,‎‎while‎
free blacks would be treated as slaves and be flogged and sentenced to ten years hard 
labour.80 However, when one reads the original plakkaat one discovers that the law 
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sets out the penalties for buyers and sellers of slave clothing. The buyers could be 
anybody in Cape Town – no mention of race or other qualification is made – and they 
were to be punished with a fine for the first two offences and if caught a third time 
they would be banished.81 The sellers however would receive the harsh punishment of 
flogging and ten years hard labour. These sellers would mostly be slaves or free blacks 
(in this case convicts), simply because they were the ones who received these clothes 
from the Company.82 But this was a co-incidental circumstance and one searches in 
vain for any deliberate reference to race or colour. It would be a misrepresentation of 
the facts to present this law as a racially motivated one. 
 
The same applies to the first example they use, which refers to the sumptuary laws 
issued in 1755. These rules prohibited for instance, that free black omen wore 
clothes and accessories which would surpass the ones worn by respectable burgher 
women. Robert Ross has convincingly pointed out that these laws were created to 
preserve the ‘distinction‎and‎subordination’‎within‎society‎and‎to‎make‎sure‎that‎the‎
Company officials stayed on top and every other group below them knew their place 
rather than to construct a difference between races.83 Ross also made a strong case for 
eighteenth-century Cape society as not ‘divided along racial lines, but rather as 
containing‎a‎multitude‎of‎statuses’.84 Accordingly free black was not primarily a race 
classification, but free blacks were just as much a status group as were the burghers or 
Company employees or women. 
 
Maybe the best demonstration of this argument is that descendants of free blacks and 
slaves at the Cape could become burghers. This would not have been possible if 
membership of the different groups was based purely on race. In the archives of the 
Burgher Council is a tax list of burghers dated 1783.85 On this list one finds Abram 
Ventura (junior) and his brother Adriaan. They were the sons of Abraham van Ventura, 
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the grandson of the slaves Ventura and Helena. Abraham van Ventura was named a 
free black in 1746 in a request to manumit a slave86, yet his sons were burghers. 
Abraham Ventura junior took the burgher oath in 1770 and became a member of 
second burgher company infantry.87 His brother Adriaan also swore the burgher oath 
in 1770 and joined the ranks of the fourth burgher company infantry.88  
 
Also on the 1783 tax list is Abraham Adehaan, who was the grandson of Abulbas, the 
Rajah of Tambora, who was banished to the Cape in the seventeenth century. The son 
of Abulbas, Abraham de Haan (or Ibrahim Adehaan) converted to Christianity and was 
baptised in 1721. He married Helena Valentijn, a daughter of free blacks. Their son, 
Abraham, was born in 1731 and married a Dutch woman, Christina Alesia Eversdijk of 
Amsterdam.89 Abraham Adehaan was recorded as having taken the burgher oath on 21 
October 1750 and was therefore a burgher.90 He was even one of the 404 protesters 
against the VOC administration in 1779.  
 
A third case was the one of Moses Davids, who was born in 1742 as the son of Martha 
of the Cape. On 18 October 1758 he took the burgher oath in Cape Town.91 In 1762 he 
married Anna Elizabeth Knoetzen, the illegitimate child of Elizabeth Knoetzen and 
Joachim Prinsloo. In 1779 he was one of the 404 protesters and identified as burgher 
and in 1783 he is found on the Quotisatie Roll. In 1794 he was nominated to become a 
teacher in the District of Stellenbosch and named a ‘Cape burgher and member of the 
Dutch Reformed Church’.92 
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In the above cases it seems that access to the burgher group was obtained because 
free black status was not inheritable. Free blacks achieved freedom in their lifetime. 
Any child born after the mother had obtained freedom was thus born free. In those 
cases where the mother was married, the father also had to be free or born free for 
the child to be considered born free.93 This was the decisive factor: not that they were 
from black, Asian or mixed descent, but that they were born free. And as free born 
they had the right to be classified as burghers, which they later confirmed by taking 
the burgher oath. The fact that children of free blacks were assimilated into the 
burgher group this way very likely contributed to the free blacks remaining relatively 
small in number throughout the eighteenth century. 
 
It thus took at least one generation for free blacks to be classified as burgher. However 
we know of one case in which a man born as a slave achieved burgher status himself. 
This concerned Frans Smiesing, the son of Jan Smiesing and Anna van Dapoer, both of 
whom were slaves in the Slave Lodge in Cape Town.94 It is not known exactly when 
Anna van Dapoer became free, but in 1739 she was described as a free black and 
requested the Political Council to manumit her two sons, Jan and Frans, who were 
slaves in the Slave Lodge.95 Frans was born in 1729, so he must then have been about 
10‎years‎old.‎He‎entered‎the‎service‎of‎the‎Company‎in‎1745‎as‎a‎smith’s‎apprentice‎
and in 1751 he requested the Political Council to favour him with the burgher rights of 
Cape Town.96 On 18 October 1751 he took the burgher oath.97 Frans Smiesing followed 
therefore the same route as many Europeans to become a burgher and made the full 
transition from slave to free black to company servant to burgher. This shows that at 
the Cape anybody who had been in Company service, no matter where he came from 
or what his background was, earned the right to apply for burgher rights. Thus apart 
from being born free there was another opportunity to become a burgher at the Cape 
and this condition, for obvious reasons, did not exist in Dutch cities. This made Frans 
                                                          
93
 See also the discussion on pages 139-140. 
94
 R. Shell and A. Dick, `Jan Smiesing, Slave Lodge schoolmaster and healer, 1697-1734’,‎in:‎N.‎Worden‎
(ed.), Cape Town between East and West. Social identities in a Dutch Colonial Town (forthcoming 
publication). 
95
 WCARS, C 1101, 8-9 (n.d., 1739); C 110, 42 (28.4.1739). 
96
 WCARS, C 1118, 81-82 (n.d., 1751). 
97












Smiesing a perfect example of the possibilities of social mobility that existed in 
eighteenth century Cape Town.  
 
In the South African context it is perhaps understandable that free blacks have been 
discussed mainly in racial terms. However the main determinant for their status in 
eighteenth‎century‎Cape‎society‎was‎that‎they‎were‎“free”, not that they were black. 
The examples from the Cape illustrate that burgher identity was based more on status 
than race in the Dutch empire overseas. Thus burghers there should not be seen 
strictly as Europeans or white, but rather defined as people who were not employed 
by the VOC or were slaves. There was no stipulation that burghers had to be purely of 
European descent. 
 
It was not unexpected for people at the Cape - as it was for non-burghers in cities in 
the Republic - to want to be burghers, because having burgerschap meant being 
member of an exclusive club. It meant having access to privileges and rights which 
other groups in the city did not have. But perhaps most of all, and especially in the 
case of lower ranked VOC employees or free black children, getting burgerschap meant 
an improvement in status. The thinking around status was ingrained in Dutch society 
and this had a lot to do with a certain way of life and belonging to a group, and having 
that acknowledged by other members of society. It was important for the burghers 
that they kept up appearances as defined by their status, but also that everybody in 
society knew where they stood and what they were about. It was regarded as a serious 
threat to societal order if people should try to rise above or outside their station 
without the proper right to do so. It was for this reason that the sumptuary laws were 
acceptable and accepted, because they defined what the various groups were entitled 
to and were in line with the almost obsessive Dutch interest for etiquette, status 
symbols and ceremony.98 Against this background it must come as no surprise that 
their status was very important to the protesting burghers at the Cape and that they 
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stressed the position which set them apart from other groups in Cape society and 
wanted this recognised by the VOC government.  
 
The claim of the Cape burghers that their status and rights were comparable to those 
of the burghers of Dutch cities seems to be supported by the evidence presented so 
far. In fact, it was even confirmed by the Cape administration itself. In September 1768 
they issued instructions and regulations for the burgher militia and Burgher Military 
Council.99 One of the rules stated that all persons who left the Company service or who 
‘came as freeman from The Netherlands or India to the Cape’‎were‎obliged to 
immediately register with the burgher militia.100 And in October 1734 Pieter Christiaan 
Been swore the burgher oath in Cape Town and it was specifically remarked that he 
had arrived in the Cape ‘as burgher from the fatherland’.101 This demonstrates that the 
comparable standing of burgerschap of a Dutch city and Cape Town was acknowledged 
by the Cape authorities. Why then was Fiscal Boers so adamant that Cape burghers 
could not be compared to Dutch burghers? He was reacting to the Cape protest 
movement and he certainly did not want to support its credibility. In so doing he did 
not react very differently from the regents in Dutch cities when they were confronted 
with burgher demands about their rights. The regents mostly did not want to give in to 
the demands and very often they replied that they had no knowledge of these rights or 
could not acknowledge them. And because they were often not recorded properly it 
was difficult to prove that they existed.102  
 
Besides this the VOC administrators at the Cape were reluctant to enhance the 
standing of the burgher group, because the Cape was the only settlement in the Dutch 
Asian territories which boasted a large and relatively self-sufficient burgher group. It 
would not do to further boost their confidence in a time of political turmoil. This fitted 
into the Company policy that all residents were subject to the interests of the VOC as 
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the Directors had made abundantly clear with regards to the burghers in Batavia and 
other Asian settlements. As spokesperson of the Cape VOC government Fiscal Boers 
merely conveyed the official position. But the reality and practice surrounding 
burgerschap at the Cape proved to be contrary to his statements and the Cape 
protesters of the late 1770s clearly did not want to be regarded as second-rate 
citizens, but claimed their rightful position in economic and political life as ‘free 
Burghers‎of‎a‎colony‎belonging‎to‎the‎liberated‎united‎Netherlands’.103 
 
A further demonstration of this argument is the practical way in which the Cape 
burgher protesters took their cue from their Dutch counterparts in constructing the 
relationship between burghers and administration during the political turmoil. 
Maarten Prak has written extensively about Dutch burgerschap and he points us to 
Charles‎Tilly’s definition of citizenship, which, as we have seen so far, is applicable to 
the burgerschap of Dutch cities: ‘a continuing series of transactions between persons 
and‎agents‎of‎a‎given‎state‎in‎which‎each‎has‎enforceable‎rights‎and‎obligations’.104 
Prak further explains the ‘series‎of‎transactions’‎between‎a‎state‎and‎its‎citizens‎and‎
the choices available to them on the basis of the theory developed by Albert 
Hirschman in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.105 The basic concept is that members of an 
organisation have two options when they are dissatisfied with the organisation and 
what it has to offer: they can withdraw from the relationship (exit) or they can 
complain, raise their concerns and try to improve the relationship (voice). In a political 
situation the first option would be to emigrate and the second to protest and 
negotiate. This last option presumes that there is a certain measure of loyalty between 
the organisation and its members and that the organisation (state) will try and 
promote that loyalty. The exit strategy is an extreme form of reaction and not available 
to everybody. In a political situation it would be a choice accessible only to the very 
rich or taken by the poor who did not have much to lose. Therefore voice would be the 
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best and most suitable alternative for the middle classes who were not in a position to 
exit. Voice in the political relationship between state and citizens would normally take 
the form of riots, rebellions or revolution.  
 
Prak explains that the Dutch Republic experienced many conflicts during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but that most were ‘limited in scope and 
relatively non-violent’106, because they were undertaken by the middle classes of 
shopkeepers and artisans - sometimes mobilising the grauw or common people, 
sometimes joined by dissatisfied members of the elite – who were not willing to risk 
high stakes. Another reason for the rather low-key nature of protests in the Republic 
was that most were organised by guilds or local burgher militias and they expressed 
their protest or discontent through petitions rather than violent uprisings.107 ‘Petitions 
were‎seen‎as‎a‎specific‎political‎right‎that‎the‎Republic’s‎citizens‎were‎entitled‎to’108 
and they were a frequent instrument of protest used by individuals as well as 
organisations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Usually the 
petition was part of a lengthy process of negotiation. Even before they were submitted 
local city councils and representatives of the guilds would meet to discuss the matter 
at hand and the contents of the complaints. Then the petition would be submitted. 
The city council would embark on an extensive investigation into the complaints and 
various parties would be consulted and only after all that had taken place a decision 
would be taken. Only if the whole process dragged out too long, would the petitioners 
try and put pressure on the councils, which could sometimes involve more pronounced 
and physical forms of protest.109 
 
The above described process was exactly what happened during the Cape burgher 
protests of the late 1770s. In May 1778 the protesters started by setting out their right 
to complain because the government was not fulfilling its obligation to take care of the 
burghers. This was followed by meetings trying to establish what course of action to 
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follow. The meetings were not very successful and for a while the movement 
dissipated. It took the arrest and treatment of Buijtendag in January 1779 to trigger 
the protesters into renewed action. Again meetings were held and the protesters 
started to look for support among the wider burgher population. Independent Fiscal 
Boers commented that ‘They openly use 2 or 3 young, inexperienced upstarts to ride all 
around the country and let gullible commoners sign papers of which they might never 
know the content’.110 These exploits happened more or less at the same time that a 
form of negotiation with the VOC administration was underway. The burgher 
protesters asked the administration for permission to send a delegation to Holland to 
lay their complaints before the board of directors of the VOC. And the government 
tried to find out from the leaders of the protest movement how far they were 
prepared to take this.111 This did not bring the parties any closer together and in May 
1779 a petition was submitted to the Cape administration with the same content as 
the earlier request and signed by 404 male burghers. Despite refusal by the 
government to allow a delegation to be sent to Holland, the burghers continued on 
their course of action and their representatives arrived in Amsterdam in July and 
August 1779. 
 
It is significant that the negotiations between protesters and VOC officials about the 
contents and nature of the burgher grievances continued in Holland. Cornelis van der 
Oudermeulen, a bewindhebber (director) in the Amsterdam chamber of the VOC, 
invited Hendrik Swellengrebel junior, a son of a former governor of the Cape of Good 
Hope and a regent in the city of Utrecht, to come to Amsterdam and use his 
connections and knowledge of the Cape to speak to the Cape delegates about the 
burgher complaints. Swellengrebel has left us with an insightful account of his 
negotiations in letters he wrote to Governor Van Plettenberg and Independent Fiscal 
Boers.112  
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The Cape delegates must have caused some stir in Amsterdam and word had spread 
about the petition they were planning to present to the Heeren XVII, which included 
personal attacks on some VOC officials. Swellengrebel and his fellow negotiators were 
of the opinion that submitting a petition with these kinds of ‘personaliteiten’‎would‎
greatly harm the burgher efforts and set them on a path of failure, because they would 
offend the Company directors. They tried to convince the Cape representatives to limit 
the petition to ‘a general plan of redress for the Colony’.113 This was in line with the 
established practice: petitions ‘usually included proposals to remedy particular 
problems’,114 and because this was generally accepted it would be something the 
opposing parties would be more inclined to talk about. But at the same time 
Swellengrebel had to persuade the Company and above all its main representative, the 
powerful First Advocate Frederik Willem Boers (who was a cousin of Independent 
Fiscal Boers), to accept a petition like that and that was a hurdle he could not 
overcome. The First Advocate, who was ‘the pivot on which the entire Company 
turns’115 and Swellengrebel had a tremendous disagreement about the amount of 
freedom which should be accorded to the burghers. Swellengrebel maintained that 
burghers should have the security that their person and their goods could not be 
touched unless a proper (i.e. involving burgher participation) court process was 
followed. He agreed that banishment was a power given to the city governments, but 
stated that it should only be used in extreme circumstances, and even then the 
burghers should still have the right of appeal to higher authorities. First Advocate 
Boers was vehemently opposed to this, perhaps motivated by his desire to defend the 
actions of his cousin at the Cape. The two men did not manage to work out their 
differences. The only thing they agreed on was that Swellengrebel would continue to 
try and get the Cape delegates to tone down their petition.  
 
But without anything forthcoming from the side of the Company these men possibly 
became‎distrustful‎of‎Swellengrebel’s‎endeavours‎and‎they‎continued‎to‎set out their 
Memorie the way they originally planned. Once bewindhebber Van Der Oudermeulen 
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got word that the Cape burghers were on the verge of submitting their petition, he 
wanted to undertake a last-ditch effort to stop them and asked for a conference 
between First Advocate Boers, Swellengrebel, himself and the Cape delegation ‘to see 
if they could put the matters back on the road that was set out by them before’.116 At 
first it seemed that the leader of the delegates, Jacobus van Reenen, was willing to 
accept this. But he was not supported by his fellow delegates. He later informed Van 
Der Oudermeulen that they had decided to submit their petition unchanged to the 
Heeren XVII and therefore inclusive of reform proposals, but also containing the 
personal attacks on certain VOC employees based at the Cape. On the day of the 
submission, 16 October 1779, a clearly disappointed Van Der Oudermeulen wrote to 
Swellengrebel that he ‘should not trouble himself anymore’‎and‎that‎all‎they‎could‎do‎
now was be observers of events of which ‘the consequences can only end in misery’.117 
 
The process following the submission of the petition was the same procedure of 
investigation and consultation as was generally followed in cities in the Republic after 
petitions were submitted. In the meeting of the Heeren XVII of 22 October 1779 it was 
stated that the complaints from the Cape burghers were a matter ‘of utmost 
importance and should be treated with the highest consideration’.118 The Directors 
decided to hand all the documents over to the chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland 
for further investigation. They also resolved to send the Memorie and accompanying 
material to the Governor at the Cape. The Governor was instructed to give his opinion 
about the burgher complaints and advise the Directors about the proposed measures. 
The VOC officials against whom charges were made were asked to reply to the 
accusations. ‘And lastly the Governor was informed that the Lords XVII trusted that he 
would do everything to restore peace and order and mutual trust’.119 The Cape 
delegates remained in the Republic and tried to influence the process and lobby 
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officials for a speedy and favourable conclusion. However it took until December 1783 
before a decision was finally reached and it was mostly adverse to the burgher 
demands.120 
 
The Cape burghers made clear during their protests that they considered themselves 
to be just as much part of the Dutch Republic as burghers of cities in the Netherlands 
and had the same rights and status. A closer investigation of the burgerschap and 
burgher identity in the Republic and at the Cape confirmed that they certainly had a 
case. The procedural side of the protest movement – organisation of the burgher 
movement, negotiation between government and burghers, drawing up and 
submission of petitions and the contents thereof – furthermore confirmed the Dutch 
connection of the Cape protests. The Cape burghers used avenues hich were tried 
and tested over two centuries and which were known and available to them. 
 
It cannot be denied that the fight for burgher rights certainly played a role in the Cape 
protests of the late 1770s. This chapter has also demonstrated that this was not 
inspired by an ideology of enlightenment or Dutch patriot movement, but that it was 
based on a long established Dutch tradition and history. There was however another 
side to the conflict and one that is hinted at by the involvement of the negotiators 
described earlier. Hendrik Swellengrebel was the son of a former Cape governor and 
his connections with Cape personalities were considered important by a group of 
moderates among the VOC elite. In the background of his involvement an important 
role was almost certainly played by his desire to become governor of the Cape.121 
Opposite him and fiercely opposed to the burgher demands was Frederik Willem 
Boers, arguably the most powerful VOC official and a cousin of one of the main targets 
of the burghers, Independent Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers. This indicates that faction 
politics could have played a role in the protests and that perhaps burgher identity was 
merely used by leaders looking for support, but having ulterior motives for their 
actions. This aspect will be investigated in the following chapters. 
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3. Factions at the Cape: burghers and protesters investigated 
 
The burgher protests which rocked the Cape settlement in the late 1770s illustrated 
that the burghers regarded themselves as a distinct group with its own identity and 
privileges comparable to those of burghers of Dutch cities. Once this identity and these 
burgher rights were threatened, some burghers felt that they should stand up to 
defend them. In Dutch cities local conflict was often fought out between various 
interest groups or factions and in many cases these were fights for economic or 
political control between equal groupings rather than ideologically inspired revolts. 
The practice around burgerschap and identity at the Cape was quite similar to that in 
Dutch cities, and it could very well be that the dynamics of political conflict involving 
burghers were then also alike. According to this reasoning the Cape burgher protests, 
besides being a struggle to protect burgher identity, were furthermore, and perhaps 
foremost, a faction conflict. For a better understanding of this argument it is again 
necessary to make a comparison with Dutch society. 
  
All the advantages of burgerschap were mobilised in a high level of social networking 
that developed within burgher society in Dutch cities from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century onwards. Certain burghers were forming alliances with each 
other with the aim of controlling the burgher privileges, because it would benefit their 
merchant interests. To achieve this control they needed to have access to public office 
and political power. Prominent merchant families in cities closed their ranks and made 
sure that only members of their family group were appointed in the city government. 
These so-called regenten and their families had to hold on to their privileged positions 
within the city administration, which ultimately gave them status, wealth and power, 
and to enable them to do this they built up networks formed by family members, 
friends, business relations, less powerful regents and lower placed employees, who all 












important and profitable jobs ended up with his family and friends and in return he 
could count on their support in times of trouble.1 
 
A central aspect of the political dynamics was that it was based on group loyalty rather 
than allegiance between individuals. Being a member of a group was of major 
importance to the burghers. This form of rule is best described as patrimonialism, in 
which ‘rulers rule by granting exclusive politico-economic rights and immunities to self-
governing corporate groups, which are liable for certain reciprocal obligations to the 
ruler.’2 Julia Adams points out that in the Dutch Republic this form of rule was 
distinguished from other types, such as bureaucracy or patronage, by the presence of 
a strong familial component.3 Regents were out to build dynasties and obtained 
positions for their sons to set them on a career path which would enable them to 
inherit leading functions in the city governments. Marriages of daughters were 
carefully planned to benefit the family aim of holding on to and gaining power. The 
families and their networks which were linked together through this common interest 
are defined as factions, which became the general clustering of political forces in cities 
in the Dutch Republic.4 
 
It was essential to the interests of the regents as a group and the maintenance of the 
patrimonial system that a relative peace and order was maintained. All regents 
profited by keeping the attractive and lucrative offices within the ruling group and this 
situation would be threatened by infighting and arguments and result in serious 
damage to the regent families, both financially and socially. To reduce conflicts 
leading families entered into formal written arrangements, also known as ‘contracts 
of‎correspondence’,‎through‎which‎positions‎were‎divided‎and‎succession‎matters‎
arranged. These contracts determined exactly the turns each leading family would 
take in getting positions in the city council, VOC board of directors or other leading 
functions. Power was thus concentrated in the hands of only a few families and their 
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clientele. Sometimes less important families were given a post here or there to keep 
them pliable and to gain their support. Some families however were not (yet) part of 
the arrangements and were therefore excluded from power. They could get impatient 
or maybe they wanted more than was allocated to them. Despite the contracts they 
formed opposing factions and fierce conflicts could erupt about the control over city 
councils, public offices and their lucrative offshoots.5 
 
In most Dutch towns the vroedschap or city council formed the core of local 
government. Council members were appointed for life and new members were co-
opted. The city council handled all major policy decisions. From the ranks of the 
council members the aldermen and mayors were recruited. The aldermen were the 
local court of justice and the mayors formed the executive. Together, the aldermen 
and mayors constituted the magistracy, which was the legislative authority. Whereas 
the members of the council sat for life, appointment to the aldermen bench and the 
mayoral offices was temporary and limited to two or three years at a stretch. After 
standing down, these officials could be re-elected in due course. While awaiting 
another turn as alderman or mayor, former magistrates would become ordinary 
councillors again and could take up other offices in the meantime.6  
 
Even though the Cape did not have a city council, it did have a government in the form 
of the Political Council, which could be compared to the permanent vroedschap of 
Dutch cities. At the Cape members of the Political Council were appointed 
permanently, just as Dutch city councillors, and it ruled the settlement together with 
bodies like the Council of Justice and Orphan Board, to which members were 
appointed for terms of two years. Another important similarity was that both Dutch 
city councils and the Cape Political Council were in practice dominated by relatively 
closed elites. In Dutch cities these were formed by burghers, while at the Cape they 
were VOC officials. Yet we have seen in the previous chapter that VOC officials were 
firmly entrenched in the Dutch practice of regent and familial rule, and therefore they 
can be regarded as the equivalent of the regents and patriciate of Dutch cities. 
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The resemblance between political institutions in Dutch cities and at the Cape and the 
resultant similarity in political practices, like patrimonial rule and faction forming, is 
best illustrated by a well-known episode in Cape history: the W.A. van der Stel affair.7  
 
Willem Adriaan Van Der Stel became governor of the Cape settlement in 1699 and 
succeeded his father Simon in that position. He had not made a career in the VOC, but 
was catapulted into the highest function at the Cape. The links of the Van Der Stels 
with the regent world of Amsterdam most likely were instrumental in this 
appointment. The paternal grandfather of Willem Adriaan had been governor of 
Mauritius and his maternal grandfather was a mayor of Amsterdam. While living in 
Amsterdam he himself had been a member of the church administration of the 
Zuiderkerk and a city councillor in 1691. He belonged to an influential family of 
regents, which apparently attempted to set up a ruling dynasty at the Cape. 
 
Governor‎Willem‎Adriaan‎van‎der‎Stel‎made‎his‎own‎and‎his‎families’‎interests‎
paramount to those of the Cape and the burgher population. He made sure that his 
family, friends and closely related colleagues were awarded large tracts of land to 
farm, even though Company officials were legally forbidden to engage in farming. By 
1705 about a third of the total farming land of the Cape settlement was in the hands of 
only twenty Company officials, who all happened to be closely related to the Van Der 
Stels.‎The‎Governor’s‎favours‎were‎not‎just‎reserved‎for‎VOC‎employees,‎but‎did‎also‎
extend to burghers, like his brother Frans. Other burghers who profited from their 
relationship with the Governor were the four licensed burgher butchers who were 
allowed to buy the monopoly to trade in cattle and meat and Johannes Phijffer, who 
through the manipulations of Van Der Stel was afforded the opportunity to buy the 
exclusive right to sell Cape wine. It was common knowledge in the small Cape 
community‎that‎these‎burghers‎were‎all‎the‎Governor’s‎men. 
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Willem Adriaan Van Der Stel set himself, his family and a few friends up with a cast-
iron monopoly on the trade in meat, wine and grain and he did not think there was 
anything wrong in doing that. His past as Amsterdam regent and councillor and the 
status that went with it must have conditioned him to act in this manner. At the Cape 
he was the highest authority and as a highly placed regent he felt he was entitled to 
exploit all the advantages at his disposal as he and his fellow regents were accustomed 
to do. 
 
Some burghers did not agree with this practice. Under the leadership of Henning 
Hüsing, a group of mostly rich farmers drew up a petition against the Governor. Among 
them were Jacob Van der Heijden, Pieter Van Der Bijl, Ferdinand Appel and the well-
known Adam Tas. The wealthy farmers and businessmen felt disadvantaged and 
threatened by the unfair competition practices of Van Der Stel and his network of 
business relations. Thus their motivation to form a faction opposing the Governor was 
more economical than ideological even though they made it seem as if they were just 
trying to protect the interests of the Company and the Cape by exposing the 
incompetency of the administration, just as the protesting burghers of the late 1770s 
would do.  
 
Governor Van Der Stel did not intend to take the threat to his authority, status and 
business interests lying down. He arrested members of the opposing faction and 
organised a counter petition, for which he collected 240 signatures, most of whom 
were people who were favoured by the Governor in one way or another or were 
dependent on him as a business patron. It all was to no avail. In October 1706 the VOC 
Directors decided to relieve Van Der Stel of his duties as Governor and called him back 
to‎Holland.‎Furthermore‎all‎the‎Governor’s‎land‎was‎restored‎to‎the‎Company‎as‎well‎
as the land in the hands of other officials. The Directors issued orders that no Company 
employee was allowed to trade, directly or indirectly, in corn, cattle or wine. It were 
these instructions that the burgher protesters of the late 1770s referred to time and 













It could be that the VOC Directors took these decisions because they wanted to avoid 
any public scandal which could harm the reputation of the Company. They probably 
also wanted peace and order at the Cape, which was a vital strategic and refreshment 
station for the VOC. But it was also clear that Van Der Stel no longer enjoyed the 
protection of the majority of the Amsterdam VOC directors. By 1706 they were mostly 
new‎appointees‎and‎followers‎of‎Joan‎Corver,‎while‎Van‎Der‎Stel’s‎patron,‎Nicolaas‎
Witsen, had lost most of his influence. Van Der Stel had become the victim of a typical 
eighteenth century feud between two factions and while his rise to power had to be 
attributed to his close relations with the regent elite in Amsterdam, his fall came 
following a lack thereof. 
 
The point of relating the W.A. van der Stel affair is that it had clear elements of 
patrimonial rule, with a leader who built networks based on family links and mutual 
interests and abused his power. This resulted in faction conflict as was so common in 
many Dutch cities. It is furthermore possible to draw arallels between the Van Der 
Stel affair and the dispute of the late 1770s, e.g. the complaints against VOC officials, 
the role and nature of petitions and the involvement of wealthy burgher farmers. 
Robert Ross writes after stating that the conflict of the 1770s was caused by Company 
employees grabbing too large a share of the economic activity in the Cape settlement: 
‘In‎this‎sense‎it‎was‎a‎replay‎of‎the‎W.A.‎van‎der‎Stel‎affair‎earlier‎in‎the‎century’.8 All 
this raises the question whether the burgher protests of the 1770s were a similar 
struggle between two groups or factions for economic and political control. 
 
To be able to shed light on this question we need to study the protesting burghers in 
more detail. Who were they? Where did they reside? Where did they come from? 
Were they related with each other and if so, how? Where did they stand in relation to 
other members of Cape society? What role did they play in Cape society? Were they a 
large section of the burgher population? Did they belong to the upper echelons or 
were they found among all social strata? The attempt to answer these and other 
questions prompted the building of a database of burghers residing in the Cape 
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District in the 1770s and early 1780s, which makes it possible to perform a 
prosopography. Lawrence Stone has defined prosopography as follows and this 
describes accurately the function of this database:  
‘Prosopography is the investigation of the common background characteristics 
of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives. The 
method employed is to establish a universe to be studied, and then to ask a set 
of uniform questions - about birth and death, marriage and family, social 
origins and inherited economic position, place of residence, education, amount 
and source of personal wealth, occupation, religion, experience of office, and 
so on. The various types of information about the individuals in the universe 
are then juxtaposed and combined, and are examined for significant variables. 
They are tested both for internal correlations and for correlations with other 
forms‎of‎behaviour‎or‎action.’9 
 
This is precisely what we are setting out to do in the following. The study of the 
dynamics of political life in Cape Town at the time of the burgher protests, particularly 
with regards to the question whether these were a faction fight, made it necessary to 
compare the protesters to the rest of the burgher population residing in the Cape 
District in 1779. The year 1779 was chosen, because it was in that year that one of the 
main documents of the protest movement, the petition of May 1779 to send a 
delegation to Holland, was produced. This petition was signed by 404 burghers and 
contained their names, which enables the identification of a large number of burgher 
protesters. But unfortunately there is no list of burghers in the Cape District for 1779. 
The opgaaf or annual tax returns, which would have provided a detailed list of names, 
run until 1773 and for the years after that only total figures are available.10 Therefore a 
burgher list for 1779 had to be compiled and for this the database of burghers is an 
essential tool.11 
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The database contains different kinds of information on the burgers of the Cape 
District. The data can be combined in many diverse ways and various aspects of 
burgher life can be highlighted. This makes the database a useful instrument for the 
historical research of burgher society and indeed Cape society as a whole at the end 
of the eighteenth century. 
 
Much of the data for the database has been collected from primary sources held in 
the archives of the Western Cape Archive and Records Service. Because the ultimate 
aim is to gain insight into the political life in particular Cape Town at the end of the 
eighteenth century the gathered data focused on the Cape District. And because the 
burgher protests started in 1778 most of the information is from the decade leading 
up to the protests, the period 1770 to 1780. In the following section it will firstly be 
shown which sources were used to compile the database and how a list of burghers 
residing in the Cape District in 1779 was assembled. After that more general 
conclusions about the protesting burghers will be drawn.  
 
Figure 3-1 is a record of the database showing which data has been collected. The 
records start with the name of the person. There were no uniform spelling rules for 
names at the time and various contemporary writers spelled them differently. 
Because the database contains a search function it was decided to record all 
alternative spellings. Figure 3-1 shows a typical example of the many diverse ways in 
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In the archives of the Burgher Council12 is a ‘Taxatie-Lijst’ dated September 1773. This 
tax list contains the names of 406 burghers, who were required to contribute 
financially to the building of a new road between Cape Town and Rondebosch.13 The 
criteria for having to pay this tax were as follows:14 
 Owners of a ‘rijtuig of bolderwagen’‎(carriage‎or‎handcart)‎– 10 rijxdaalders. 
 Owners of a ‘chaise of bolderwagen’‎(chaise‎or‎handcart)‎– 8 rijxdaalders. 
 Owners of a ‘rijpaard tot plaisier of om te verhuuren’ (horse for pleasure riding 
or to rent out) – 2 rijxdaalders. 
 Licensed butchers – 24 rijxdaalders. 
 Bakers – 9 rijxdaalders. 
 Private butchers – 6 rijxdaalders. 
 Wood transporters – 6 rijxdaalders. 
It is apparent that the prospective users of the road were made to pay for its 
construction.  
 
The tax list forms the basis of a roll of burghers living in the Cape District in the 1770s 
and provides the following information: 
1. First name and last name of the burghers. 
2. Sometimes extra details were given, e.g. junior, senior or son of, and this has 
also been recorded. This assists with identification of the person concerned, 
but also helps with providing some information on family relations. 
3. Furthermore a field has been created for the tax amount that each person on 
the list was supposed to pay, because this gives an indication of wealth, which 
will be one of the issues investigated later on. 
4. The burghers on the list all resided in the Cape District, which has been 
recorded as well. However there were five burghers, who lived in the outer 
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districts, but owned property in the Cape District.15 They have been marked 
with‎an‎“X”‎behind‎the‎tax‎amount. 
5. Lastly almost all the burghers on the list were males, but there were females 
as well: one a widow and the other the (two) daughters of Johannes 
Vermeulen. This has prompted the creation of a field in the database which 
reflects the gender of the person. 
 
Another source in the archives of the Burgher Council is the ‘Quotisatie Rolle over den 
Jaaren 1783’.16 The Quotisatie tax was raised by the Burgher Councillors to provide for 
a fund out of which several expenses were paid. It used to be called ‘Lion, tiger, 
bridges, roads and night watchmen tax’17 and thus paid for the killing of dangerous 
animals, maintenance of roads and bridges and the wages of the night watch men.18 A 
new Quotisatie roll was made up every year around September19 and consisted of two 
parts: one with burghers and burgher widows and one with VOC employees and VOC 
widows.20 In the database only the names of the burghers, a total of 1011, have been 
included. The following information has been obtained from this list: 
1. The names of the burghers and extra information provided. New records were 
only created for burghers who did not appear on the 1773 tax list. If they did 
appear on the 1773 list and were therefore already in the database any new 
information was added to their existing record. 
2. The quotisatie tax was based on financial means and this roll therefore provides 
information about the wealth of the burghers. The decision of the Political 
Council regarding the Quotisatie Tax taken in 1754 mentioned the following 
criteria on which the tax amounts were based: 
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 Two Schellingen a month for each chimney21, which makes 24 Schellingen 
per year, which is equivalent to 1.2 Guldens (Guilders) per annum.22 
 An annual amount of 6 to 12 Guilders for everyone who owned houses or 
land 
 An annual amount of 3 and 4 Guilders for everyone who did not own real 
estate 
 An annual amount of 2 Guilders for unmarried young men.23 
The amounts on the Quotisatie Rolle were all in Guilders and range from 1 to 
30.24 The tax amounts have been recorded in the database and will be 
evaluated later. In some cases two amounts are given, because the roll has 
figures in the margin in front of names. Presumably these were corrections to 
the original amount after the list was checked by the authorities. 
3. All the burghers on the roll lived in the Cape District, because it was compiled 
by the Burgher Councillors whose jurisdiction only extended to this district. 
However, as with the 1773 tax list, there were five persons who did not reside 
in the Cape District, but had either a business or houses or warehouses there.25 
It appears that they were required to pay local tax as well. In the database they 
are‎marked‎with‎an‎“X”‎behind‎the‎tax‎amount. 
4. The roll also included twenty-seven females, who apparently were not widows 
(because there was a separate list for these), but could have been unmarried or 
divorced women. At least one of them was identified as a ‘gesep huijsvrou’‎or‎
divorced (separated) wife. 
 
The role of female burghers was discussed briefly in the previous chapter and one of 
the points made was that they did not have a political voice and thus did not sign the 
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protest petitions. The females on the tax lists are therefore not considered in the 
comparisons in this thesis.  
 
When the twenty-seven women and the five burghers living in the outer districts on 
the 1783 Quotisatie roll are excluded, one ends up with a list of 979 males.  According 
to the Opgaafrol of 1783 there were 958 male burghers in the Cape District.26 The 
difference between the two figures could be explained by the fact that the Opgaafrol 
was compiled in April and the Quotisatie roll in September 1783. It is possible that in 
the period in between twenty-one more persons could have registered to become 
burgher. Whatever the case, the difference is minimal and it can be maintained that 
the 1783 Quotisatie Rolle was a complete burgher roll or at least a complete roll of all 
burghers who were required to pay tax. This is why the 1783 Quotisatie roll can be 
used as a basis from where to work out who were burghers in the Cape District in 
1779. 
 
The start of this process is to select the burghers who appeared both on the 1773 tax 
list and on the 1783 Quotisatie roll. This totals a number of 255. None of these are 
females and none are burghers residing in the outer districts. It can reasonably be 
assumed that these 255 burghers were residents of the Cape District in 1779. This is 
recorded‎in‎a‎separate‎field:‎“Burgher‎Cape‎District‎March‎1779”.‎Other‎sources‎are 
used for confirmation of this. 
 
Some of these can be found in the archives of the Burgher Military Council.27 There is a 
‘Generaale Rolle Der Burgerrij zoo als Die zigh is bevindende zedert Primo October 1783 
Aan Cabo de Goede Hoop’‎or‎Burgher‎roll‎of‎Cape‎District‎burghers‎dated 1 October 
1783.28 Unfortunately the list is not complete and only contains the burghers with 
surnames starting with the letters A, B and M-V. They have all been added to the 
database. Sometimes notes were made about burghers regarding date of death, date 
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of moving to another district or date of entry into Company service. This provides 
valuable personal data on these burghers. 
 
The Burgher Military Council archives furthermore hold a complete list of burgher 
militia members in the year 1785.29 This list is divided in the following categories: 
 The officers of the two companies burgher cavalry and four companies 
infantry with rank and year of appointment. 
 The non-commissioned officers (onder officiers) of the two companies cavalry 
with rank and year of appointment. The appointment year was only recorded 
for sergeants and corporals. 
 The non-commissioned officers of the four companies infantry with rank and 
year of appointment. The appointment year was only recorded for sergeants 
and corporals. 
 The burgher constables (burger constapels). 
 The Pijpebestierders (hose operators) at the brandspuijten (fire engines) with 
the rank of sergeant. 
 The Firewardens of 1785 (Brandmeesters). 
 The twenty rattle-watch (Ratelwagt). 
 Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Company de Reserve. 
 Officers and non-commissioned‎officers‎of‎the‎Company‎d’Invalides. 
 All the soldiers (gemeenen) of the various companies. 
 
All male burghers had to become members of the burgher militia once they reached 
the age of sixteen or after being granted burgher rights. It follows that this list was 
therefore the most complete burgher roll of burghers in the Cape District in 1785. 
Therefore all the burghers on this list have been added to the database and if the 
burghers were already in the database because they were on the tax lists of 1773 and 
1783 and the burgher roll of 1783 the information provided has been added to their 
records. 
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The records of the database are set up in such a way that all information regarding 
burgher militia membership can be displayed in a separate pop-up. The burgher 
militia data reflect the years of appointment and service, the rank, the burgher 
company and the source of information. In this way the career of the burgher through 
the ranks of the militia can be traced and the database can also filter this information 
to a required set of records. 
 
Regarding the militia careers of the various burghers it must be noted that further 
information about these has been obtained from other sources. In the archives of the 
Burgher Military Council itself is a ‘Lijst der Officieren bij de resp Compagnien burger 
Militie hier aan Cabo de Goede Hoop. Aanstelling der officieren in den jaaren 1781’‎
(List of officers of the respective companies burgher militia here at Cape of Good 
Hope. Appointment of the officers in the year 1781).30 These appointments were 
made in April 1781 by the Political Council after the leaders of the burgher militia had 
requested that the militia would be strengthened with more officers ‘to be able to 
lead the troops better in case of enemy attack’.31 This was shortly after the Cape 
residents had been informed of the new war that had broken out between the United 
Netherlands and England in December 1780. Other sources are the Minute books of 
the Burgher Military Council and the Burgher Council and the Resolutions of the 
Political Council. These bodies all recorded or decided on militia appointments at 
some time or other. 
 
Even though they were linked to the burgher militia the information about two sets of 
burghers in the 1785 militia member list has been excluded from the burgher militia 
data, and has been added to the records of the database in another place. These are 
the brandmeesters or fire wardens and the rattle-watch members. 
 
There are two reasons for recording the brandmeesters separately. The first one is 
that this was one of the more prestigious functions a burgher could be appointed to 
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by the administration. All Dutch cities had these fire wardens and they were 
responsible for making sure that no dangerous fire-causing situations existed in the 
town and that streets were kept free from flammable material. In case of fire they 
would be in charge of fighting it together with members of the burgher militia. Very 
often it was more an honorary position and the actual work was carried out by 
assistants (the pijpebestierders). The burghers who were appointed to be fire wardens 
were part of the regent elite.32 This is confirmed by the data available about the 
brandmeesters in Cape Town. Twenty-six are identified in the database and half of 
them were also church council members, burgher councillors or orphan masters. And 
according to their tax figures most fell in the highest tax brackets. The second reason 
was that they were exempt from performing burgher militia duties. This was very 
likely an extra motivation for burghers wanting to become brandmeesters. 
 
On the other side of the spectrum were the ratelwagt members. Their duties were to 
patrol the streets of the cities at night and apprehend burglars and disturbers of the 
peace. This was not the same duty as the members of the burgher militia performed 
at night, because these mainly occupied strategic points such as entrances to the city. 
Being a ratelwagt was not a popular job. They were burghers who were recruited 
from the lowest strata of society and they generally did not have a good reputation.33 
They would be paid a small fee and that is why the fact that a burgher was a ratelwagt 
has been‎recorded‎in‎the‎“occupation”‎field‎in‎the‎database‎rather‎than‎the‎burgher‎
militia information. During the 1770s the Burgher Councillors controlled a contingent 
of twelve rattle-watchers in Cape Town, who were divided over three wards.34 The 
database contains thirty-eight burghers who had been ratelwagt in Cape Town at one 
time or another and the available data for these men confirms their common status: 
none of them had an administrative function and all of them were found in the lowest 
tax brackets. Besides this the minutes of the Burgher Council reflected that there was 
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quite a turn-over among the rattle-watchers, because they were fired regularly for 
bad behaviour or being drunk on duty. 
 
After having added the burghers on the two tax lists, the burgher militia lists and the 
burgher roll of 1783 we now have a relatively good insight into who were burghers in 
the Cape District in the early 1780s. There were close to 1200 male burghers 
altogether. But to be able to make the comparison between the 404 protesters and 
the rest of the burgher population in 1779 and answer the questions referred to 
earlier we still need to get a more accurate burgher list for (the beginning of) 1779. 
 
For this the archives provide some helpful additional sources. The archives of the 
Political Council contain the requesten, among which are many requests for the 
burgher rights of Cape Town. These and the information they provide for the 
database have been discussed in the previous chapter. The date of the requests is the 
date when the person first applied to become a burgher of the Cape District, even 
though the actual registration may have occurred at a later stage when the burgher 
entered the ranks of the burgher militia. Unfortunately not all the requests for 
burgher rights have been preserved. 
 
The Oath Books in the archives of the Political Council have turned out to be 
invaluable in providing further information on burghers and their date of 
registration.35 The Oath Books consist of a great number of different oaths. There are 
oaths for members of the Political Council and other VOC employees; oaths for 
midwives and surgeons; for various tradesmen; and oaths for burgher councillors, 
burghers and burgher militia members. Apart from the burgher oath itself it was also 
recorded who actually swore the oath, the date on which this happened, and in which 
district the new burgher was registered as such. In the 1770s the administration 
furthermore added in which burgher militia company the new burgher had to serve. 
The oath books thus provide a wealth of information for the purposes of the 
database.‎The‎burghers‎on‎the‎“oath‎lists”‎have‎been‎compared‎to‎the‎burghers in the 
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database and this has made it possible to give the date on which the men in the 
database became burghers. It can reasonably be assumed that when a person 
requested to become a burgher or was found on the oath lists of the Cape District 
before 1779, while his name was also on either the 1783 Quotisatie roll, the 1783 
burgher roll or the burgher militia lists of 1785, this person was a burgher in the Cape 
District in 1779. 
 
At this point we need to remind ourselves that all 404 signatories of the May 1779 
petition were added to the database. Apart from their first and last names the 
signatories in some cases also provided the position they were holding or had held in 
Cape society, e.g. burgher councillor, captain or elder. It is therefore an important 
source of information. The names of the signatories have been checked against the 
names of the burghers already in the database. In cases where their records already 
existed, it has been reflected that they signed the May 1779 petition. In other cases a 
new record was created. 
 
According to the March 1779 request and the May 1779 petition only residents of the 
Cape and Stellenbosch districts had signed the petition.36 Therefore we can safely 
assume that none of these signatories was resident in the district of Swellendam. But 
the protest documents unfortunately did not specify the residence of the signatories 
further. This information has to be deduced from other sources. It is important to 
establish where the 404 signatories lived and if any district or place was more 
represented than others to be able to draw conclusions about the spread of the 
protest movement in the Cape settlement. Should it turn out that all or even most of 
the 404 lived in the Cape District it could mean that almost 50% of the burgher 
population closest to the centre of the Cape government and power would be 
supportive of the protest movement and that in turn would have been something that 
was difficult for the administration to ignore or downplay. 
 
                                                          
36
 WCARS, C 157, 149; C 1173, 88 (30.3.1779); C 2665, 2 (7.5.1779). This is confirmed by Governor Van 












With the information gathered from the tax lists and the militia records we can draw 
conclusions about the residence of a large number of the signatories. The oath books 
provide further assistance, because they state in which district the burgher took his 
oath. Another important source of information can be found in the Returns for 
Taxation Purposes, which the VOC administration compiled of the burghers in the 
outer districts. They are comparable to the Opgaafrollen and provided data on the 
names and number of men, women, children, slaves and cattle and quantities of 
produce that were held at a particular time. For the purpose of establishing the 
residence of the signatories the returns of the district of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein 
for the year 1778 and 1779 were used.37 The names of the signatories were checked 
against the names of the burghers on these tax returns to determine if they were 
indeed residing in the Stellenbosch district. 
 
Figure ‎3-2: Protesters as part of the total male burgher population per district (1779)38 
 
 
It is now possible to select the protesters in the database and divide them according 
to the district they were living in (Figure 3-2). There were 247 protesters in the Cape 
District and 157 in the Stellenbosch district. The Cape District figure represents 61.1% 
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of the 404 protesters and 25.4% of the total male burgher population of the district. 
This illustrates that a not inconsiderable portion of the protesters were found in the 
Cape District. This becomes more significant if one compares the number of male 
burghers in the Cape and Stellenbosch districts. Even though there were more male 
burghers in the Stellenbosch than in the Cape District, the support for the protest 
movement in the former district was remarkably less (12.05%). Therefore the Cape 
District can definitely be regarded as the area where the core of the protest 
movement was located.  
 
In none of the primary sources used for the database a distinction was made between 
the urban and rural burgher population. In some sources more information on 
residence is provided, but generally it is almost impossible to ascertain if the 
protesters were based in Cape Town or if they were found among the farming 
population of the Cape District. It can however not be denied that Cape Town was the 
largest place in the Cape District and indeed the entire Cape settlement and it has 
been calculated that one third of the total population of the Cape lived in Cape Town 
throughout the eighteenth century.39 Coupled with the fact that Cape Town was a 
port city, which needed the services of a large number of innkeepers, craftsmen and 
shopkeepers, it could be speculated that a majority of the Cape District protesters 
lived in Cape Town and that this city could be regarded as the centre of the burgher 
protest movement. 
 
All the information gathered so far produces a combined list of 812 burghers who 
were registered in the Cape District in the first half of 1779. This is still 161 short of 
the number of burghers there were supposed to be according to the 1779 Opgaafrol, 
but it does provide a reasonable sample to compare the 247 Cape District protesters 
to and start dealing with some of the questions asked.40 
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In the petition of May 1779 the Burgher Councillors and Heemraden claimed they were 
the ‘representatives of the entire burgher population’‎of‎the‎Cape‎of‎Good‎Hope.‎The‎
Cape delegates to the Republic stated exactly the same in the introduction to their 
Memorie.41 This statement could be attributed to the required propaganda of a 
political protest movement wanting to emphasise that they were supported by a 
majority. But it was actually more than that. In the chapter about Cape burgerschap 
the notion of ‘exit, voice‎and‎loyalty’‎was‎introduced‎to‎shed‎more‎light‎on‎the‎
dynamics of the relationship between state and burghers. To resolve tensions and 
prevent citizens from taking the exit route or voicing their dissatisfaction and protest, 
governments needed to encourage and promote loyalty to the state. They could do so 
in several ways, e.g. through raising the profile of the urban community in order to 
make it attractive for people to be part of it, by formalising burgerschap arrangements, 
and by offering burghers various welfare schemes.42 Another important loyalty 
strategy was for the elite to show their commitment to the community and that was 
done through the tax system. In most European countries the poorest citizens had to 
pay the most towards taxes, while in the United Netherlands ‘the Dutch elite not only 
paid taxes like everybody else, but in the eighteenth century, even experimented with 
progressive‎taxation’.43 The urban rulers, despite having become a closed elite by this 
time, were still burghers and as such they wanted to be seen to be looking after the 
common good with their initiatives and investments. However the middle layer of 
craftsmen made the same claim and argued that their skilfulness, industry and thrift 
were just as, if not more, beneficial to the public interest.44 They certainly did not want 
to be accused by the rulers of not acting in the interest of the community. Both groups 
considered that paying ones taxes was an indispensable and essential part of 
burgerschap and benefitted the entire community. This point was underlined in 
petitions by stressing that the petitioners not only acted in their own interest, but 
defended that of the community as a whole.45 Thus when the Cape protesters pointed 
out that they represented the total burgher population of the Cape they wanted to 
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demonstrate that they were committed and loyal subjects of the administration and 
that their aim was not to lead some kind of revolt against the government. They knew 
that the vast majority of petitions in the Dutch Republic contained similar formulas and 
that the meaning of this statement would be well understood. It was thus an 
extremely important declaration to make and not merely a hollow political phrase. 
 
The VOC officials at the Cape were just as familiar with the way petitions worked and 
how they were usually formulated and therefore they were well aware with what was 
implied by the burgher statements about representation. In their responses to the 
burgher Memorie they did their utmost to discredit the protesters and to show them 
up as nothing more than a band of troublemakers. They did this by stating that the 
protesting burghers were just a small group which was not representative at all for the 
rest of the burgher population.  
 
The governor of the Cape, Joachim van Plettenberg, stated in his official response to 
the burgher complaints that ‘the Burgher Councillors in this matter can and must not 
be regarded as anything else than exceptional persons, or at the most leaders of the 
signatories, whom altogether are only a small portion of the Freeburghers and 
Colonists’.46 Clearly the governor did not mean exceptional in the positive sense of 
being special, but he wanted to point out that the Burgher Councillors were few 
amongst many. He continued to write that ‘the largest and highest part [of the 
burghers], do not approve at all of the actions of their fellow Residents and certainly do 
not recognise the quality, which Burgher Councillors and Heemraden have given 
themselves’.47  
 
Independent Fiscal Boers was true to his vocation of lawyer in his reply to the burgher 
charges and wrote a long exposé on the authority of the Burgher Councillors which, he 
concluded, did not extend to anything other than a few burgher matters and then only 
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subject to strict instructions from the Political Council. They were definitely not 
‘entrusted with anything like general care or supervision and therefore they cannot in 
the least be considered Representatives of the Burgher nation’.48 He stated that 
wanting to present a request of just a few hundred of the many thousands of burghers 
as being representative of all of them was ridiculous and presumptuous.49 
 
Other officials also commented on the small portion of signatories in relation to the 
total burgher group and claimed that this could not be seen as representative. It is not 
too difficult to establish whether the VOC officials were right, because fortunately the 
Dutch administrators were well-organised record-keepers. Figure 3-2 shows the 
number of protesters in relation to the total male burgher population in 1779 and 
confirms that the 404 protesters formed 14% of this total. When the Swellendam 
district is left out of the picture, because nobody there signed the petition, this 
percentage increases to 17.75%. Both these figures are not small, but also not 
impressive and it seems that the Governor and other government officials were right 
when they depicted the protesters as a minority of the burghers overall. They 
conveniently did not make mention of the fact that 60% of the protesters lived in the 
central Cape District, where they formed a quarter of the population. 
 
The VOC officials realised however that the protesters could not merely be evaluated 
in terms of quantity and that the quality, status and background of the members of the 
movement needed to be called into question as well. Despite the fact that they may 
not have made up a large part of the burgher population in numbers, it could not be 
denied that they did form a protest movement which made a considerable impression 
and had proved to be a more than just a minor source of irritation and annoyance to 
the Cape authorities. This group of burghers managed to send a delegation to Holland 
despite the tight control measures of the VOC, they made sure that the ‘Wel-Edele 
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Groot Achtbaare Heeren XVII’‎took‎note‎of‎their‎complaints‎and‎ordered‎a‎far-reaching 
investigation, they organised further protests with burgher militia support at the Cape, 
and intimidated the Cape administration into conceding to various demands. 
 
That the protest movement was a thorn in the side of the VOC officials was illustrated 
by the sour comments they made about the protesters, who they described as 
insignificant and lowly kinds of burghers. Based on information provided to him by the 
rich Cape farmer Hendrik Cloete, it was Hendrik Swellengrebel who wrote: ‘the 
disgruntled at the Cape are not the most prominent settlers, but people of lower 
standing’.50 Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers called the 404 signatories ‘the gullible 
rabble’.51 And Governor Van Plettenberg wrote in a letter to Hendrik Swellengrebel 
‘that the people who started this whole game for the larger part have such a bad 
reputation, that one does not want to have much to do with them, as I concluded from 
the Register of Signatories’.52 Provisions Master Damiaan Hugo Staring was perhaps 
most vitriolic in his judgment of the protesters: ‘at least three quarters are the lowest 
kind of Europeans, most of whom had to leave that continent because of their criminal 
behaviour, mixed with Hottentotten and slaves’.53 
 
The Cape Company officials did not want to acknowledge that the protest movement 
was supported by a considerable section of the burgher elite. Among the signatories of 
the May 1779 petition were three Burgher Councillors, four incumbent and eight 
former Heemraden a d several other members and former members of administrative 
colleges. Furthermore twelve of the eighteen highest officers of the burgher militia, 
among whom five of the six captains, had signed the petition. The status of these 
burgher officials will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, but it must 
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be pointed out that these were burghers of the highest ranking within Cape society 
and certainly not the kind of people who could just be ignored or set aside as people of 
lower standing. 
 
Even though wealth is generally not regarded as a guarantee for class or standing, in 
the light of the claims made by the VOC officials about the protesters it is necessary to 
determine if the protesters were indeed found among the lowest or lower income 
groups. This can be done with the help of both the 1773 Taxatie Lijst and the 1783 
Quotisatie Rolle, which provide some information on the wealth distribution among 
the protesters and how this compares to the rest of the burgher population.  
 
There are 404 male burghers on the 1773 tax list for the building of a new road. This 
group formed 48.44% of the burgher men in the Cape District in 1773.54 It was 
established that there were 812 burghers in the database of whom it was confirmed 
that they resided in the Cape District in 1779. We find 315 of these burghers on the 
1773 tax list and these are divided in non-protesters (191) and protesters (124). The 
number of 124 represented half of the total number of protesters in the Cape District. 
The above establishes that the burghers on the 1773 tax list form a good sample of 
burghers from which to draw some conclusions about wealth and perhaps status. 
 
According to the criteria on which the tax amount was based it can be determined that 
the burghers who had to contribute to the building of the new road were 
entrepreneurs and in possession of modes of transport. This means that they had at 
least some wealth and is a first indication that the 124 protesters on the tax list were 
not the poorest burghers. When we look at the tax that each of these burghers had to 
pay according to the 1773 tax list, we can compare protesters and non-protesters. The 
results of this comparison are shown in Table 3-3. Apart from showing the number of 
tax payers per tax amount, they are divided in three groups, which represent a lower, 
middle and higher tax bracket. Judging by the percentages in columns 4 and 6 it can be 
concluded that there is no significant difference between protesters and non-
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protesters. Even though the biggest variation (higher percentage for protesters) is 
found in the lowest tax figure of 5 Rijxdaalders, the total difference for the lowest 
group is not considerable. Overall indications are that the protesters were an average 
group of burghers and certainly did not stand out as predominantly poor or as people 
of particular lower standing than other burghers. 
 
 
















5 111 61 31.9 50 40.3 
10 120 70 36.7 50 40.3 
15 30 23 12.0 7 5.7 
20 31 21 11.0 10 8.1 
Total 292 175 91.6 117 94.4 
30 13 8 4.2 5 4.0 
40 3 1 0.5 2 1.6 
Total 16 9 4.7 7 5.6 
50 5 5 2.6 0 0 
60 2 2 1.1 0 0 
Total 7 7 3.7 0 0 
      
Grand total 315 191  124  
 
 
The 1783 Quotisatie Rolle provides an even clearer picture. The information on wealth 
distribution furnished by the Quotisatie roll is more accurate for a number of reasons. 
As was established before it was a complete burgher roll and the criteria by which the 
tax amounts were determined were based more firmly on financial means and income. 
Furthermore the sample of protesters on the 1783 tax roll is larger in comparison to 
the 1773 list. By selecting the burghers residing in the Cape District in 1779 who are 
found on the Quotisatie Rolle, we get a group of 697 burghers. This group is divided in 
non-protesters (495) and protesters (202). The 202 protesters formed 81.8% of the 
247 Cape District protesters. 
 
In Table 3-4 the protesters and non-protesters are compared based on the 1783 tax. 












the division. The first group is formed by the young and lower income burghers, who 
did not own property (0-4 Guilders). The next group comprises the property owning 
burghers (6-30 Guilders) and is divided in half thereby creating a middle income (6-15 
Guilders) and a higher income (18-30 Guilders) group. 
 
















0 39 37 7.4 2 1.0 
1 2 2 0.4 0 0 
2 140 126 25.3 14 6.9 
3 120 91 18.2 29 14.4 
4 64 44 8.8 20 9.9 
Total 365 300 60.1 65 32.2 
6 84 55 11.0 29 14.4 
8 12 9 1.8 3 1.5 
9 61 28 5.6 33 16.3 
10 8 1 0.2 7 3.5 
12 45 26 5.2 19 9.4 
15 38 24 4.8 14 6.9 
Total 248 143 28.6 105 52.0 
18 33 17 3.4 16 8.0 
21 18 13 2.6 5 2.4 
24 11 8 1.6 3 1.5 
27 11 8 1.6 3 1.5 
30 15 10 2.1 5 2.4 
Total 88 56 11.3 32 15.8 
      
Grand total 701 499  202  
 
 
Immediately a number of differences between protesters and non-protesters stand 
out. Firstly the percentage of protesters in the lowest income group is significantly 
lower than that of the non-protesting burghers. If one considers in particular the 
criterion for being taxed 2 guilders - which was to be an unmarried young man - one 
finds only 6.9% of these young men among the protesters, while this percentage was 
25.3% among the non-protesting burgher population. Secondly in the middle income 
group the situation is virtually the other way around: the percentage of protesters is 












highest income group are almost the same for protesters and non-protesters, the 
combined percentage of the middle and highest income groups is almost 30% higher 
for the protesters. These figures show more pronounced than based on the data of the 
1773 tax list that the protesters did not belong to the poorest burghers and also that 
they included a considerable portion of older burghers with property. Especially this 
last aspect is a first indication that the protesters were found more among the middle 
layer of entrepreneurs and tradesmen. 
 
Apart from the financial evidence this argument can be substantiated with other facts. 
There is for instance the case of the rattle-watchers. They were salaried employees, 
who were drawn from the bottom layers of the burgher community. They were paid 
six Rijxdaalders per month, which was increased to seven in 1773 and eight in 1774.55 
This was 96 Rijxdaalders or 230 Guilders per year. With this income the rattle-watchers 
may have belonged to the more fortunate commoners among the burghers, but they 
were still part of the lowest strata of the burgher population.56 It is therefore 
significant to note that none of the rattle-watchers active during or before 1779 signed 
the protest petition of 1779, the one exception being Hermanus van der Schijff 
Janszoon, who was a rattle-watcher in the 1760s, but must have done better later in 
life, because according to the 1783 tax list he fell in the middle bracket. 
 
The results of the tax comparisons between protesters and non-protesters show that 
Governor Van Plettenberg was less than candid when he attacked the quality of the 
protesting burghers and signatories of the burgher petition by stating that they were 
found at the bottom of burgher society and therefore most of them had nothing to 
lose. According to him any change would be an improvement for them.57 By his own 
admission the Governor had studied the register of signatories and within the small 
society of the Cape he must have known exactly who he was dealing with. His 
comments were contradicted by the financial facts and clearly did not have much 
substance. They must be attributed to a deliberate attempt to discredit the protesters. 
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 WCARS, BRD 1, 19 (25.2.1773), 42 (4.2.1774). 
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 De Jong, Een deftig bestaan, 14; Van Duin and Ross, The Economy, viii. 
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Apart from describing the burgher protesters as a lowly and poor group of people, the 
VOC officials at the Cape and their supporters also tried to depict them as being 
uninformed and ignorant of what the protest movement actually stood for. Governor 
Van Plettenberg claimed that most signatories were not aware of the exact nature of 
the burgher complaints and thought they only signed a petition to prevent ‘that what 
happened to Buijtendag would happen that evening or another day to them or 
theirs’.58 Jacobus Johannes Le Sueur wrote to Swellengrebel that ‘among those who 
signed the petition, are several, who in hindsight felt very misled’.59 And Fiscal Boers 
stated in his reply to the burgher accusations that most signatories of the protest 
petition‎‘did not know the content of the paper they signed, and that some only days 
after having signed regretted this, and insisted that their names would be removed, 
and informed him in person of this desire, so that this ill-considered deed would not be 
held against them later’.60 The Company administrators wanted to portray the 
protesters as an uninformed bunch of people, who withdrew their support for the 
movement once they found out that it was mainly directed against the government. 
 
However the tax figures show that a majority of the protesters belonged to the more 
established part of the burgher population. It seems improbable that people who had 
managed to make a financial and entrepreneurial career were as gullible as the 
administrators argued. Even more so because the signing of the petition was preceded 
by meetings of burghers where it was discussed what the protest movement stood for. 
It was thus unlikely for the signatories not to have been informed or at least have 
some inkling of the nature of the objections against the administration. 
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 `het gebeurde met Buijtendag niet t’avond of morgen hun, of iemand van de hunne mogt overkomen’‎- 
WCARS, C 2692, 9 (20.3.1781). 
59
 `onder die genen die mede voort redres getekend hebben, zijn verschijden die van agteren zien, zeer 
misleijd te zijn geweest’ – Schutte, Swellengrebel, 85. 
60
 `onkundig zijn geweest van den inhoud van het Papier, waaronder zij hunne handtekeningen hebben 
gesteld, dat sommige selfs seer weijnige dagen na deselve tekening sig daarmede hebben beswaard 
gevonden, en dat sij op de roijeeringe van hunne naamen hebben doen geinsteerd, en er aan den 
Ondergetekenden selve in persoon van hebben doen kennisse geven, opdat men naderhand uijt die 












Furthermore, even though it is no indication of a higher form of education, most 
burghers in eighteenth century Cape Town could read and write, which was more than 
could be said about the lower ranked VOC employees, who were mostly drawn from 
the ‘unemployed‎proletariat‎of‎Dutch‎towns’.61 The burghers who signed the protest 
petition were not uneducated: only four of the 404 signatories were illiterate and 
signed the May 1779 petition with a cross. They were almost certainly not people who 
were led astray by a few conniving leaders as the Company administrators claimed. 
 
The burgher protest movement was not disorganised or losing strength from the time 
it started as the VOC officials implied with their above quoted statements. Support for 
the movement was not diminishing at all. At the annual burgher militia review in 
October 1779 the burghers forced the Political Council with military intimidation to 
accept that the serving Burgher Councillors would stay on for another year instead of 
resigning in December as should have happened.62 And in January 1780 Hendrik Cloete 
reported to Hendrik Swellengrebel that ‘the riots of the burghers spread like wildfire’.63 
There were more petitions and requests from protesters throughout 1780 and even 
though they were not signed by the same number of burghers as the one of May 1779, 
it was clear that the protest movement showed no signs of fading. 
 
The evidence presented so far suggests that the support for the protest movement 
was found among the middle income and richer burghers. This was not unique to Cape 
Town. In the previous chapter it was established that most of the burgher protests in 
cities in the Dutch Republic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
rather non-violent, because of the involvement of the middle layer of burgher 
shopkeepers and artisans organised in guilds and burgher militia, who chose the more 
civilised way of petitions rather than running amok. The motive of these burghers to 
support the protest movement was likely that they would benefit from the proposed 
economic reform measures. The Cape entrepreneurs favoured cutting out the VOC 
middleman from trade and being allowed to trade freely with Europe and the Asian 
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settlements. They would also have been opposed to any unfair competition by 
Company officials or other groups. All the indications are that these protesters were a 
well-established, informed and organised faction fighting for a share of the economic 
spoils.   
 
This is further supported by statements made at the time of the protests, which 
illustrated that the opposing groups had a familial basis. Fiscal Boers wrote on 31 
January‎1780‎that‎‘Hate and anger, always so common in these circumstances, are 
playing a remarkable role in our current drama. One needs to be here to truly 
experience the real nature of what is going on. The nearest relatives begrudge each 
other the light in their eyes and only self interest is preventing an unspeakable 
persecution, which would be followed by murder and mayhem’.64 And in February 1788 
the Political Council refused one of the leaders of the protest movement, Burgher 
Councillor Cornelis van der Poel, permission to sue the VOC koopman Christoffel Brand 
with the words that they feared ‘the immediate revival of the despicable divisions, 
which dominated this Colony for a long time, through which animosity and bitterness 
between residents and even between those who normally were tied together through 
the loving bonds of family came about, so that one had to fear the most harmful 
consequences for this Colony’.65 
 
Apart from the fact that these accounts were evidence of the traumatic impact of the 
political turmoil, they are also illustrations of the aspect of family and faction conflict 
involved in the burgher protests. This aspect, and the question if the motive behind 
the conflict was indeed economic, will be further investigated in the following 
chapters. This will be done by describing the role of various role-players and 
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 `Haat en nijd, altoos zo eijgen aan dit climaat, spelen bij die gelegenhijd eene wonderbaerlijke Rolle op 
ons Toneel. Men dient hier present te zijn, om de ware geschapenhijd der zaken regt te bezeffen. De 
naaste bloedverwanten gunnen elkanderen het ligt niet in de oogen, en indien men door het point van 
interest niet nog eenigzints in teugel wierd gehouden, geloof ik, dat moord en doodslag de gevolgen van 
een onbeschrijffelijke persecutie zouden zijn’ - Schutte, Swellengrebel , 104. 
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Colonie hebben geheerscht, en waardoor verwijderingen en verbitteringen tusschen Ingezeetenen Ja 
zelfs ook tusschen de zodanige die anderzints door de teederste banden van namaagschap aan 
elkanderen verbonden zijn waren ontstaan, zo dat men uit deselve de Schadelijkste gevolgen voor deze 












organisations, starting with the officials (Burgher Councillors), then the burgher militia, 
and finally the burgher entrepreneurs. A closer study of the people will eventually shed 












4.  The Burgher Councillors 
 
Even though the ruling elite in many Dutch cities closed their ranks more and more 
from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards they were never completely 
detached from the rest of the burgher residents and realised they could not rule 
without their support. Therefore they invited and allowed leading members and 
representatives from the middle layer of the burgher population to become part of 
the city government. They were called burgerraden (burgher councillors) or 
burgemeesters (burgher masters) and were given specific tasks, like looking after the 
city walls, the canals and the market and taking care of the orphans. These prominent 
burghers were frequently engaged in the same type of business as the regents and 
often family and friendship ties were forged between them.1 
 
A similar development occurred in the Cape settlement. Once the burgher group was 
created at the Cape at the end of the 1650s it grew rapidly. In the Cape District alone 
the number of burghers grew from 51 in 1658 to 563 in 1701.2 The VOC administrators 
were steeped in the Dutch regent tradition and practices and following the principles 
of patrimonial rule, which were based on mutual support, they must have thought it 
wise to give the burghers representation in the administration of the settlement. Even 
though the VOC ultimately stayed in control of its settlement, it wanted to obtain a 
certain measure of co-operation from the growing burgher population, because 
without it there would be a potential for conflict. The Cape government thus made 
space for representatives of the burgher population on its administrative colleges and, 
as in the Dutch cities, they were called burgerraaden. In 1676 the number of Burgher 
Councillors increased from two to three and by the mid 1680s they had developed into 
a separate body (the Burgher Council). They were given tasks not unlike their Dutch 
counterparts and supervised the Ratelwagt (night watch), controlled the burgher 
butchers and bakers, and took care of the financing of the maintenance of roads and 
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 Worden, Cape Town, 26; Beyers, Die Kaapse Patriotte (1967), 339. The total number of burghers in the 












bridges in the town and district. The Burgher Councillors raised taxes from the 
burghers in the Cape District to be able to perform these functions. The VOC 
administration furthermore determined by 1685 that the Burgher Councillors were 
allowed‎to‎take‎part‎in‎the‎meetings‎of‎the‎Cape’s‎second‎highest‎administrative‎body,‎
the Council of Justice, but only when it dealt with matters concerning burghers.3  
 
The Burgher Councillors at the Cape were appointed for terms of two years. Two of the 
three Burgher Councillors were replaced one year and one of them the next year. The 
Burgher Council submitted a double nomination of candidates to the Council of Policy, 
which would then choose and appoint its preferred candidates.4 Like the aldermen and 
mayors in Dutch cities, the Burgher Councillors alternated their function with several 
other positions within the administration and burgher militia of the Cape settlement. 
They served as members of the Orphan Chamber or as Commissioners of Civil and 
Marriage Affairs; they were often the highest officers in the burgher militia; and they 
were elders or deacons of the Church Council of the Dutch Reformed Church. Most of 
these important burghers were repeatedly appointed on the executive bodies and 
subsequently their administrative careers could sometimes span a period of several 
decades.  
 
Because the functions of the burghers are recorded in the database it is possible to 
select the Burgher Councillors who served in the ten year period running up to the 
start of the Cape protest movement – the period 1770-1779. It results in a list of just 
fifteen names (Table 4-1), which indicates that the Burgher Councillors belonged to a 
relatively exclusive group. It is on this group that this chapter will mostly focus.  
 
As members of this elite group the Burgher Councillors were awarded a high status. In 
1755 the so-called sumptuary laws were issued at the Cape following instructions from 
the central VOC government in Batavia. The laws were designed to regulate ‘pracht en 
praal’‎(pomp‎and‎circumstance)‎among‎the‎various‎segments‎of‎the‎population‎to‎
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 Visagie, `Inventory’, 2-5. 
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ensure that nobody would rise above or go outside the station they were supposed to 
be in accordance with their rank and status.5 It can be concluded from these laws that 
Burgher Councillors were awarded a rank equal to that of under-merchant in the VOC. 
The ‘onderkoopman’‎was‎the‎third‎highest‎rank‎in‎the‎VOC‎hierarchy.‎The‎sumptuary‎
laws determined that Burgher Councillors were therefore allowed to wear gold or 
silver shoe buckles and their wives jewellery up to a certain value and clothes of 
specific material. 
Table ‎4-1: Burgher Councillors, 1770-1779 









Bottiger, Jan Fredrik Willem Orphan Master; 
Captain; 
Brandmeester 
 50 30 
Brink, Andries (sr) Orphan Master; 
Ritmeester 
 30 30 
Cruijwagen, Johan Meijnderts Ritmeester; Elder  60 30 
De Wit, Petrus Johannes Orphan Master; 
Brandmeester 
 50  
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald (sr) Orphan Master  50 30 
La Febre, Jacobus Alexander Orphan Master; 
Commissioner; 
Captain; Deacon 
 20  
Maasdorp, Christiaan George Orphan Master; 
Ritmeester 
Yes 10 30 
Meijer, Gerrit Hendrik Orphan Master; 
Captain 
Yes 10 30 
Muller, Adam Gabriel Orphan Master; 
Brandmeester; 
Deacon 
 15 30 
Smuts, Johannes Orphan Master; 
Commissioner; 
Captain 
 15 30 
Van Breda, Michiel Orphan Master; 
Lieutenant 
Died 1777 30  
Van der Poel, Cornelis Captain Yes 20 30 
Van der Spuij, Jacobus Orphan Master Died 1778 60  
Van Reenen, Jacobus (sr) Orphan Master; 
Lieutenant 
Yes 50 30 
Van Sittert, Johannes (sr) Orphan Master; 
Brandmeester; Elder 
 40 30 
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The burgher protesters of the late 1770s were not satisfied with this ranking and 
maintained that the Cape administration went against the instructions of the Heeren 
XVII. One of the points raised in the Memorie was that ‘the members of the Burgher 
colleges should be having the rank which was awarded to them by Your Honourable 
and Respectable Gentlemen: a Burgher Councillor and Captain of the Burgher Militia 
the rank of Merchant’.7 This request was indicative of the enormous importance that 
was placed on having the proper rank and status in Cape society as was the case in the 
social and political world of any Dutch city. The insistence on a higher ranking by the 
protesters was not merely motivated by a desire among the Burgher Councillors to 
wear more expensive clothes or be allowed to have more horses before their 
carriages. It carried great significance for their status in public life. Arrivals of high 
officials, inaugurations and funerals were highly public events and a perfect 
opportunity‎to‎show‎one’s‎standing to the general populace. Accordingly the place one 
was awarded during these occasions was precisely circumscribed. In the 1760 funeral 
procession of Sergius Swellengrebel, the Secunde (deputy Governor), the incumbent 
Burgher Councillors were in the eleventh (out of thirty-one) position immediately 
behind various VOC officials, but grouped together with the members of the Council of 
Justice. Former Burgher Councillors were number seventeen and came before the 
captains of the burgher militia and members of the Orphan Chamber and Commission 
of Civil and Marriage Affairs.8 The protesters thus wanted to make sure that the 
Burgher Councillors were given the place they were entitled to in accordance with 
their proper rank. 
 
Not only did the Burgher Councillors have a high status, they were required to be able 
to afford it financially. Table 4-1 gives an indication of the wealth of the fifteen Burgher 
Councillors. The Taxatie Lijst of 1773 shows that seven of them had to pay the highest 
tax amounts of 40 to 60 Rijxdaalders, a further four fell in the middle category (20-30 
Rd) and only four were in the lower brackets, but none in the lowest of 5 Rijxdaalders. 
And in a decision taken by the Political Council in 1754 regarding the Quotisatie tax it 
                                                          
7
 `de Burger Collegianten dien rang te laaten genieten, die hun reeds door U Wel-Ed: Groot Achtb: 
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was resolved that the Burgher Councillors had to pay the fixed and highest amount of 
30 Guilders.9 They had to do this even when they were not in function, because all the 
(former) Burgher Councillors still alive in 1783 were taxed with this amount. This 
indicated that being a Burgher Councillor was a permanent status, even when not 
serving as such – an important point in the discussion about factions among Burgher 
Councillors later in this chapter. A certain measure of wealth definitely was one of the 
prerequisites and criteria for becoming a Burgher Councillor. This impression is further 
supported by the fact that the Burgher Councillors all owned various properties in 
Cape Town itself as well as gardens and farms.10 
 
Another feature of the Burgher Councillors was that they came from influential 
families and this very likely contributed to them achieving their position. The 
grandfathers, fathers and elder brothers of many members of the group of Burgher 
Councillors of the 1770s, e.g. Cornelis van der Poel, Jacobus van Reenen, Johannes 
Meijnderts Cruijwagen, Christiaan George Maasdorp, receded them in that function 
or in the comparable position of Heemraad in the outer districts. More details about 
the families of the Burgher Councillors will be provided when their individual 
backgrounds are discussed later on. 
 
The Burgerraaden were thus generally wealthy and came from high-ranking 
backgrounds. Everything pointed to the fact that this group of burghers belonged to a 
ruling elite within the burgher community. By accepting their position on the 
administrative colleges of the Cape they became regenten just like their VOC 
counterparts. And as regents they were expected to belong to the ‘wisest, most 
important and richest’11 among the burgher population. Despite this, it could be 
argued that the Burgher Councillors did not have any real political power. All the 
administrative bodies that the burghers served on consisted of both Company 
employees and burghers, but this was never on equal footing. The VOC administration 
made sure Company members were in the majority or had the deciding vote. The 
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appointment of the Burgher Councillors was completely subject to Company approval 
and it was unlikely that candidates who did not have a favourable disposition towards 
the administration would make it into the inner circles of the administration. All the 
decisions of the Burgher Councillors had to be signed off by the Council of Policy. On 
acceptance of their position they were required to swear an oath which pledged 
absolute loyalty and allegiance to the Dutch States-General, the Stadholder, the 
Directors of the VOC and the local Company government.12 It is clear that the role, 
status and political position of the Burgher Councillors was heavily dependent on the 
good-will of, and was interwoven with, the VOC government and its officials. It cannot 
have been a comfortable position for the Burgher Councillors: how were they expected 
to act as proper representatives of the burgher population if they were so deeply 
entrenched in the VOC administration? But this was precisely where the VOC wanted 
the Burgher Councillors to be, because it would make it more unlikely that they and 
the burghers they represented would seriously oppose the Company government. 
 
Yet all three serving Burgher Councillors - Cornelis van der Poel, Christiaan George 
Maasdorp and Gerrit Hendrik Meijer - turned against the government in 1779. 
According to the ‘Resolutie Boek van E: E: Burgerraaden’‎(Resolution‎Book‎of the 
Burgher Councillors)13 the Burgher Councillors did have regular meetings together. In 
the minutes of these meetings no reference whatsoever is found to the burgher unrest 
of the time. It seemed that the Burgher Councillors, knowing how closely scrutinised 
they were, did not discuss this subject in their meetings or at the very least they did 
not minute their discussions. It is probable that they did not want to raise the 
suspicions of the Political Council and the Company about the burgher actions. 
 
On 30 March 1779 they submitted the request to the Political Council to send a 
delegation to Holland to address the burgher concerns. Suddenly the tension between 
the VOC officials and the Burgher Councillors became palpable. On the day that the 
Burgher Councillors wanted to submit the afore-mentioned request to the Political 
Council they were kept waiting outside the council chamber. They were never invited 
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to come in and a lowly messenger was sent to collect the request from them. A few 
days later the Councillors were summoned to appear before the Governor to explain 
what all the burgher meetings and unrest were about and what the burghers were 
planning to do.14 Until then the relation between the members of the administration 
and the Burgher Councillors was based on mutual respect and letters from the 
government to the Burgher Council usually started with the collegial ‘Goede Vrienden’‎
or ‘Dear‎Friends’.‎To‎be‎treated‎like‎common‎underlings‎was‎a‎serious‎affront‎to‎the‎
status of the Burgher Councillors. Clearly the VOC government wanted to show who 
really was in charge.15 
 
Subsequently the relationship between VOC officials and Burgher Councillors became 
even more strained as the three Burgher Councillors continued to test the boundaries 
of their authority. In October 1780 they appointed the burghers Dirk Weesberg and Jan 
Andreas Grundlingh to obtain affidavits and statements about civil and criminal 
complaints from burghers. They did this after having been requested to do so by 
several burghers.16 In so doing they assumed powers which the Burgher Councillors 
never had according to the members of the Council of Justice, which was the only 
judicial court in Cape Town and the only body authorised to attend to any legal matter. 
The Burgher Councillors were merely part of the proceedings when matters concerning 
burghers were heard. The Council of Justice complained to the Political Council about 
the activities of the two burghers, who acted independently from the VOC government 
almost as a separate burgher court or scheepenbank. The members of the Political 
Council were shocked to hear that the Burgher Councillors ‘could have emancipated 
themselves to go beyond their authority for which no precedent has ever existed’.17 The 
Council instructed the members of the Council of Justice to disregard and ignore the 
activities of the two burghers and not accept any cases or statements produced by 
them. The conduct of these burghers was even more detestable, because it would 
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cause ‘the current discord and disputes among the Cape residents to worsen and 
continue’.18  
 
Then in November 1780 another conflict erupted between the Political Council and the 
Burgher Councillors. This time it concerned the Quotisatie Rol of 1780. It appears that 
the Burgher Councillors had had the audacity to increase the tax amount of Company 
employees and put previously untaxed Company employees on the list without seeking 
the permission of the Political Council first. The Council was very annoyed and it saw 
this as a challenge to its authority. That the Burgher Councillors thought they could ‘do 
things by themselves without any consultation with the government’‎was‎unheard‎of.19 
To prevent this from happening again it was decided that from then on the Quotisatie 
Rol would be compiled by a commission consisting of Burgerraaden and one or more 
members of the Political Council.20 
 
It appears that the Burgher Councillors tried to become something that they were not 
entitled to be in terms of Company policy: independent administrators. This raises the 
question why the three serving and the former Burgher Councillor Jacobus van 
Reenen would turn against the government in 1779, seeing that they were in a 
respectable position as part of the Cape ruling elite and the administration. At the 
same time it must be noted that apart from these four Burgher Councillors and after 
having discounted the two who died before 1779, there were nine others who 
apparently did not support the protest movement or at the very least did not sign the 
May 1779 petition. This points to a difference of opinion among the Burgher 
Councillors. 
 
The obvious disagreement among the Burgher Councillors is a relevant point, which 
becomes clear when the responsibilities of the Burgher Councillors are looked at more 
closely. One of their duties was to represent the interests of the burghers towards the 
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VOC administration. Therefore they would often submit requests to the Political 
Council on behalf of burghers. Against this background it might be argued that the 
four protesting Burgher Councillors were merely doing their job as burgher 
representatives. However this function of representing the burghers did not just 
extend to the serving Burgher Councillors, but also to the former ones. Burgher 
Councillors would often serve a number of terms and once someone was appointed 
as Burgher Councillor the status and role remained with him even after he had served 
his term. It was furthermore customary that when the Political Council wanted to 
investigate something concerning the burghers, it consulted both with the serving as 
well as the former Burgher Councillors.21 In line with this, and especially in such an 
important matter as the struggle for burgher rights, one would expect that more 
Burgher Councillors would have signed the burgher petition. Yet they did not do so 
and therefore one has to consider why. 
 
Contemporary observers saw the three serving Burgher Councillors indeed as leaders 
of the protest movement. Governor Van Plettenberg stated that they appointed 
themselves as the leaders of the Malcontenten.22 The writer of an anti-protest 
pamphlet described Cornelis van der Poel as ‘Cornelis den Hoofdman’‎(Cornelis‎the‎
Chief), who poisoned many good and obedient burghers against the administration.23 
Van Plettenberg saw him as one of the ‘instigators of the discord’‎and‎singled‎him‎out‎
as one who particularly tried to turn the opinion of the burghers against him.24 Van 
der Poel in his turn accused the Governor of having an unfavourable disposition 
towards him and other members of his family because of ‘the part he had played in 
promoting the Burgher rights during the complaints to the lords Directors in the 
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Fatherland’.25 The Governor had offended his honour and status as captain of the 
burgher militia by refusing to promote his nephew, Albertus Johannes van der Poel, to 
vaandrig despite this being the wish of the majority of the members of the burgher 
militia. It was for this reason that Van der Poel requested his discharge as captain in 
the burgher militia and of all his other burgher duties in February 1782. In the same 
request Van der Poel pointed out that the Governor had embarrassed Christiaan 
George Maasdorp by not appointing him in a militia position he qualified for on the 
basis of seniority. Maasdorp was bypassed in favour of the younger and less 
experienced captain (and non-protesting Burgher Councillor) Johannes Smuts. Van der 
Poel‎cited‎Maasdorp’s‎involvement‎as leader of the burgher protests as the reason for 
this.26 The Governor simply replied that‎Van‎der‎Poel’s‎claims‎were‎untrue,‎but‎that‎
he did not want to argue about it and the discharge was granted.27 
 
Governor Van Plettenberg provided further insight into the apparent division within 
the ranks of the Burgher Councillors. In his official res onse to the burgher complaints 
the Governor remarked that it would have been customary for the three serving 
Burgher Councillors to consult with their former colleagues. As was established earlier 
serving and former Burgher Councillors met on a regular basis, especially when 
important issues needed to be discussed. The Governor continued to argue that 
should they have done this when the troubles started and together have agreed on a 
course of action, they would have rightly been able to say that they acted in the 
interest of all the burghers. Instead the serving Burgher Councillors disregarded their 
colleagues28 ‘to not expose themselves to the unpleasantness of being outvoted or be 
opposed in their actions’.29 Apart from the fact that the Burgher Councillors were 
therefore not properly qualified as burgher representatives, the Governor also 
implied that there were opposing camps among the Burgher Councillors. This 
warrants a closer inspection of the Burgher Councillors. 
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One of the major complaints contained in the second part of the 1779 burgher 
Memorie was that various Company officials engaged in private trade against the 
regulations of the Company and according to the protesters one of the main culprits 
was the firm La Febre & Co.30 The main partner in this company was ex Burgher 
Councillor Jacobus Alexander La Febre and he was in business with the VOC Provisions 
Master and member of the Political Council Damiaan Hugo Staring and the Provisions 
bookkeeper Hendrik Pieter Möller.31 La Febre was the youngest son of a large 
(originally) Huguenot family, which was aligned to a number of important VOC families 
through marriage. An older sister of La Febre was married to the Secunde Otto Luder 
Hemmy.32 La‎Febre’s‎wife‎was‎Christina‎Jacoba‎de‎Wet.33 She had two sisters who 
were married to respectively Petrus Ludovicus Le Sueur, the Company Warehouse 
Master, and his brother Johannes Jacobus Le Sueur, the Company Cellar Master and 
member of the Political Council.34 The last one was quite vocal in his opposition to the 
burgher protesters.35 Two‎brothers‎of‎La‎Febre’s‎wife‎were‎Olof‎Godlieb‎de‎Wet,‎a‎
member of the Council of Justice, and Hendrik Justinus de Wet, a VOC boekhouder. 
Olof Godlieb de Wet was the son-in-law of Burgher Councillor Jan Fredrik Willem 
Böttiger. Hendrik Justinus de Wet had an extensive network of links with both VOC 
officials and Burgher Councillors. Through his first wife, Sophia, he was a son-in-law of 
Burgher Councillor Andries Brink (sr). Through his sister he was a brother-in-law of 
Jacobus Alexander La Febre, while his second wife, Elisabeth Jacoba, was a niece of La 
Febre.36 Perhaps more important were his entrepreneurial links. He was one of the six 
partners in the firm Cruijwagen & Co, the other company that the protesting burghers 
specifically mentioned in their complaints. The other partners were the Burgher 
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Councillors Adam Gabriel Muller and Petrus Johannes de Wit, the VOC under-merchant 
Christoffel Brand and the bookkeeper Abraham Chiron and lastly the person after 
whom the firm was named: VOC kassier Gerrit Hendrik Cruijwagen, who was the 
brother of Burgher Councillor Johan Meijnderts Cruijwagen.37 Both Christoffel Brand 
and Petrus Johannes de Wit were sons-in-law of Johannes Hendrikus Blankenberg, a 
member of the Council of Justice and secretary of the Orphan Chamber, who was again 
the uncle of Hendrik Justinus de Wet and his siblings. Jacobus Alexander La Febre also 
had business dealings with Burgher Councillor Petrus Johannes De Wit, Christoffel 
Brand and Abraham Chiron.38 One of the partners in his company La Febre & Co, 
Hendrik Pieter Möller, was a member of the Möller family, most of whom were 
employed by the VOC. One of the Möller brothers, Marthinus Johannes, was the son-
in-law of VOC assistent Michiel Smuts, who was the brother of Burgher Councillor 
Johannes Smuts and the brother-in-law of Burgher Councillor Johannes van Sittert (sr). 
 
The above intricate web of relationships has been translated into a schedule (see 
appendix 2) with the aim of showing that eight non-protesting Burgher Councillors 
were part of the same faction. The over-arching conglomerate has been divided in four 
sub-networks, each revolving around a prominent Cape family or group of 
entrepreneurs. The major three were the De Wet family, the firm La Febre & Co and 
the firm Cruijwagen & Co. The main families in these networks were La Febre, Le 
Sueur, De Wet and Möller. Perhaps most striking is that Jacobus Alexander La Febre 
was a member of all three main sub-networks and as such was the centre figure in this 
ruling faction of Burgher Councillors and VOC officials. His position reflects pre-
eminently the familial component of patrimonial rule referred to in the previous 
chapter. His central place will prove to be of vital importance for the course of the 
political events of the late 1770s as will be described later. 
 
The presented information shows that the non-protesting Burgher Councillors were all 
linked into a tight network of burghers and VOC employees close to the centre of 
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government. Governor Van Plettenberg was well aware of this situation when he 
claimed that the protesting Burgher Councillors would have been outvoted by their 
colleagues. Belonging to this ruling faction could very well have motivated the majority 
of the Burgher Councillors to not support the protest movement – most were simply 
too closely related to high Company officials and they had nothing to gain, but much to 
lose, from opposing the VOC administration. 
 
The schedule in appendix 2 also shows the three protesting Burgher Councillors and 
their links with the ruling establishment. It is no surprise that they had these 
connections, because without them it would almost certainly not have been possible 
to become a Burgher Councillor. But despite their being part of the elite group they 
chose to stand up against the administration. How can this apparent contradiction be 
explained? 
 
Of the three Burgher Councillors, Gerrit Hendrik Meijer was the one who seemed to 
have had most links to the Cape establishment and was therefore the least likely to go 
into opposition. He was a third generation Cape burgher. His grandfather was from the 
Netherlands and arrived at the Cape in the 1690s. The Meijer family eventually moved 
to the Swellendam district, and it was there that Gerrit Hendrik and his brothers took 
the burgher oath in 1753.39 He climbed the ranks of the burgher militia to become a 
captain and he was also a Swellendam Heemraad. In 1772 he asked to be relieved of 
his burgher duties in the district, because he wanted to move to Cape Town.40 The 
status of his positions in Swellendam ensured that he did not become an ordinary 
burgher in the Cape District. Soon after arrival in Cape Town he was appointed as 
deacon in the Dutch Reformed Church (1774), Burgher Councillor (1776) and Orphan 
Master‎(1777).‎He‎also‎became‎the‎captain‎of‎the‎burgher‎Company‎d’Invalides.‎
Another contributory factor to his career as official in Cape Town was probably that he 
was married to Hester de Wet.41 She was a cousin of the brothers Olof Godlieb and 
Hendrik Justinus de Wet. Gerrit Hendrik Meijer was furthermore a nephew of former 
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Burgher Councillor Jan Mijndert Cruijwagen and therefore a cousin of Burgher 
Councillor Johan Meijnderts Cruijwagen and VOC official Gerrit Hendrik Cruijwagen.42 
 
With this background and these family links one would not expect to find Gerrit 
Hendrik Meijer on the side of the burgher protesters, were it not for the fact that he 
was in serious conflict with Independent Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers. Meijer wrote 
about this in a statement submitted in support of the protest movement and recorded 
in the documents related to the protests. He recalled how the geweldiger Doeksteen 
came to his house and told him, on orders of Independent Fiscal Boers, ‘that I would 
have to prepare a sum of money, payment of which would prevent, that a certain 
Person would give a statement about a Criminal case in which he [Meijer] would be 
accused of sleeping with and fathering a child with a young girl’.43 Meijer became 
extremely angry and upset that he would be accused of such an abhorrent misdeed. 
He told Doeksteen that he would never pay any money, because this had nothing to do 
with him. 
 
In his official response to the burgher complaints, Fiscal Boers gave a different 
interpretation of the incident. He claimed that he had heard about a nephew of Meijer 
of the same name, who had impregnated an orphan girl staying with him and his wife. 
Boers had suggested to Doeksteen to make some discrete enquiries. Doeksteen was a 
cousin of Meijer and Boers assumed that because of this family relationship he may 
have been have been less diplomatic than expected. Presumably Doeksteen had 
advised Meijer to quietly handle matters for his nephew and save the whole family 
shame and embarrassment. Whatever the case, Boers stated he never instructed 
Doeksteen to accuse Meijer himself or demand any money or bribe. He furthermore 
pointed out that Meijer should have rather kept quiet about this shameful incident to 
protect his family name. But now, because Meijer had issued a public statement, the 
whole embarrassing story was out in the open and all that merely because Meijer had 
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wanted to tarnish the reputation of the Fiscal. According to Boers the tactic had 
backfired badly on Meijer and his family and there was no substance in the story.44 
Cape Town was a kletsdorp (gossip town) and an incident like this would not have 
remained hidden very long. It was a major affront to the high standing of a prominent 
burgher like Gerrit Hendrik Meijer, who without doubt took this very seriously. It may 
have prompted him to side with the protesters in an effort to get his own back at Fiscal 
Boers, who he saw as the instigator of the offence. 
 
Christiaan George Maasdorp was also a third generation Cape burgher. His grandfather 
Christiaan Maasdorp was German and arrived at the Cape around 1700. He became a 
burgher after his contract with the Company was finished. Originally he was a wagon 
maker, but soon after receiving his burgerschap he became a liquor pachter.45 His two 
sons, Arnoldus and Christiaan, became prominent burghers in the Stellenbosch district. 
Arnoldus, the father of Christiaan George, was a deacon of the Stellenbosch church, a 
captain of the burgher dragoons and a Heemraad of the district. He owned several 
farms in the area among which the well-known Vergelegen farm. In 1762 he requested 
to be relieved of all his burgher duties, because he intended to sell his farms and settle 
in Cape Town.46 
 
The first wife of Arnoldus Maasdorp and mother of Christiaan George was Anna Sophia 
van Brakel.47 She was the sister of Adriaan van Brakel, a captain of the burgher militia 
in‎the‎Stellenbosch‎district.‎Arnoldus‎Maasdorp’s‎second‎wife‎was‎Anna‎Sophia‎de‎Vos,‎
a niece of his first wife, whose mother was Maria Sophia van der Bijl. The Van Brakels 
and the Van Der Bijls were prominent farmer families, members of which joined the 
burgher protests in 1779. After the death of Arnoldus Maasdorp’s‎second‎wife‎he‎
married a third time in 1752. Significantly, Elsabé La Febre, his third wife and 
stepmother of Christiaan George was a sister of Jacobus Alexander La Febre.48 
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Christiaan George Maasdorp was born in 1737. He took his burgher oath on 1 
November 1756 in Stellenbosch and joined the burgher militia.49 In 1758 he was 
already a cornet of the Stellenbosch dragoons.50 In or shortly after 1762 he followed 
his father to the Cape district, because in November 1763 the Political Council 
recorded that he was (‘now’)‎living‎at‎the‎Cape‎and‎he‎was‎appointed‎cornet of the 
burgher militia there.51 In 1773 he was promoted to lieutenant of the burgher 
cavalry.52 In 1777 followed his promotion to ritmeester (captain) of the second 
company cavalry.53 In the meantime he was also made deacon of Cape church council 
(1772-73) and he served as Commissioner of Civil and Marriage Affairs (1773-74) and 
Orphan Master (1776-1777). In between these positions he was Burgher Councillor for 
the first time in 1775 and he was again appointed in that position in 1779 till 1781. He 
was one of the permanently appointed Burgher Councillors in 1786. Towards the end 
of his life his fortunes seemed to have taken a downturn. In March 1790 Hendrik 
Cloete wrote in a letter to Hendrik Swellengrebel that Maasdorp ‘is in a sad state: his 
possessions will soon be sold by the council of Justice which affects him to such extent 
that he often falls into reveries and is absent-minded’.54 Maasdorp died in April 1790. 
 
Cornelis van der Poel was the grandson of Pieter van der Poel, who was born in Leiden 
in Holland and arrived in the Cape around 1688. He married Johanna Vijandt from 
Amsterdam and together they had six children.55 Pieter van der Poel became a 
respected and wealthy burgher with a farm near the Liesbeek River and six properties 
in Cape Town. He was elected as deacon and elder in the Dutch Reformed church of 
Cape‎Town.‎Among‎Pieter’s‎six‎children‎was‎only‎one‎son,‎Jonas‎van‎der‎Poel,‎who‎was‎
born‎in‎1695‎and‎followed‎in‎his‎father’s‎footsteps‎by‎becoming‎a‎farmer.‎In‎the‎
Resolutions of the Political Council he was mentioned as the owner of a cattle farm at 
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the Kleine Paardebergen in 1744, a butcher contractor and a liquor pachter.56 He did 
better in Cape and burgher society than his father, because he was an elder in the 
Cape church, a Burgher Councillor and an officer of the burgher militia. He resigned 
from all burgher duties, among which captain of the burgher infantry, in October 
1753.57 
 
Jonas was the first Van Der Poel to marry into the Meijburgh family when he married 
Sophia Meijburgh, a daughter of Jan Lamberts Meijburgh. Her grandfather, Lambert 
Lambertz,‎came‎from‎Leiden‎as‎did‎Jonas’‎father‎and‎this‎may‎have‎been‎a‎link‎
between the Meijburghs and Van Der Poels. The Meijburgh family did financially well 
and many descendants settled in the Stellenbosch district, where they served on the 
church council as deacons and elders and became officers in the burgher militia. One 
of the most well-known Meijburghs was Johannes Albertus. He was a nephew of 
Sophia Meijburgh and Jonas van der Poel. Both Johannes Albertus and his son, 
Phillipus Albertus, served several terms as Heemraden in the Stellenbosch 
administration. The relation between the Meijburgh and Van Der Poel families must 
have been close, because four of the five sons of Jonas van der Poel married a 
Meijburgh bride.58 
 
Cornelis van der Poel was the youngest son of Jonas. He was born on 16 November 
1736 and took his burgher oath in October 1753 when he was 18 years old.59 After that 
he joined the ranks of the burgher infantry. In February 1766 he was promoted to 
vaandrig or ensign. At the time he was a vaanjonker (standard-bearer) and therefore 
skipped the two ranks of corporal and sergeant to join the officer corps and with that 
the Burgher Military Council.60 In September 1772 he became a lieutenant and when in 
April 1776 his older brother Albertus resigned as captain of the burgher infantry and all 
his other burgher duties due to ill health, Cornelis was appointed in his place.61 In 
December 1777 he became a Burgher Councillor – a function he would fulfil until the 
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end of 1780.62 It is noteworthy that Cornelis van der Poel was never an Orphan Master 
unlike the other Burgher Councillors. As in his burgher militia career he jumped the 
ranks to the highest burgher position. In 1768 Cornelis van der Poel married Elsie 
Elisabeth Meijburgh, a daughter of the above-mentioned Johannes Albertus. After her 
death in 1772 he married Susanna Smuts, a sister of Johannes Smuts.63 Thus at the 
time of the start of the burgher protests he had a direct family link to the Burgher 
Councillor establishment surrounding Jacobus Alexander La Febre, which clearly did 
not prevent him from standing out as the leader of the protesting Burgher Councillors. 
 
There were some striking similarities between the three incumbent (and protesting) 
Burgher Councillors. All three were born in the 1730s and were therefore of the same 
age group. Each of them was a third generation Cape born burgher from mixed Dutch 
and German descent. They and their families each had links to the outer districts: 
Maasdorp and Meijer grew up in Stellenbosch and Swellendam respectively and only 
moved to the Cape District later in life, while the Van Der Poel family had close 
connections with the Meijburghs of Stellenbosch. This meant that they all had a farmer 
background and links to the farming community. In contrast the non-protesting 
Burgher Councillors seemed to have had more an urban base in the economic and 
political centre of the Cape settlement. 
 
It can however not be denied that the three serving Burgher Councillors, being 
members of some of the foremost burgher families, were also connected in some way 
to the group of non-protesting Burgher Councillors and through that to the VOC 
administration. The family links to the ruling faction were especially strong in the case 
of Gerrit Hendrik Meijer. But they were placed somewhat on the fringes as becomes 
clear from the schedule in appendix 2, perhaps because they did not have business 
connections to the ruling elite. Yet the existence of the relationship was extremely 
significant, because being Burgher Councillors and leading burghers afforded them the 
perfect springboard and opportunity to become political challengers. 
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This is illustrated by a particular set of events which occurred at the end of 1778 and 
the beginning of 1779. In his official response to the burgher complaints Damiaan 
Hugo Staring elaborated on the reason why he and his partners decided to wind down 
the company known as La Febre & Co. He wrote that at the beginning of 1779 ‘the 
Burgher Councillor La Febre struggled already for a long time with consumption64, 
which worsened every day, and it was expected he would die soon and it was advisable 
to stop the buying of goods, settle the outstanding balances and sell the remaining 
goods’.65 La Febre died in April 1779. From the description of the network of non-
protesting Burgher Councillors it can be concluded that La Febre was very much at the 
centre and most probably the leader of the ruling faction of burghers and VOC officials. 
Fighting a debilitating disease for quite some time not only made it impossible for him 
to continue his business, but very likely made it difficult to fulfil his leading and central 
role in the political field. It could very well be that the ruling faction began to unravel 
and this opened the way for others to step forward and become contenders for the 
position. The challenge came from three Burgher Councillors with similar backgrounds, 
who were part of the establishment and had the political position to make it possible 
for them to take this step. 
 
This supports the notion that the burgher protests had another facet apart from a 
purely ideological one, namely the role of patrimonial rule and particularly the faction 
system and disputes, which clearly had an impact on Cape political life. Apparently 
there were opposing camps among the Burgher Councillors and Governor Van 
Plettenberg must be credited with his astute assessment of this situation. But this does 
not‎explain‎the‎motive‎behind‎the‎protesting‎Burgher‎Councillors’‎actions‎and‎still‎
leaves the important question unanswered exactly why these three men, being part of 
the administrative elite, chose a route which would lead them into conflict with the 
administration. To gain further insight in this matter we need to dig more into other 
aspects of their background. 
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5. The burgher militia and their role in the protests 
 
‘The militias were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries part and parcel of 
everyday‎life‎in‎the‎towns‎of‎the‎Dutch‎Republic’.1 They were one of the many 
corporate entities that existed in Dutch society: provinces and cities were seen as 
communities and within the cities there were guilds, neighbourhood associations and 
militia. These corporations were vital to the dynamics of Dutch society. People were 
generally not regarded as individuals, but as members of various communities. 
Membership of corporations gave meaning and value to individual lives. It meant that 
people belonged to a certain status group and contributed to the community. The 
other side of the coin was that people were only entitled to certain privileges as 
member of a group or corporation. Individual rights were not acknowledged and 
therefore belonging to a corporate entity, like a guild or burgher militia, was 
important if one did not want to place oneself outside society. Thus being a burgher 
(and protection of that status) could not be taken lightly, because that was the only 
access to membership of a guild or militia.2 
 
Before 1600 many Dutch towns had schutterijen or civic militias, which until then 
were organisations which could be compared to guilds. Membership of the militias 
was voluntary. During the uprising against the Spanish rulers the Stadholders, who 
were leading the struggle, found a regular standing army formed by mercenaries 
more useful than scattered militia forces. The militias gradually transformed to a civic 
guard and lost their exclusive status. From the beginning of the seventeenth century 
most Dutch cities made membership of the militia compulsory for all male burghers 
between the ages of eighteen and sixty. In fact, the association between burgerschap 
and militia membership became so strong that the same word – burger – was used to 
name both militia members and burghers and the words schutterij and burgerij were 
virtually interchangeable. As the cities grew, the ranks of the militia increased. In 
practice the poorest burghers and the grauw were still excluded, because militia 
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members had to be able to afford to buy their own weapons and uniforms and some 
cities even used certain criteria of wealth for admission. The burgher militias were 
given a new role by city governments. They could be used to defend the cities 
together with the regular army garrison when threatened by outside forces and they 
were used in times of crisis to quell riots. In many cities militias were put to work as 
fire watch and night watch, which policed the towns during the night and maintained 
order.3 
 
Even though the militias had lost their original military role in the cities and very often 
their military prowess left a lot to be desired, they maintained their organising 
function and remained a significant factor in sustaining a sense of community among 
the burghers. They became the embodiment of common interests and responsible 
citizenship. The bond between militia members was strengthened through ritual and 
ceremonial gatherings, such as meals and festivals. Many cities had an annual militia 
parade through the streets followed by a review, some spectacular drills and more 
feasts. And at special events, like a visit to the town by the Stadholder, the urban 
burgher community was represented by the civic militias.4 
 
The Dutch rulers allowed the existence of guilds and militia as long as they just busied 
themselves with their own limited purposes. Playing a role in the political arena was 
not regarded as being part of this. In the province of Holland the burgher militias were 
robbed of any political influence by a resolution of the Provincial States issued in 
1581, which prohibited the city governments from consulting militias and other 
burgher organisations on national and city affairs. However the prominent social 
function of the militias combined with their military potential - even if it was 
insignificant in many cases - made them role-players on the political scene regardless 
and almost by default. In times of turmoil they could be a threat to the authority of 
the city administration. The militia were often the only organising vehicle available to 
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the burghers to make demands, voice their dissatisfaction or form an opposition to 
the ruling regents. What is significant is that in those cases the militia leaders often 
claimed to speak on behalf of the entire burgher community. In the time of political 
turmoil in the Netherlands around 1747-48 the burghers made their demands to the 
city councils through the militia. In Amsterdam and Leiden the militia companies 
elected representatives who drew up a list of demands, which included the 
maintenance and revival of guild regulations and the right to elect their own burgher 
officers. In Leiden the militia went as far as occupying strategic points in the city when 
their demands were turned down and the regular army had to be brought in to force 
the burghers into submission. It must be noted that these burgher protests were not 
started to achieve a radical or revolutionary change, but had more a rectifying 
function: they wanted to expose excesses by the city rulers and asked for a return of 
old burgher privileges – be it real or perceived.5 
 
Because of the potential threat that the militias could pose to the authority of the 
patriciate, they had to be kept under close supervision. One way to control the 
militias was to prohibit or prevent them having militia meetings. However this would 
not make the city rulers very popular, because it would be regarded as going against 
the burgher rights and was therefore not the preferred method. Another way to exert 
some influence over the militia was via the burgerkrijgsgraad or Burgher Military 
Council, which controlled the militia. In many cities these councils could only meet 
after having obtained approval from the magistrate. But more effective was the use of 
networks available to the administration. The members of the Burgher Military 
Councils were the highest officers of the burgher companies and these men usually 
were appointed from among the narrow circle of regents themselves. They would 
therefore be closely linked to members of the city government and this would usually 
ensure that burgher militias would remain on the side of the administration.6 
 
When the VOC created its settlements in the Asian empire, burgher militias became 
an integral part of these as they were in Dutch cities. Militias were found in all parts of 
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the Dutch VOC empire and they often performed the same organising role as did their 
counterparts in the Republic. This meant that the Company administrators, like the 
Dutch regents, had to attempt to keep the burgher militias under VOC control. This 
did not prevent that the militias at times proved to be important role-players in the 
political world of some Dutch settlements in Asia. In places like Colombo in Ceylon the 
burghers frequently tried to get greater privileges from government. They chose the 
officers of the militia to speak on their behalf, because they enjoyed respect and 
standing among the burgher population. In 1678, when there were just over one 
hundred burghers living in Colombo, a first petition was submitted. The complaints 
were much the same as the grievances of the Cape burghers of a later time. The 
burghers of Colombo claimed that they were in a desperate state after Asian 
merchants had managed to wrest lucrative trade from them and the burghers, 
because they were Dutch or from Dutch descent, thought themselves entitled to 
preferential treatment. The first petition was followed by many others, but seldom 
did the VOC give in to their demands.7 
 
At the Cape of Good Hope the political position of the burgher militia was more 
volatile than in other parts of the Dutch Asian world. It is helpful to explore the 
reasons for this before looking at the role of the militia in the burgher protests of the 
late 1770s. 
 
The Cape was relatively isolated from other parts of the Dutch empire, but its 
strategic importance to the Dutch empire and VOC trade routes was crucial. For that 
reason the settlement had to be defended at all costs and the burghers were 
expected to play a large role in this. Even though the VOC at the Cape had its own 
military forces, a factor in agreeing to release employees to become free-burghers 
was that they would contribute to the defence of the Cape and all the burghers were 
conscripted in the militia. The militias of the Dutch cities served as an example for the 
Cape government in setting up the burgher militia, which was clearly illustrated when 
in September 1768 the Cape administrators decided to regularise the rules and 
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instructions regarding the burgher militia and issued a ‘Reglement voor den Burger 
krijgsraad’‎or‎‘Regulations‎for‎the‎Burgher‎Military‎Council’.8 Many of these mirrored 
the ones that were in force in Dutch cities. Each burgher between the ages of 16 and 
60 had to be a member of a militia company, although the youngest ones were free 
from watch duty until they were 18 years old. This regulation stemmed from as far 
back as the agreements of the ‘Unie van Utrecht’,‎the‎1579‎treaty‎between‎the‎
northern Dutch provinces and one of the founding documents of the Dutch Republic, 
where in article eight a general conscription of all healthy men between the ages of 
18 and 60 into burgher militia was determined.9 Members of the militia also had to 
provide their own weapons and ammunition and keep it in good working order at all 
times. 
 
It was furthermore evident from the 1768 regulations that at the Cape the association 
between burgerschap and militia membership was as equally strong as in Dutch cities. 
Clause 20 read: ‘The young men who have reached the age of 16 and have not 
registered themselves as Burghers, will have to pay a fine of ten Rixdollars when this is 
discovered’.10 And clause 24 started as follows: ‘Everybody who has enrolled oneself as 
burgher...’and‎continued‎to‎stipulate‎that‎as‎long‎as‎they‎still‎were‎considered‎recruits‎
they had to come to the Burgher Watch house once a month to be exercised as 
preparation for their Burgher militia duty.11 Clause 45 stated that ‘All the burghers will 
once every year be under arms to have its usual and annual Exercise’ and ‘nobody 
enrolled in the Burgher service will be excused from this’.12 At the Cape, as in Dutch 
cities, the word ‘burger’‎was‎used‎for‎both‎burghers‎and‎members‎of‎the‎burgher‎
militia. 
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The above association was likely to have a considerable significance at the Cape. The 
number of Cape burghers was much larger than that in other Asian settlements and 
they had developed a more self-conscious identity in the eighteenth century. There 
were no other corporate institutions like guilds or neighbourhood organisations as in 
Dutch cities. Therefore the burgher militia were the only way in which the large 
number of burghers were organised and they were thus of vital social importance to 
the burghers and their identity. It was in the militia that the burghers met with each 
other, accessed their social and business networks, and discussed all kinds of issues. 
The Cape burgher militia, like their Dutch counterparts, had ceremonial gatherings 
and an annual parade in which the burghers could show their military competence. 
And at official occasions, like the visit of a VOC return fleet or the funeral of a high-
ranking official, the burgher militia was part of the proceedings representing the 
burgher population. 
 
An important criterion for membership of the burgher militia at the Cape was that one 
had to be born free. It was for this reason that free blacks could not become militia 
members. The minutes of a meeting of the Burgher Military Council on 7 September 
1774 recorded the following:  
‘After which it was noted that two freed young men had presented themselves 
to Captain Soermans, and another one to the Scriba, to be enrolled in the 
Company of master Soermans as Burghers, and serve with other Burghers, 
claiming that there were other freed men like them who served in the burgher 
militia, after investigation this was found not to be the case; it was resolved 
that according to ancient custom, nobody could be enrolled among the 
burghers than those who were born free; or whose father was married to their 
mother and would therefore be legitimate, providing their fathers were free and 
born free’.13 
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Free blacks were not burghers, but members of a different status group in Cape 
society (comparable to inwoners in Dutch cities). They were not born free, but were 
freed during their lives, and could thus not enrol in the burgher militia. However their 
sons would have been born free and this enabled them to become members of the 
burgher militia and therefore burghers. The determining factor seemed to have been 
whether‎one‎was‎born‎free‎and‎not‎one’s‎race.‎The‎difference‎between‎the‎groups‎
was based on status with specific reference to freedom. It follows that being a militia 
member must have been important in the forming of burgher identity in Cape 
society.14 
 
What we have established so far is that the burghers at the Cape were organised in 
burgher militia by the VOC government according to Dutch example; that the militia 
were the only corporate organisation available to the burghers at the Cape; and that 
the militia played a major role in shaping the identity of the burghers as a status 
group. The combination of these factors created the capricious situation referred to 
earlier. Under the wrong leadership - which at the Cape would mean: opposed to the 
VOC administration - the militia could be a powerful threat to Company authority. 
And with all the ingredients for an explosive situation present a stand-off between 
burgher militia and VOC government did indeed take place during the burgher 
protests of the late 1770s, which illustrated that the Cape militia played the same role 
in burgher society as the militia in Dutch cities: acting as the medium through which 
protests and revolts were organised and demands to the government were made. 
 
In October 1779 the Military Exercise of the Cape District burgher militia was held. 
This event happened every year according to the instructions of 1768 and lasted six 
days.15 All the burgher militia companies had to exercise and parade in Cape Town 
and on the last day a grand review was held at which the burgher Companies would 
parade outside the seat of the Cape government, the Castle. For this occasion the 
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members of the burgher militia were all armed. The review would be the end of the 
week of events and afterwards the militia normally dispersed. However, after the 
review of October 1779 this did not happen: the burgher companies remained in their 
position and did not lay down their weapons. Contemporary observers claimed that 
the officers of the militia were made to go to the Governor and demand, in name of 
all the burghers, that the three serving Burgher Councillors – Van Der Poel, Maasdorp 
and Meijer - would stay in function for another year instead of two of them being 
replaced as would have been usual in December. Naturally the VOC officials were 
highly upset about the threatening and intimidating way these events took place. One 
of them exclaimed: ‘is that the way to submit a request?’.16 Another member of the 
administration, Independent Fiscal Boers, thought it highly offensive that this demand 
was made. He was of the opinion that the three Burgher Councillors should have 
stopped the burgher unrest and protests which preceded this event a long time ago 
and that they had not done so showed they were not fit for the job in the first place. 
According to him it was therefore not appropriate at all to let them stay on in their 
position. However the Governor and other members of the Political Council tried to 
minimise the gravity of the event and stated that ‘this was such a small matter and a 
curt refusal would only lead to unpleasant incidents’.17 They acceded to the burgher 
demands and the Burgher Councillors could remain in their post. Boers obviously did 
not agree with the decision.18 The resolution of the government was announced in 
the meeting room (de groote Kamer) of the Burgher Military Council in the Burgher 
Watch House. Boers remarked that it was unheard of that there were also 
onderofficieren present at this meeting and to make matters worse: apparently they 
did not just sit quietly, but commented loudly that the Governor had been forced to 
agree to the burgher demands ‘otherwise blood would have flowed’.19 
 
That it was possible for this serious incident to happen illustrated that the VOC must 
have lost control over the burgher militia. The VOC officials were certainly not 
                                                          
16
 `is dat een gedoente, om een versoek op die manier te doen?’ - Schutte, Swellengrebel, 96. 
17
 `de saak om welke versogt word, op sig selven van te kleinen belang is om door een rauwelijx afslaan 
des versoeks somwijlen aanleijding te geeven tot onaangenaame gebeurtenissen’ - WCARS, C 2674, 52 
(19.10.1779). 
18
 Schutte, Swellengrebel, 103. 
19












oblivious to the potential threat of the militia and kept a close watch on them. They 
did so through the Burgerkrijgsraad or Burgher Military Council, which consisted of the 
highest‎burgher‎officers,‎but‎was‎presided‎over‎by‎the‎head‎of‎the‎Company’s‎garrison.‎
The Council was furthermore convened by the VOC.20 At its meeting the Council 
recorded all the resignations, changes, appointments and promotions within the 
burgher militia and dealt with disciplinary matters. The Burgher Military Council itself 
handled the appointments up to officer rank, but all its decisions had to get final 
approval of the Council of Policy. All the higher officer appointments (from adjudant 
up to captain and ritmeester) were made by the Cape government. And, as will 
become clear later, often these high burgher officers were closely involved with and 
linked to Company officials and through this network the government could keep an 
eye on the burgher militia, much as city councils in Dutch cities did. Yet apparently this 
was not enough to completely control the burgher militia. What had gone wrong? 
 
The Burgher Military Council was supposed to meet six times a year.21 However, 
judging by the Minute book of the Council this schedule was rarely met.22 In Table 5-1 
the meeting schedule of the Council is recorded. The contrast between the number of 
meetings in the years 1779-1780 and the four preceding years is noticeable. In 1779 
the burgher protests erupted in earnest. The three serving Burgher Councillors played 
a central role in these protests, while at the same time being captains of the burgher 
militia. Even though the minutes did not reflect any debate about the protest 
movement, it is more than likely that this matter was discussed – if not during the 
meetings, then before or after. The burgher militia officers may have insisted that 
more regular meetings were held according to the VOC instructions, giving the protest 
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Table ‎5-1: Meeting Schedule of the Burgher Military Council, 1768-1780 
 Ordinary Meeting Extra-ordinary Meeting 
1769 2 1 
1770 2 1 
1771 1 0 
1772 3 0 
1773 1 1 
1774 4 1 
1775 1 1 
1776 2 0 
1777 1 0 
1778 1 0 
1779 4 0 
1780 5 0 
 
Less speculative will be to investigate what support the burgher protest movement 
actually had among the officer corps of the burgher militia. According to clause 1 of 
the instructions for the Burgher Militia of 1768, the Burgher Military Council had to 
consist of the captains, lieutenants and ensigns of the burgher companies.23 There 
were six companies: two cavalry and four infantry, and each of these companies had 
one captain (or ritmeester in the cavalry), one lieutenant and one ensign (vaandrig in 
the infantry and cornet in the cavalry). This meant that eighteen burgher officers were 
members of the Burgher Military Council, besides the VOC president and the secretary 
(who was also a burgher).24  
 
The officers of the burgher militia are quite easily identifiable. Burgher officers of high 
rank would often be mentioned as such in official documents like the Resolutions or 
Requests. And the Archives of the Burgher Military Council contain records of officers, 
‘onder officiers’ and other members of the burgher militia.25 
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Table 5-2 shows the eighteen officers who served at the start of the burgher protests 
in 1779. It shows that twelve of the eighteen burgher members of the Burgher Military 
Council and highest officers of the burgher militia, among whom five of the six 
captains, supported the protest movement. And only one of the five highest officers of 
the reserve companies did not sign the May 1779 petition. This clearly indicates that 
there was considerable support for the burgher protesters among the leaders of the 
burgher militia. 
 
Table ‎5-2: Burgher protest support among officers of burgher militia, 1779 
Company Rank Name Signatory May 1779 
Petition 
Cavalry Ritmeester Johan Hendrik Munnik Yes 
 Ritmeester Christiaan George Maasdorp (BC) Yes 
 Lieutenant Dirk Gijsbert Van Reenen Yes 
 Lieutenant Johannes Dempers No 
 Cornet Pieter de Waal Arendzoon Yes 
 Cornet Andries Stephanus Gous No 
Infantry Captain Johan Daniel Wieser Yes 
 Captain Cornelis van der Poel (BC) Yes 
 Captain Pieter Soermans Yes 
 Captain Jacobus Alexander La Febre No 
 Lieutenant Johannes Smuts No 
 Lieutenant Johannes Matthias Bletterman Yes 
 Lieutenant Johannes de Waal Arendzoon Yes 
 Lieutenant Petrus Jesse Möller No 
 Vaandrig Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen 
Pieterzoon 
Yes 
 Vaandrig George Hendrik Bunding Yes 
 Vaandrig Michiel Casparus Eksteen Yes 
 Vaandrig Johannes Gie No 
Reserves Captain Johan Anton Hitsman No 
 Vaandrig Hendrik de Waal Yes 
 Vaandrig Johannes Guilleaume van Helsdingen Yes 
d’Invalides Captain Gerrit Hendrik Meijer (BC) Yes 















The 1768 burgher militia instructions furthermore stipulated that each company had 
to have the following onder officiers: four sergeants (wagtmeester in the cavalry) and 
four corporals, making a total of forty-eight onder officiers. In Table 5-3 the twenty-
four sergeants are listed and again the overwhelming support for the protest 
movement is visible: sixteen of the twenty-four were among the 404 signatories of the 




Table ‎5-3: Burgher protest support among sergeants of burgher militia, 1779 
First Name Last Name Further Description Signatory May 
1779 Petition 
Rank 
Johannes Jacobus Tesselaar   Yes Wagtmeester 
Johannes 
Gijsbertus 
Van Reenen   Yes Wagtmeester 
Cornelis De Waal junior/Corneliszoon Yes Wagtmeester 
Daniel De Waal Johan Z Yes Wagtmeester 
Servaas Van Breda   Yes Wagtmeester 
Johannes Brink Andriesz (Junior) Yes Wagtmeester 
Francois Pieter De Necker    No Wagtmeester 
Johannes Poulus Eksteen Hendrik Zoon  No Wagtmeester 
Jens Jansen    No Sergeant 
Franciscus 
Xaverius 
Jurgens   Yes Sergeant 
Dirk De Jong   Yes Sergeant 
Hendrik Blankenberg    No Sergeant 
Hendrik Olweg   Yes Sergeant 
Christoffel 
Hendrik 
Bierman    No Sergeant 
Jan Christiaan Bremke    No Sergeant 
Jan Smit Van Dilburg    No Sergeant 
Johannes 
Mattheus 
Hertzog   Yes Sergeant 
Barend Akkerhuijs    Yes Sergeant 
Matthiam Hofman    No Sergeant 
Johan Christoffel Luster   Yes Sergeant 
Diederik Keppelaar   Yes Sergeant 
Christiaan Pieter Brand JohannesZ Yes Sergeant 
Andries DanieI Grove   Yes Sergeant 
Johannes 
Henricus 














Of course it is not only the numbers that count when discussing the support for the 
burgher protesters among the burgher militia. In line with the investigation into the 
faction dynamics and networks it is important to determine who the officers were and 
how they were linked together and, above all, if and how they fitted into the complex 
of the leaders of the protest movement. 
 
The one captain who did not support the protest movement was Jacobus Alexander La 
Febre. It has already been established that his company, La Febre & Co, was one of the 
main enterprises that the protesting burghers had complaints about, because it was so 
closely linked to high Company officials and therefore was seen to have unfair 
advantages over other burghers. His connections to the VOC establishment were 
confirmed. It is clear that La Febre was the central figure in a ruling faction consisting 
of burghers and high VOC officials. When Jacobus Alexander La Febre died in April 
1779 it was generally expected that he would be replaced by another senior captain in 
the burgher militia. Cornelis van der Poel later claimed that Christiaan George 
Maasdorp should have been appointed in his position. Maasdorp did not get the post 
however, presumably because of his leading role in the burgher protests, and instead 
of him the younger and junior Johannes Smuts was promoted to captain.26 
 
The VOC authorities may have wanted to build up their support among the officers of 
the burgher militia with the appointment of Johannes Smuts. His cousin Catharina 
Adriana Smuts was married to Lieutenant Johannes Dempers and his niece to 
Marthinus Johannes Möller, the brother of Lieutenant Petrus Jesse Möller. Neither of 
these lieutenants signed the May 1779 petition against the government. Petrus Jesse 
Möller’s‎brothers,‎Marthinus‎Johannes‎and‎Hendrik‎Pieter,‎were‎in‎the‎service‎of‎the‎
VOC as was their father, boekhouder Hendrik Möller.27 Johannes Smuts had already 
served a year as Burgher Councillor in 1777. Earlier in the 1770s he was Orphan Master 
and Commissioner of Civil and Marriage Affairs as well as a member of the Dutch 
Reformed Church Council. His support of the VOC administration probably served him 
well, because in 1782 he again became Burgher Councillor and remained in that 
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position almost uninterrupted until 1790. One of his daughters went on to marry 
Hendrik Justinus de Wet, while another daughter married the son of Jacobus 
Alexander La Febre. 
  
There were multiple family relationships among the supporters of the protest 
movement within the officer corps of the burgher militia.28 Cornelis Van Der Poel was 
the brother-in-law of Pieter Gerhard Van Der Bijl (married to a Meijburg), whose 
cousin and former captain Adriaan Van Brakel was the uncle of Christiaan George 
Maasdorp.29 The senior Captain Pieter Soermans was the uncle of ensign Hendrik 
Oostwald Eksteen Pieterzoon and the father-in-law of lieutenant Johannes De Waal 
Arendzoon, who again was the brother of cornet Pieter De Waal. Johannes and Pieter 
were nephews of ensign Hendrik De Waal and ensign Hendrik Oost ald Eksteen was 
the nephew of ensign Michiel Casparus Eksteen.  
 
Even outside the officer corps the officers had close family ties with leading protesters. 
Lieutenant Dirk Gijsbertus van Reenen and his brother, sergeant Johannes Gijsbertus 
van Reenen, were the sons of the wealthy entrepreneur, protest delegate and Burgher 
Councillor Jacobus van Reenen. Dirk Gijsbertus was also the son-in-law of protester 
Johan Willem Hurter, whose son was married to a daughter of former Heemraad 
Gerhardus Munnik, the brothe  of ritmeester Johan Hendrik Munnik. Pieter and 
Johannes De Waal were brothers-in-law of Heemraad Joost Rijnhard Van As.  
 
The protesting officers in the burgher militia formed a majority in the officer corps and 
had strong familial links with each other. Judging by the October 1779 incident they 
could count on the support of a large number of militia members. That this was not 
only due to the existence of family or friendship connections is illustrated by the 
following episode recounted by the burgher soldier Jan Willem Lutsche to the Council 
of Justice.30  
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Lutsche was on burgher watch duty on 21 September 1780. The officer in charge on 
that day was Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen and the sergeant on duty Johannes Beck. 
Suddenly corporal Hendrik Hermanus Bos entered the Burgher Watch House and 
started shouting ‘Mameluk’‎and‎then‎‘Mameluk Koning’.‎Lutsche‎stated‎that‎‘a 
Mameluk according to divine scripture is a liar, a traitor, and a renouncer of God’.31 
Clearly this serious insult was directed at Lutsche, because his nickname was Koning.32 
And when he told Bos that a Mameluk was a rogue, Bos replied: ‘Koning you are twice 
a rogue’.33 Shortly after this exchange Bos said to everyone present: ‘all worthy 
burghers must come to the back to hear what I will announce’.34 He then started to 
read the statement of the daughter of Carel Hendrik Buijtendag about the events that 
had befallen her father in January 1779, but he was stopped by lieutenant Van Reenen. 
That same evening Bos sent his slave to the Burgher Watch House ith two bottles 
wine to ‘drink to the health of all worthy Burghers’.35 The day after this incident 
Lutsche again reported for burgher watch duty, but was informed by the lieutenants 
Johannes de Waal and Johannes Matthias Bletterman that he was suspended from 
duty until further notice. And the next day Jacobus Kruger told Lutsche that he was no 
longer prepared to act as surety for his watch monies. Lutsche then went to his captain 
Cornelis van der Poel to seek assistance. Van Der Poel claimed ignorance of the events 
and refused to look into the matter. When Lutsche left the house of Van Der Poel he 
met sergeant Johannes Henricus Verlee in the street and greeted him. Verlee did not 
greet him back, but said ‘for such bad guys, as you are, I will not doff my hat’.36 
 
It seemed that a number of militia members, who were all supporters of the burgher 
protest movement, conspired to ostracise Jan Willem Lutsche, who was not a protest 
supporter. What is even more remarkable is that these events did not just involve 
lower ranked members of the militia, but went right up the ranks to the captain 
                                                          
31
 `Een Mameluk is volgens godlijk heijlijker schriftuur, een Verleugenaar der Waarheijd, een Verrader, en 
een van God afgevallen Mensch’‎– WCARS, C 2674, 66 (12.10.1780). 
32
 WCARS, C 2691, 241-242 (12.10.1780). 
33
 `Koning dat ben gij 2 maal’‎– WCARS, C 2674, 56 (12.10.1780). 
34
 `Alle brave Burgers komen na agteren om aantehooren wat daar door mij zal gepubliceerd worden’‎– 
WCARS, C 2674, 57 (12.10.1768). 
35
 `als dan de Gezondheijd van alle braave Burgers gedroncken worden’‎– WCARS, C 2674, 59 
(12.10.1768). 
36












himself. Lutsche himself was extremely shocked and upset by this treatment. He stated 
that he had been an honest Christian burgher since 1759 and always performed his 
burgher duties to the best of his ability. Now he was defamed by his fellow burghers 
and had‎become‎an‎outcast‎(he‎was‎‘verstooten’)‎from the burgher community. It was 
for this reason that Lutsche asked the Council of Justice to punish Hendrik Hermanus 
Bos, whom he saw as the instigator of the insult and injury visited on him. 
 
Apart from the fact that the above case clearly shows that the Cape conflict caused 
deep divisions within the burgher community, it also indicates that there could be 
negative and traumatic consequences for burghers who did not support the protest 
movement. To be excluded from the burgher militia and community like Lutsche must 
have been a scary prospect for any burgher, because these kinds of corporate 
memberships were of vital importance to their social identity and networking. 
Lutsche’s‎social‎and‎financial‎support‎was‎suddenly‎taken from him. In a society where 
one’s identity and survival was so dependent on the group and networks to which one 
belonged and had access to, this was nothing less than a shattering experience. 
Against this background it is not surprising that the leaders of the protest movement, 
who had a firm base in the officer corps of the burgher militia and a keen 
understanding of the dynamics of burgher society, managed to turn the burgher militia 
against the Company administration in October 1779. 
 
It has become clear that the three serving Burgher Councillors and protest leaders, 
while being captains of the burgher militia, had access to a close and wide network of 
burghers, who supported the protest movement. The burgher militia at the Cape had 
the same function in organising the burghers as the ones in Dutch cities. It could be 
argued that this function was even more pronounced at the Cape, because there were 
no other corporate vehicles available to the burghers to get organised. In the hands of 
the leaders of the protest faction the burgher militia could be turned into an 
opposition force. But even though the workings of the protest movement have 
become clearer, the motives of the burgher protesters and their leaders still remain 












6.  The burgher entrepreneurs 
 
In the previous chapters more clarity has been obtained about who the leaders of the 
burgher protest movement of the late 1770s in the Cape were and how they managed 
to manoeuvre themselves into a leadership position from which they could challenge 
the authority of the ruling VOC/burgher faction. They made use of their public 
positions and patrimonial connections to fight their battle. But what has not been 
clearly established yet is the motive of these prominent burghers to undertake their 
struggle and protest. At first glance strife and turmoil was not in their interest, because 
as part of the ruling elite they would be more served by peace and quiet. It is also not 
sufficient to simply state that the protesters were local burghers fighting colonial 
administrators coming from overseas1, because the ruling elite consisted of a complex 
network of VOC officials as well as local burghers. Battle lines within Cape society 
could not be drawn on a clear-cut basis anymore by the end of the eighteenth century. 
There is no denying that the fight to protect burgher identity, freedom and rights 
played a role, but this cannot be the entire reason for the protests. An indication of the 
ulterior motive for the burgher uprising was embedded in the Memorie of 1779, which 
apart from demands for a firmer regulation of burgher rights also contained a manifest 
economic content with burghers asking for greater freedom to trade and less 
competition from the Company itself.2 It is therefore important to have a closer look at 
the entrepreneurial side of the protesters and the role this played in the protests, and 
to establish if the main motive for the political turmoil can be found here. 
 
The reason why this is important is that in the 1779 Memorie the protesters painted a 
picture of dismal circumstances for the burghers of the Cape settlement, whose 
economic development was restricted by VOC policies and unfair competition (see 
chapter‎1).‎However,‎despite‎the‎writers’‎claims‎that‎they‎presented‎a‎fair and 
reasonable assessment of the situation, the Memorie was a highly polemic work and 
therefore the complaints should not be taken at face value. Pieter van Duin and Robert 
















Ross have convincingly illustrated in The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth 
Century that the Cape economy was vibrant and growing and that Cape farmers and 
entrepreneurs were operating in a rather favourable economic climate throughout the 
eighteenth‎century.‎They‎conclude:‎‘Our argument in favour of a steady, market-based 
expansion of agrarian production is in itself an important re-interpretation of the 
economic history of the period, but it has corollaries which stretch far beyond the 
purely economic realm’.3 In line with this, and based on the evidence presented in the 
previous chapters, the question must be asked if the disputes of the late 1770s were 
an attempt to wrest control over a rather prosperous economy from one faction by 
another. And if so, who, besides the burghers identified so far, were behind this 
challenge? 
 
The meat pachters 
 
The 1779 Memorie discussed many aspects of Cape economic life. The eighteenth-
century agrarian economy of the Cape had three major components: wheat, wine and 
cattle farming and one would expect the protest document to deal with all three of 
these. It is therefore quite remarkable that neither the references to farming and trade 
in agricultural produce nor any other part of the Memorie made any mention of the so-
called meat pacht. Because of the importance of cattle farming and meat consumption 
for the Cape economy this was rather a glaring omission. This could hardly have been a 
co-incidence and this exclusion cannot be ignored. The reasons behind it may reveal 
more about the driving forces behind the protests and their motives. 
 
In the earlier years of the Cape settlement the Company kept its own cattle farms and 
the meat needed for Cape Town and passing ships was supplied from there. The 
holding and maintenance of the cattle farms proved to be too expensive in the long 
run. The Company did not consider the sending out of employees to buy cattle from 
the burgher farmers and transport them to the Cape to be the solution to the problem, 
because that was also costly. The administration furthermore conceded that it was not 
practical that farmers would deliver the necessary cattle and meat to the Cape 
                                                          
3












themselves. The cheaper and more convenient way out of the problem was to arrange 
the supply of fresh meat through contractors and to pay a set price for it. Moreover 
the income from the sale of the contract to supply meat was a form of revenue for the 
Company, albeit not a major one. The meat pacht, or the contract for the delivery of 
meat to the Company, slaves and the Hospital, was granted by the VOC for a period of 
five years. The conditions of the contract were that the contractors, the so-called meat 
pachters, had to sell healthy and fresh meat and that it always had to be available. To 
make sure there was a steady supply of fresh meat the contractors could make use of 
holding farms, like Groene Kloof, which were situated close to Cape Town. They also 
had the benefit of access to the Company shambles to slaughter the cattle and did not 
have to invest money for this.4  
 
The meat pacht was usually sold in four parts and bought by a group of burghers 
operating in partner-ship. It was necessary for the contractors to work as a syndicate, 
because enough funds had to be available to buy cattle from the suppliers. In addition 
each contractor had to have two wealthy and reputable burghers who would stand 
surety for him. This was not without risk for these burghers, because the Company 
would definitely hold them liable should the contractor not be able to fulfil his financial 
obligations in terms of the contract.5 
 
During the eighteenth century the Cape experienced a considerable growth in the 
production of cattle a d meat and in the size of the meat market. There were several 
reasons for this. The consumption of meat by the Company quadrupled between the 
1720s and the 1790s. The population of the Cape settlement increased steadily 
throughout the eighteenth century and with that the size of the internal market for the 
meat pachters. One of the conditions of the meat pacht was that the contractors had 
the monopoly on the sale of meat to foreign vessels visiting the Cape and after 1770 
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the sales to foreigners increased enormously. Lastly during the 1750s the export of 
meat products began and this market showed a rising development from then on.6 
 
The prosperity of the meat market did not really benefit the producers, the cattle 
farmers. Because of the meat pacht system they could only sell their meat through 
middlemen and were often forced to accept low prices. Yet apparently they did not 
manage to get their dissatisfaction with the way the meat trade was organised 
recorded in the 1779 Memorie. The main explanation for this could only be that meat 
pachters, who did not have much to complain about, had managed to prevent this. In 
this light it may come as no surprise that the foremost author of the Memorie, Jacobus 
van Reenen, the former Burgher Councillor who lead the protest delegation to the 
Dutch Republic in 1779, happened to have made his fortune as a meat pachter. 
 
Jacobus van Reenen was born at the Cape in 1727 as the son of the German immigrant 
Jacob van Reenen, who became a wealthy man because of his extensive business 
interests in farming, wine trading and property dealing. He was one of the meat 
pachters between 1742 and 1754.7 Van Reenen junior was therefore born into a highly 
placed family and this contributed to his rise in Cape public society. In 1763 he was 
promoted from cornet to lieutenant in the burgher militia.8 During 1768 and 1769 he 
was an orphan master and in 1769 and 1770 he became a Burgher Councillor. He was 
again appointed in this position for the years 1776 and 1777. Jacobus van Reenen was 
an enterprising burgher like his father and he owned a large number of properties and 
farms. This caused him to request the Political Council in August 1770 to release him 
from all his burgher duties and positions, because ‘the management of his farms and 
loan farms, some of which were situated far into the interior, keeps him more and more 
busy’.9 The Political Council granted his request. Between 1772 and 1775 he made an 
overseas business trip and visited several European countries.10 
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The other reason why Van Reenen asked to be relieved of his burgher duties was that 
he was one of the meat contractors and was tasked with the buying of cattle by his 
fellow pachters. This would mean, as he stated, that he would be away from the Cape 
for prolonged periods of time. It was the meat pacht which contributed mostly to Van 
Reenen’s‎prosperity.‎He‎first‎became‎a‎meat‎contractor‎in‎1747‎and‎from‎then‎on‎until‎
1773 he was virtually uninterrupted one of the pachters. The only break in this period 
was between 1764 and 1768 when the only meat contractor was Jan Plaat.11 However 
Plaat was a business associate of Van Reenen and it is probable that Van Reenen, being 
a large cattle farm owner, was one of the main meat suppliers to Plaat.12  
 
The partners of Jacobus van Reenen in his last meat contract were his long-time 
partner Jan Plaat and the two Burgher Councillors Hendrik Oostwald Muller and Jan 
Serrurier (Table 6.1). Plaat and Muller died before 1779 and were therefore not 
involved in the burgher protests. The role of Jan Serrurier is not entirely clear. He 
became the owner of the farm Alphen through his first marriage to Catharina 
Kretzschmar, the widow of the previous farm owner Jan van der Swijn. In 1768 he 
bought two houses and erven in Block 10 in Cape Town on which he built a 
warehouse.13 In 1778 he became the owner of the wine farm Groot Constantia, but 
unfortunately his crop was damaged by hail and in December 1778 he sold the farm 
again to Hendrik Cloete.14 Serrurier was a prominent member of burgher society and 
was appointed several times to elder, orphan master and Burgher Councillor. He was 
also captain of the burgher infantry. In November 1772 he requested to be relieved of 
all his burgher duties.15 In 1786 he repatriated to the Dutch Republic with his wife and 
a daughter.16 Serrurier’s‎relationship‎with‎the‎Van‎Reenens‎was‎close.‎After his first 
wife died he married again on 23 November 1755 with Geertruijda van Reenen, a 
sister of Jacobus.17 In 1776 he sold his property in Cape Town to Dirk Gijsbertus van 
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Reenen, a son of Jacobus.18 On the other hand, his brother was a minister in the Dutch 
Reformed Church in Cape Town and his son Jan Jacob a bookkeeper in service of the 
VOC. This son would later in 1784 succeed Willem Cornelis Boers as Independent 
Fiscal. Jan Serrurier did not seem to have any other significant involvement with the 
ruling establishment of VOC officials and burghers. It may have been this position 
between the two opposite camps which made him decide to remain neutral in the 
political conflict. In any event he did not sign the May 1779 protest petition, but he 
was also not found in the anti-protester camp. 
 
Table ‎6-1: Meat Pachters, 1769-1783 
Period 
of pacht 






1769-73 Jacobus Van Reenen 1 Delegate Burgerraad Jan Serrurier 
Hendrik Oostwald Muller 
Jan Plaat 
 Jan Serrurier 2 No Burgerraad Hendrik Oostwald Muller 
Jacobus Van Reenen 
Jan Plaat 
 Hendrik Oostwald 
Muller 
3 Died 1773 Burgerraad Jan Serrurier 
Jacobus Van Reenen 
Jan Plaat 
 Jan Plaat 4 Died 1775 - Jan Serrurier 
Hendrik Oostwald Muller 
Jacobus Van Reenen 
1774-78 Johannes Albertus 
Meijburgh 
1 Yes Heemraad Cornelis Van Der Poel  
Jan De Villiers (JPzoon) 
 Philippus Albertus 
Meijburgh 
2 Yes Heemraad Cornelis Van Der Poel  
Johannes Albertus 
Meijburgh 
 Cornelis Van Der Poel 3 Yes Burgerraad Johannes Albertus 
Meijburgh 
Jan De Villiers (JPzoon) 
 Jan De Villiers (JPzoon) 4 Yes Heemraad Cornelis Van Der Poel  
Thobias van Dijk 
1779-83 Jan Smook 1&4 No - Maarten Baatman 
Christoffel Luster 
 Dirk Gijsbertus Van 
Reenen 
2 Yes - Jan Willem Hurter 
Thomas Fredrik Dreijer 
 Johannes Gijsbertus 
Van Reenen 
3 Yes - Dirk Gijsbertus Van 
Reenen  
Jan Smook 
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Jacobus van Reenen was not the only protest leader involved in the meat pacht. 
Between 1774 and 1778 a by now familiar figure in the protest movement was found 
among the contractors: Burgher Councillor and militia captain Cornelis van der Poel. 
His partners were his former father-in-law Johannes Albertus Meijburgh and former 
brother-in-law Philippus Albertus Meijburgh. In January 1775 it was recorded by the 
Political Council that Meijburgh senior had transferred his portion of the meat pacht to 
his brother-in-law Albertus van der Poel, the older brother of Cornelis.19 
 
That Cornelis van der Poel was a leader and instigator of the burgher protest 
movement is without doubt. Apart from being a prominent burgher in administrative 
and militia circles he now appeared as part of an entrepreneurial partner-ship involved 
in one of the major business ventures open to burghers at the Cape. This partner-ship 
was founded on the close relationships between the Van Der Poel and Meijburgh 
families. It is possible that they took advantage of the absence of Jacobus van Reenen 
at the time that the meat pacht was auctioned in 1774 to take over this enterprise. It 
did not last long however, because by 1779 the contract reverted back to the Van 
Reenen family and stayed there until the 1790s. 
 
It has now been established that two of the main leaders of the protest movement 
were also meat pachters. It was unlikely that they would criticise the meat pacht 
system. Jacobus van Reenen had made his fortune in this enterprise and as one of the 
main authors of the 1779 Memorie he could choose to make no mention of it. The 
omission is especially significant, because it is a first indication that the burgher 
protesters were more interested in protecting their own interests rather than those of 
the entire burgher community as they purported to do. 
 
The farming community 
 
Besides this connection to the meat pacht, the role of these two men had further 
implications for the motives behind the protest movement. Jacobus van Reenen was 
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involved in the meat pacht for a period of about twenty-five years during a time that 
the size of the meat market grew significantly. His influence in that market and the 
world of the farming community must have been considerable. In chapter 4 it was 
established that the Van Der Poel family had many connections with the farming 
community surrounding Cape Town. Both Jacobus van Reenen and Cornelis van der 
Poel were thus part of a network of wealthy and established farm owners operating in 
the vicinity of Cape Town and Stellenbosch. The following paragraph describes some of 
the relationships in this network and in order not to be repetitive, the farmers who 
were signatories of the May 1779 petition are marked with a *. 
 
Van Reenen and his many sons were themselves considerable land owners and were 
as such firmly embedded in this community.20 Van der Poel’s‎father‎was‎a‎cattle‎farmer‎
at the Paardeberg. He was the brother-in-law of Philippus Albertus Meijburgh*, whose 
wife Hester Anna van der Bijl was a sister of Pieter Gerhard van der Bijl*, the owner of 
the farm Welmoed. This Van Der Bijl was married to a sister of Meijburgh.21 Philippus 
Albertus was the son of Johannes Albertus Meijburgh*, owner of the wine farm 
Meerlust since 1757, who again was married to Sophia Margaretha Morkel.22 It was 
through this marriage that he became the brother-in-law of Wouter de Vos (married to 
Elisabeth Morkel), the owner of Oude Molen and Libertas,23 and the Van Brakels.24 
Sarah van Brakel, wife of Willem Morkel, was the sister of Adriaan van Brakel*, owner 
of the farms Brakelsdal and Boute Rivier, and Anna Sophia van Brakel, the first wife of 
Arnoldus Maasdorp. Their son was Christiaan George Maasdorp*. The wife of 
Johannes Albertus Meijburgh and the other heemraad who signed the May 1779 
petition, Joost Rijnhard van As*, were both grand-children of the patriarch of the Van 
Der Merwe family. Van As was married to Wilhelmina de Waal, a daughter of Arend de 
Waal and Maria van Breda, and thus related to two of the leading protest families.25 
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The connections described here are set out in appendix 3, which shows some of the 
foremost farming families and the various links between them. From this illustration it 
becomes clear that the Meijburgh family, because of its many familial links with other 
farming families, played a central role in this community. Members of these leading 
families, apart from being involved in their own agricultural enterprises, often played a 
prominent role in the administration of the Cape and Stellenbosch districts. It was 
from these families that the heemraden, burgher militia officers, church elders and 
deacons were recruited.26 Yet several members of these farmer families were 
signatories of the May 1779 protest petition. At first glance this seemed somewhat 
contradictory, because as Van Duin and Ross have shown, the 1770s were one of the 
more lucrative periods for the wine farmers with high demand and an expanding 
market. It seemed they (like the meat pachters) did not have much reason to protest.27  
 
But despite this fortunate set of circumstances many farmers felt that they were still 
too dependent on and subject to the VOC for a considerable part of their market. 
Several of them supported the petition with statements complaining about being 
forced to accept lower prices for their wine than originally agreed to with the 
Company. And if they objected, they were forced into submission with the threat that 
they would not be allowed to sell their wine at all. Besides that they were not allowed 
to export any wine without permission of the Company. Even Hendrik Cloete, although 
no supporter of the protest movement, complained bitterly that he was not allowed 
‘to provide his good friends in Europe with a small amount of wine’‎now‎that‎he‎was‎
the owner of Constantia, because it was forbidden by the administration.28  
 
From the economic demands and proposals of the 1779 Memorie it becomes evident 
that many of these favoured the farmers of the Cape and Stellenbosch districts. It was 
suggested that the control over the buying of wine and grain and other agricultural 
produce for export and supply to the Company would be handed to burghers and no 
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longer handled by VOC officials. Another proposal was that the farmers would be able 
to take occupation of open land between farms if it could be shown that it would not 
be viable to fit another farm there.29 The plans put forward in the Memorie regarding 
free trade with the Asian territories and the Netherlands were also beneficial to the 
farmers, because this trade involved the export of agricultural produce and the import 
of slave labour.  
 
It can be concluded that the protest petition was to a considerable extent set up to 
assist the farmers. With this in mind it was actually not unexpected to find a large 
number of them among the burgher protesters. And because many of them belonged 
to leading and prominent families, it is conceivable that they had influence on the 
economic proposals made in the burgher Memorie. Again it becomes apparent that 
the protest movement was geared towards the concerns of some, rather than of all 
the burghers. 
 
The 1779 Memorie suggested that the trade and import market was controlled by a 
small number of companies, like La Febre & Co and Cruijwagen & Co, which were 
made up of a network of leading burghers and high VOC officials. This oligopoly kept 
the prices for imported goods, which the farmers needed to purchase, at a high level. 
This urban elite had furthermo e managed to exclude other burghers from their 
profitable enterprises. For the farming families involved in the burgher protests it was 
vital that they gained access to the import market. If they could manage to do so, they 
could control and subsequently lower the prices, which would be of great financial 
benefit to them. At the same time a greater measure of free trade with the Dutch 
Republic and Asia would be of advantage to the merchants and entrepreneurs in Cape 
Town itself. It was here that a significant combination of interests emerged. If the 
farmers could somehow forge a coalition with burghers in the city, they would have a 
foothold in Cape Town which would help them in the pursuit of their goals. The role of 
Cornelis van der Poel and Christiaan George Maasdorp in this endeavour could prove 
to be crucial. 
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Van Der Poel and Maasdorp were based in Cape Town and both men were involved in 
the wine trading business of the large wine farmers. At the beginning of 1785 Van Der 
Poel was mentioned as ‘the private wine buyer’‎in‎a‎request‎to‎the‎Political‎Council.30 
In 1782 Maasdorp submitted a request to the Political Council in which he stated that 
he had earned his living for many years with ‘the buying and again selling of wine by 
wholesale’.31 Neither of the men were liquor retailers, which meant that they did not 
sell wine in bars and inns. Instead they bought wine in large quantities from the wine 
farmers, transported it to Cape Town and there sold it again to the retailers and 
innkeepers. They were agents and representatives for the wine farming families. This 
bond was strengthened further in 1774 when Cornelis van der Poel became a partner 
in the meat contract together with Johannes Albertus Meijburgh and two of the four 
heemraden of the Stellenbosch district, Philippus Albertus Meijburgh and Jan de 
Villiers Jan Pieterszoon. During the 1770s Van Der Poel and Maasdorp were placed in 
leading administrative positions as Burgher Councillors and captains of the burgher 
militia. When political unrest started brewing in January 1779 the influential farming 
families‎like‎the‎Meijburghs‎and‎the‎De‎Villiers’,‎being‎politically‎prominent‎in‎the‎
outer districts themselves, may very well have recognised that two of their close 
associates were in the ideal position to form a connection between country and city 
and thus to represent and promote their interests. 
 
Another invaluable contribution to the process was made by Jacobus van Reenen. 
Apart from being a wealthy member of the farming community himself, he was the 
founder of a family dynasty with links to both the rural and urban entrepreneurial 
elite. On 4 December 1746 Van Reenen married Maria Franke. She was the daughter of 
Berlin immigrant Johannes Franke and Cape born Catharina Verweij.32 Her mother 
descended from a farming family and was the aunt of Cornelis, Johannes, Gijsbert and 
Daniel Verweij, all four signatories of the 1779 protest petition and farmers in the Cape 
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District.33 Maria’s‎father‎however‎was‎a‎shoemaker residing in Cape Town. She 
therefore must have been familiar with both city and country life. It seemed that the 
Verweijs‎played‎a‎significant‎part‎in‎Maria‎Franke’s‎life,‎because‎she‎had‎eleven‎
children with Jacobus van Reenen and at least six of these were named after her 
siblings: Johannes Gijsbertus, Daniel, Catharina Gesina, Dirk Gijsbertus, Jacobus 
Arnoldus and Gijsbert. 
 
Maria‎Franke’s‎youngest‎sister,‎Christina,‎was‎the‎wife‎of‎Thomas‎Frederik‎Dreijer,‎the‎
messenger of the Burgher Council and a signatory of the protest petition, as was his 
brother, Johannes Augustus, whose daughter Sara Johanna was married to a nephew 
of Maria Franke, Johannes Hendrik Franke.34 This Franke owned a house and garden 
called Uijtvlugt in Cape Town and was also one of the 404 protesters. In the 1780s he 
became one of the important brandmeesters. 
 
Perhaps one of the most significant connections between the Van Reenen family and 
the city entrepreneurs of Cape Town came about in 1775‎when‎Jacobus’‎son,‎Dirk‎
Gijsbertus, married the eldest daughter of Jan Willem Hurter, Aletta Catharina. Hurter 
was at the centre of a world of urban-based alcohol pachters at the Cape and a major 
entrepreneur himself. 
 
Urban support: the alcohol pachters 
 
Before explaining why the matrimonial union between a Van Reenen and a Hurter 
carried so much weight, it is necessary to give some background information about the 
alcohol pachters. As early as at the end of the seventeenth century it became clear 
that the alcohol trade at the Cape was potentially very profitable. The settlement was 
growing and because it was a stop-over for ships travelling between Europe and Asia 
there were always many visitors. The Cape administration gave several burghers the 
right to retail liquor, which they had to buy from the Company. In the beginning the 
system was still somewhat unregulated, but before long the VOC administration 
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realised that stricter controls were necessary to prevent smuggling and to create a 
stable source of revenue for the Company. From the Dutch Republic the administrators 
were familiar with a system whereby certain privileges, e.g. the right to sell liquor, 
were verpacht (rented out). From the late 1670s the right to sell a certain type of 
alcohol was auctioned to the highest bidder on an annual basis and this arrangement 
remained one of the cornerstones of the Cape economy for more than one hundred 
years. The successful bidders and buyers of the alcohol licences were known as the 
alcohol pachters.35 The yearly auction of the alcohol licences happened on 31 August 
(unless this fell on a Sunday) and was a big event on the business calendar of the Cape. 
One of the more well-known visitors to the Cape in the eighteenth century, Otto 
Mentzel, described the auction process in lively and amusing detail.36 
 
There were two striking and closely related elements which characterised and were 
part and parcel of the alcohol pacht system: vast sums of money had to be paid (and 
could be earned) and without the right relations it was difficult to get a firm footing in 
the liquor trade. Most pachten, and especially the more lucrative ones, were sold at 
several thousands of guilders, while the general pacht to sell Cape wines was 
auctioned for tens of thousands of guilders. Clearly this was not meant for people who 
could not afford it. And that leads to the second element. Each pachter had to provide 
two burghers, who would stand surety for the payment of the pacht monies and who 
would sign the contract together with him. This was a serious affair and not just a 
formality. Sometimes the Governor would even interview would-be pachters about 
their sureties to ascertain if they were viable prospects. The Company regularly took 
pachters to court if they were late with their payments and should it happen that they 
were not able to pay, the Company did not hesitate to go after the sureties next and 
would try to get the unpaid monies out of them.37 The administration was highly 
motivated to do so, because the income from the sale of the alcohol pachten was the 
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single most important form of revenue of the Cape government throughout the 
eighteenth century. In the decade 1730 to 1739 almost 31% of the of the total net 
income of the Cape settlement came from the sale of the alcohol pachten. And by the 
last decade of VOC rule this percentage was 38%.38 Therefore standing surety was not 
to be taken lightly and it was normally only done for people who one knew well and 
trusted. In fact, Mentzel observed that the sureties were ‘usually partners in the 
transactions, for the lease is nearly always taken by a syndicate of four or more 
persons’.39 
 
The two aspects of the alcohol pacht are most significant. It meant that a pachter 
either had to be fairly wealthy himself or had to have sufficient and reliable financial 
backing. Therefore relations, both with financiers and with sureties, were of utmost 
importance in this business. Because trust was a key aspect in these bonds, they were 
often forged between family members or close friends. It was vital for alcohol pachters 
to build up a tight social network and the matter to be investigated is how these 
networks operated during the political troubles of the late 1770s.40 
 
An examination of the data regarding the alcohol pachters and their sureties for the 
period 1775-1779, the years immediately leading up to the eruption of the burgher 
protests, reveals important information. For the purpose of this investigation the six 
most profitable and expensive pachten were selected. These were the rights to sell 
brandy (which was sold in four parts or perceelen), the licence to sell wine to foreign 
ships, and the most lucrative one: the general pacht to sell Cape wine. It must also be 
noted that these pachten gave the holder the right to sell alcohol in Table Valley and 
therefore they were directly related to Cape Town.41 At the annual auction the right to 
sell Cape wine was auctioned in four parts and contracts were signed with the 
successful bidders and their sureties. After that however, the Company auctioned the 
right to sell Cape wine as one lot, the general pacht. If the successful bidder on this 
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contract offered a higher price than the total of the four parts, the contracts for the 
individual parts became null and void.42 Therefore one might find several pachten to 
sell Cape wine in the archival records, but these are not taken into account here. 
Consequently the number of ten burghers active at the annual auction in the pursuit of 
the most profitable pachten between 1775 and 1779 is reduced to five. Notably these 
men were five of the six alcohol pachters who dominated the liquor retail trade in 
Cape Town during the 1770s.43 Table 6-2 shows these five pachters, how many 
pachten they bought in this period and who their sureties were. 
 
The five pachters formed two distinctive groups. The Roep/Schreuder group includes 
Johan Casper Holtman and Johan Christoffel Luster, Jan Andries Bam and Johannes 
Smook. All of these men were active at the pacht auctions, but only Roep and 
Schreuder managed to acquire some of the more important pachten. More significant 
is that all these men were standing surety for both Roep and Schreuder, while these 
two also backed each other. Roep and Schreuder and their sureties evidently formed 
one of the syndicates that Mentzel referred to.  
 
The second group around the pachters Baatman, Melk and De Kruger used a different 
set of sureties. It is furthermore noteworthy that they seemed to be able to call on a 
wider and more varied collection of backers. Only Holtman appears in both groups, but 
was used just once by the second.  
 
The most striking difference between the two groups is that all of the men in the first 
group, except for one, belonged to the 404 signatories of the May 1779 protest 
petition, while the majority of the second network of pachters and their sureties did 
not sign the protest petition. A closer inspection of the five pachters will shed more 
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5 Yes Johannes Roep 
Johannes Casper Holtman 
Johan Christoff Luster 
Jan Smook 
Jan Andries Bam 

















Johannes Roep 3 Yes Johan Jacob Schreuder 
Jan Smook 
Johan Christoff Luster 









TOTAL 8     
Maarten 
Baatman 
5 No Michiel Cornelis Berning 
Carel Fredrik Geere 
Johannes Esselaar 
Johannes Verlee 
Martinus Lourens Smidt 


















10 No Jurgen Stadelaar 
Jan Adam Ziedel 
Johan Godfried Bottiger 
Maarten Baatman 















Jan Bernard Hofman 
Maarten Baatman 































It was in the 1730s that a family dynasty started to develop around the control of the 
brewing and selling of malt beer. Aletta de Nijs and her second husband Hans Jurgen 
Honk established a prosperous business as brewers of malt beer on their farm De 
Papenboom. For four decades the malt beer pacht was in the hands of burghers linked 
to De Nijs: her sons-in-law, grandsons-in-law and close associates. This network of 
pachters included Jan Jacob Schreuder and Johannes Roep. 
 
Roep was a German immigrant, who became a burgher in 1760. The following year he 
married Johanna Elisabeth Staf, a granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs. It is likely that Roep 
entered the alcohol pacht world and particularly that of the malt beer because of this 
marriage. In 1767 he bought his first pacht and that was the licence to sell malt beer. 
From then until the late 1770s he remained involved in the alcohol trade and bought a 
great number of pachten.  
 
Schreuder was also a German immigrant and became a burgher in 1754. Originally he 
was a carpenter, but in 1761 he invested in his first alcohol licence and over a period of 
twenty-nine years he owned thirty-nine pachten among which was the malt beer 
pacht. By the late 1770s he was firmly on the side of the protest movement: it was on 
his garden that the first protest meetings of the burghers were held in June 1778. 
 
Schreuder was not directly family related to the De Nijs dynasty, but he was supported 
regularly by sureties with strong links to the family. One of these was Jan Willem 
Hurter. Like Roep and Schreuder, Hurter was a German immigrant. He became a 
burgher in 1762. In 1755 he married Barbara Honk, the daughter of Aletta de Nijs and 
Hans Jurgen Honk, and he inherited the malt beer brewery at De Papenboom after 
Honk’s‎death.‎Hurter‎bought‎the‎malt‎beer‎pacht only seven times over twenty years, 
but because he possessed the brewery he was the sole provider of beer to all the malt 
beer pachters. On his farm he also contracted as bijtapper (assistant tavern keeper) for 
the pachters of the brandy licence for Rondebosch and False Bay, one of whom was 
Johannes Roep and another Johannes Casparus Holtman, a regular Schreuder surety.44 
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The link between the three men is evident: they were all Germans and arrived at the 
Cape in the same period. Roep and Hurter both married into the malt beer brewers 
family and all three of them belonged to a network of men who regularly supported 
each other as sureties. The man at the centre seemed to have been Jan Willem Hurter. 
He expanded the successful enterprise built by Aletta de Nijs and Hans Jurgen Honk 
and brought his family to prominence in Cape society. He was appointed to 
Commissioner of Civil and Marriage Affairs in 1775 and 1776.45 Another sign of his 
important status was that in 1775 his eldest daughter Aletta Catharina married a son 
of the prominent Jacobus van Reenen, Dirk Gijsbertus. This bond was strengthened 
further in 1779 when Hurter stood surety for his son-in-law when this one ventured 
into the meat pacht. 
 
It may very well be that this alliance between the Hurters and the Van Reenens 
marked the beginning of a shift for this group of alcohol pachters. In the early 1770s 
there was more fluidity between the two groups of alcohol pachters described above. 
Baatman used Schreuder as surety and vice versa. Roep was used once as surety by 
Melk. Among the seven sureties used by Schreuder between 1770 and 1774 there 
were only two, Roep and Holtman, who would sign the protest petition in 1779. Yet 
after 1775 a clear divide appeared between the two groups, as described earlier, and it 
is not unlikely that a highly influential burgher as Jacobus van Reenen may have drawn 
these pachters and their associates into his political camp. 
 
The connection between the Van Reenens and Jan Willem Hurter was not the only link 
Hurter had with the wealthy farmers who supported the protest movement. The 
relations of Hurter and his support of the protest movement may very well have 
contributed to the fact that several of his children went on to marry members of some 
major Cape burgher families in the early 1780s. Catharina Hurter became the wife of 
another Van Reenen scion, Sebastiaan Valentijn. Elisabeth Maria Hurter married Arend 
Munnik and Johan Wilhelm Hurter became the husband of Martha Maria Munnik, a 
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daughter of Gerhardus Munnik, the brother of Arend. Another daughter of Gerhardus, 
Jacoba, was married to yet another Van Reenen brother, Jacobus Arnoldus.46 
Gerhardus Munnik had been a heemraad in Stellenbosch, and his other brother, Johan 
Hendrik, was a ritmeester of the burgher cavalry in the Cape District, who would 
become a burgher councillor in the 1780s. Both Gerhardus and Johan Hendrik were 
signatories of the May 1779 petition. Gerhardus was in 1779 also the pachter of the 
brandy licence for Rondebosch and False Bay and must have had business dealings 
with Jan Willem Hurter. The Munniks were furthermore known as a family which 
owned‎several‎farms.‎Jan‎Willem‎Hurter’s‎second‎eldest‎daughter‎became‎the‎wife‎of‎
Servaas van Breda, a son of Michiel van Breda, the wealthy owner of the farm 
Oranjezicht. Servaas himself was the owner of several farms and a prominent burgher 
in Cape Town.47 His brother, Pieter van Breda, inherited Oranjezicht from their father 
in 1777, and owned six other properties in Cape Town. He was married to Catharina 
Sophia Meijburgh, a daughter of Johannes Albertus Meijburgh.48 Pieter van Breda was 
therefore a brother-in-law of protest leader Cornelis van der Poel and both he and 
brother Servaas signed the protest petition. 
 
Jan Willem Hurter could be regarded as a leading figure in a business and family 
network which included the alcohol pachters Johannes Roep and Johan Jacob 
Schreuder. It is therefore plausible that they would choose to follow his lead in siding 
with the protest movement. It explains that the network of sureties surrounding Roep 
and Schreuder were all signatories of the May 1779 petition. This argument will be 
strengthened later in this chapter when we will meet several of these sureties again. It 
is also clear that Hurter was a foremost member of an intricate network of leading 
urban entrepreneurs and wealthy farmers involved in the burgher protests, who were 
looking after their interests and were ready to take on the ruling faction. 
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A neutral faction 
 
A closer look at the three alcohol pachters who did not support the protest movement 
reveals an interesting aspect to the political landscape described so far. These three – 
Maarten Baatman, Willem de Kruger and Martin Melk – supported each other as 
sureties, but their network of supporters seemed to have been wider and more varied 
than that of Schreuder and Roep. They did not limit themselves to fellow Germans, but 
also associated with Dutch and Cape born burghers.49 
 
Undoubtedly the most successful of the three was Martin Melk. He owned a large 
number of farms and was one of the foremost wine and cattle farmers of the Cape 
settlement. He was furthermore involved in other enterprises like lime-burning and 
brick-making.‎When‎his‎wife‎Anna‎Margaretha‎Hop‎died‎in‎1776‎Melk’s‎estate‎was‎
valued at the enormous amount of 240,000 Cape guilders. In the late 1760s Melk was 
heemraad of the district of Stellenbosch.50 Martin Melk was an alcohol pachter for 
eighteen years, who especially later in his career invested in and controlled the most 
lucrative and expensive General Cape Wine licence. The sureties who supported him in 
his endeavours were mostly other Cape and Stellenbosch farmers, while his most 
regular backer was Hendrik Cloete. During his early days at the Cape Melk had worked 
as a farmhand for the father of Hendrik Cloete and a close personal and business 
relationship had developed.51 This‎relationship‎may‎have‎contributed‎to‎Melk’s‎
position in the burgher protests. 
 
Hendrik Cloete was a wealthy farmer in his own right. He was of the same age as 
Martin Melk and had a distinguished political and business career. During the 1760s 
and 1770s he was heemraad of Stellenbosch. He owned the farm Nooitgedacht and in 
1778 he became the owner of Groot Constantia. Besides these farms he possessed 
property in Cape Town.52 As a descendant of one of the older burgher families Cloete 
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was related to many of the other families, like the Van Der Bijls, Laubschers, Morkels 
and Eksteens. But he also had contacts with VOC officials and farmers further away in 
the interior. He seemed to have been quite well informed about events happening all 
over the Cape settlement, which was apparent from his correspondence with his friend 
Hendrik Swellengrebel junior, the son of the former Cape governor Swellengrebel.53 
 
This‎friendship‎sheds‎light‎on‎Cloete’s‎position‎in‎the‎political‎turmoil‎at‎the‎Cape‎of 
the late 1770s and 1780s. In chapter 2 we saw that Hendrik Swellengrebel tried to 
convince the delegation of Cape burghers to submit a Memorie to the Heeren XVII 
which was without any personal attacks on VOC officials. Swellengrebel was not 
unsympathetic to the cause of the Cape burghers, but he felt that a more objective 
approach would achieve better results. At the time his attempts to influence the 
events came to naught.‎However‎Swellengrebel’s‎interest‎in‎Cape‎matters‎continued‎
and he compiled a document containing the arguments and proposals to improve the 
condition for the burghers at the Cape which, according to him, the protesters should 
have submitted to the VOC directors. In July 1783 he sent this document to Hendrik 
Cloete with an explanation and instructions that the most prominent burghers and 
farmers, who had not been involved in the burgher protests, would submit it as a 
request to the Political Council. And that is precisely what happened. On 14 February 
1784 a request was submitted to the Political Council by the former Burgher 
Councillors Johannes Meijndertz Cruijwagen  and Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, Hendrik 
Cloete and a further eleven prominent residents of the Cape and Stellenbosch 
districts.54 The request was virtually word for word copied from the Swellengrebel 
document.55 
 
In essence the request was not very different from the proposals made by the 
protesting burghers in the 1779 Memorie. It gave an overview of the economic 
conditions at the Cape and the consequences for the burghers. The adverse economic 
situation was blamed on the large increase in the number of farmers and the resulting 
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larger production for which there was no market available. The upswing of the early 
1780s was considered only temporarily as it was founded on increased activity as a 
consequence of the wars between European countries. The request asked the Cape 
administration to provide a more structural solution for the economic problems, 
among which the opening of the market for the burghers and a system of free trade. 
Most‎significantly‎and‎completely‎in‎Swellengrebel’s‎spirit,‎the‎request‎did‎not‎contain‎
any negative personal attack on or comment about Cape VOC officials.56 
 
The request was thus well-received by the members of the Political Council, who 
stated in 1786 that the first three signatories of the request belonged to the 
wealthiest, oldest and most important families of the Cape burgher community. They 
also said that all the writers ‘had always loathed the behaviour and actions of another 
part of the Residents’.‎This‎observation‎could‎only‎be‎regarded‎as‎a‎reference‎to‎the‎
Cape protesters.57 Apparently these rich and important burghers did not want to 
associate themselves with the protest movement. Cloete himself commented to 
Swellengrebel in 1789 how ‘I and my family always opposed the Cape patriots’,‎and‎
complained that he was ostracised because of his stand.58 
 
What is clear from this set of events is that there was a group of wealthy burgher 
farmers which took a more or less neutral position between the protest faction and 
the ruling one made up of leading burghers and Company administrators. This non-
aligned faction agreed to a large extent that the situation at the Cape needed to 
change, but they did not want to antagonise the government. Hendrik Swellengrebel 
gave a possible explanation for this position. Being wealthy, these farmers were able 
to sustain themselves better through an economic recession. They were furthermore 
not as much victimised by harsh actions of the Independent Fiscal as many of the 
protesters. And lastly, most of these top-ranking burghers were, either by marriage or 
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in another way, connected to the administration.59 But something not mentioned by 
Swellengrebel was that they were also related to the farming community. Just one 
example of this was that Hendrik Cloete was also a grand-child of the Van Der Merwe 
patriarch as were protesting heemraad Joost Rijnhard van As and the wife of Johannes 
Albertus Meijburgh. These prosperous farmers were positioned in between the 
squabbling factions, but could afford not to choose sides. 
 
Looking back at the close and long-standing social and business relationship between 
Hendrik Cloete and Martin Melk and their very similar background, it comes as no 
surprise that the last one was not a supporter of the protest movement. Had he still 
lived he may very well have been one of the signatories of February 1784 request, 
because he was one of the wealthiest burghers at the Cape and because of his close 
friendship with Cloete. What is interesting is that apparently the supporting network of 
Melk and Cloete, which included the alcohol pachters Baatman and De Kruger and 
their various sureties, followed the same route as their influential patrons and did not 
sign the May 1779 protest petition. 
 
More entrepreneurial support for the protest faction  
 
What we have seen so far is that a group of wealthy cattle and wine farmers situated 
close to Cape Town in the Cape District and around Stellenbosch was a major force 
behind the burgher protests. They were eager to protect and promote their economic 
interests. They built a web of family connections and business relations stretching from 
the rural areas to the urban environment and aimed to use this network to challenge 
the powerful ruling faction consisting of burghers and VOC officials. Time and again 
Jacobus van Reenen and Cornelis van der Poel came to the fore as central figures in 
this protest faction. 
 
The alliance which was formed between the protesting farming families and some of 
the alcohol pachters was not the only connection between the rural community and 
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the urban entrepreneurs of Cape Town. The protest faction gained support among 
burghers involved in all kinds of trades and crafts. This was due firstly to business 
relations at the Cape becoming more complex in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. Everybody was dependent on the Company for the general welfare of the 
settlement and survival; poorer burghers were dependent on the wealthier ones for 
work; the people in town were dependent on the farmers for a supply of produce and 
food, while the farmers needed services offered by urban based burghers. And 
secondly, with a burgher population present at the Cape for several generations, 
kinship connections had become more widespread and intricate. These social and 
economic relationships had consequences for the political events of the late 1770s. 
This can be illustrated by using the example of some trades and occupations about 
which more information is available: bakers, smiths, and teachers. 
 
The burgher bakers at the Cape settlement were kept on a tight leash by the VOC 
administration. Every year in January they had to apply and pay for a licence to 
operate as a baker.60 The baker business was subject to various conditions. They were 
obliged to sell bread to the ‘komende en gaande man’ (one and all), the weight of the 
bread was standardised and each baker had to stamp the bread he baked so that it 
could be identified if something was found wrong with it.61 The number of burgher 
bakers operating in Cape Town was fixed and was from time to time increased 
following the growing population. In the minutes of the Burgher Council it was stated 
in December 1782 that there were twenty licensed burgher bakers in Cape Town. The 
Burgher Councillors did not think this number enough to cope with the larger demand 
of the town and they requested the Political Council to increase the number to twenty-
six in 1783.62  
 
Whether there were also twenty bakers in Cape Town in 1779 is not known, but of 
fifteen bakers it has positively been established that they were operating in the town 
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in that year (Table 6-3).63 Eleven of these signed the protest petition of May 1779. The 
protesting bakers all belonged to the middle and higher income group according to the 
criteria established in chapter 3 for the Quotisatie Rolle of 1783. Therefore they fitted 
into the profile of the protesters as self-employed and relatively wealthy burghers. But 
there was more to the involvement of these eleven bakers in the protests. 
 
The licensed bakers seemed to have been organised. In a request to the Political 
Council of twenty-four licensed bakers, dated August 1783, they complained among 
other things about ‘some private individuals who did not belong to the body 
[organisation] of Bakers’.64 This organisation could have been born from the desire of 
these bakers to stress that they were the licensed ones and to prevent that people 
without the proper licence would be allowed to bake or sell bread. The above request 
illustrated that the bakers on occasion made representations to the government as a 
unified body. The baker body was the only example of a guild-like organisation in Cape 
Town. If the bakers were organised in this fashion it could very well be that, when a 
decision needed to be taken on an important matter, for instance on the joining of the 
burgher protest movement, this was done as a collective. And that would explain why 
eleven of the fifteen bakers, a large majority, were signatories of the May 1779 
petition. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. Bread was a staple food 
and the bakers could have used their central role in the general well-being of the 
population as a bargaining tool. 
 
It is likely that the leaders of the protest faction were well aware of the value of the 
baker support and they used their relations with them to draw them into their camp. 
Assuming that the bakers discussed their decision as a group, it is probable that certain 
members took the lead and that this ranking position was based on wealth. There are 
three bakers among the eleven signatories who were taxed high amounts according to 
the 1783 Quotisatie Rolle, namely eighteen guilders, and these were Jacobus Johannes 
Vos, Ferdinand Christiaan Geijer and Johannes Andries Bam. It cannot be regarded as a 
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coincidence that these three were also sureties for the alcohol pachters Johan Jacob 
Schreuder and Johannes Roep and thus were part of the network of urban self-
employed burghers supporting the protest movement. The fact that they were 
accepted as sureties furthermore shows that they were considered to be trustworthy 
and upstanding burghers and not ones ‘of‎a‎lesser‎kind’‎as‎the‎VOC‎officials‎wanted‎to‎
portray the protesters. 
 
Table ‎6-3: Licensed burgher bakers in Cape Town, 1779 






Bam Johannes Andries 10 18 Yes 
D'Aillij David Benjamin  6 No 
De Jong Hendrik 10  Yes 
De Necker Adriaan 20 6 Yes 
Ekhard Jan Hendrik 30 21 No  
Geijer Ferdinand Christiaan  18 Yes 
Grove Andries DanieI  9 Yes 
Jansen Jens 15 15 No  
Laubscher Pieter Rijno 20  Yes 
Lijbrand Sijbastiaan  9 (12) Yes 
Loedolf Christiaan 20 18 No  
Smit Andreas  9 Yes 
Stapelberg Frans Hendrik 10 12 Yes 
Truter Hendrik Andreas 10 9 (12) Yes 
Vos Jacobus Johannes  18 (27) Yes 
 
 
Apart from belonging to the pachter network each of these three bakers had other 
connections and characteristics fitting the protester profile. Geijer was also a farmer 
and owned the farm Rheezicht close to Roodebloem just outside Cape Town.65 Both 
Bam and Vos had an entrepreneurial spirit. Bam would become an alcohol pachter 
himself in the early 1780s. His brother, Johan Christiaan, and brother-in-law, Johan 
Hendrik Thomasse, were signatories of the May 1779 petition. Jacobus Johannes Vos 
became a contractor for the delivery of building material for the new hospital in 1781 
and later in the 1780s he was mentioned as a lime burner operating between 
Roodebloem and Sonnebloem.66 He was the brother of Johan Hendrik and Hendrik 
Vos, who too signed the protest petition. His marriage to Johanna Margaretha Mohr 
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made him the son-in-law and brother-in-law of two more protest signatories, Hans 
Diederik and Marx Nicolaas Mohr.67 
 
It could very well be that his link with the Vos brothers and the Mohr family was held 
against Michiel Christiaan Vos, the youngest of the brothers, when he requested 
permission to go to Holland to study in the beginning of 1780. That was also his own 
interpretation of the events that followed. On his first attempt he was plainly refused 
permission by the Governor. On his second attempt the Governor did not address him 
as ‘as a burgher of this country, but as the most common fiend’.68 He was told that he 
could only go if he took his wife with him. Vos did not want to do that, because it 
would be too costly and he did not expect to be away that long. He did not give up and 
on his third try he took his father-in-law, who told the Governor in no uncertain terms 
that he would seek redress from the Burgher Councillors should he not agree to the 
request. According to Vos the Governor was wary of more complaints about his 
administration reaching the Heeren XVII and gave in: Vos was finally allowed to leave 
the Cape.69 
 
Besides Vos, Geijer and Bam there were at least two other burghers among the bakers 
with a notable background.70 Andries Daniel Grove’s* grandfather had been a farmer 
and his father was a heemraad. His stepmother, who married his father when he was 
only ten years old, was Elisabeth de Waal, a sister of Johannes* and Pieter* de Waal. 
His aunt was married to Nicolaas Godfried Heijns*, one of the burgher delegates of 
1779.‎Grove’s‎own‎partner‎was‎Elisabeth‎Henning,‎a‎sister‎of‎Paulus‎Henning*, and of 
Aletta Henning, who again was the wife of Cornelis de Waal*. His family furthermore 
had kinship relations with the Van Der Bijls*.71 Then there was Pieter Rijno Laubscher*, 
who farmed on Roodebloem and whose family was related to important families like 
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the De Waals and the Eksteens among others.72 Lastly it must be mentioned that 
bakers Hendrik Andreas Truter* and Adriaan de Necker* were brothers-in-law.73 
 
A further illustration of the argument that the burgher protest movement was 
supported mainly by self-employed entrepreneurs is the example of the burgher 
smiths. One of the main complaints of the protesting burghers was that certain 
Company employees had all kinds of excessive advantages over the burghers. In their 
meeting of 13 August 1778 the incumbent Burgher Councillors - Hendrik Oostwald 
Eksteen, Cornelis van der Poel and Adam Gabriel Muller – dealt with a request from a 
number of burgher smiths. The request stated that the smiths were disadvantaged by 
Company servants, because some of them owned or rented shops from where they 
conducted forges. The burgher smiths had to pay high prices to the Company for iron, 
while these Company employees could get material at lower prices and thus charge 
less for their work. Because they suffered greatly from this form of unfair competition 
the burgher smiths asked the government to put a stop to this practice and prohibit 
Company employees from owning businesses like this or use others, like Chinese or 
Javanese or even other burghers, to act as a front for them.74 This request basically 
summarised the complaints of the burghers formulated in the later protest 
documents, specifically the 1779 Memorie. 
 
The request was signed by nine smiths (Table 6-4). Two of them, Johannes Daniel and 
Jochim Thijsse75, died before May 1779. Of the seven that were left, five signed the 
May 1779 petition. However one of the two who did not, namely Dirk Beukers, did 
supply a statement which declared that Fiscal Boers had ordered an iron gate for his 
property from the Company smiths at prices that burgher smiths were not able to 
compete with, which showed that he disadvantaged the burgher trade.76 The 
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statement was made together with Jan Hendrik Ehlers and Beukers could very well be 
regarded as a supporter of the protest movement. It is also noteworthy that all the 
smiths who signed the 1778 request and the protest petition belonged to the middle 
income group according to the criteria established in chapter 3 for the Quotisatie Rolle 
of 1783, except for Coenraad Luijt. 
 
Table ‎6-4: Burgher smiths Cape District, 1778 








Johannes Pieter Voges Yes 10 12 
Jan Hendrik Ehlers Yes  15 (18) 
Dirk Beukers  No  8 
George Guerijn  No  9 
Frans Jordaan Yes  9 
Johannes Daniel (Died Jan 1779) 10  
Coenraad Luijt Yes  3 
Jan Ernst Heijdenreijk Yes  6 
Jochim Thijsse (Died 1779)   
 
 
A different kind of entrepreneurs were the burgher teachers. During the eighteenth 
century a burgher had to request the Political Council permission to start a school and 
until 1777 these requests were passed on to the council of the Dutch Reformed 
Church. The church council then investigated if the burgher had a proper and Christian 
lifestyle and if he was competent enough to teach. From 1777 onwards this inquiry 
was undertaken by the so-called Raad van Skolarchen or Council of School Wardens. 
This council was formed by a member of the Political Council, the two church ministers 
and an elder of the church council. Education was rather limited. The schools had to 
have a solid religious (read Dutch Reformed) component, and besides that most taught 
reading, writing and some calculus. However if a Cape resident wanted to provide their 
children with a better education, he had to send them to the Dutch Republic. Because 
of the high cost factor this was reserved for the wealthier among them. There are 












the Republic for education and this was an indication that the burghers concerned 
were generally well-off.77 
 
The reason why the teachers are categorised as entrepreneurs is that they were not 
employed by the government, but derived their income from the school fees paid by 
their pupils. The more pupils they had, the more money they made and therefore it 
would have been important to them to have a good reputation as a teacher which 
would attract more pupils to their school. The teachers were also allowed to have 
other jobs to supplement their income.78 
 
Between 1714 and 1782 there were about thirty schools at the Cape. The number of 
schools in Cape Town grew from four in 1737 to eight in 1779 as a consequence of the 
increasing population. Thanks to the fact that the teachers had to apply for permission 
before opening a school there is a good record of the burghers who were teachers in 
1779.79 From Table 6-5 it becomes clear that the teachers were not very wealthy, but 
they did belong to the middle income group. It is furthermore evident that the 
majority of the teachers (six of the eight) supported the protest movement. This is 
somewhat surprising since they were so dependent on the VOC government for their 
appointments and approval. On the other hand it could be that the reason for their 
support was found in the fact that they were entrepreneurs like many of the burgher 
traders and craftsmen and that they wanted to show solidarity for a group of burghers 
that they essentially felt part of or connected to. 
 
It is noteworthy that one of the teachers in 1779 was Johannes Henricus Redelinkhuijs. 
In chapter 1 he was identified as one of the burghers who were deeply involved in the 
protest movement from May 1778. He had close personal ties with some of the 
protesters. On 9 July 1780 he married Maria Elisabeth de Villiers. She was a niece of 
two of the foremost signatories of the May 1779 petition, the former heemraden Jan 
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and Jacob de Villiers.80 Several of his other family members were also married into the 
De Villiers family. His sister Susanna married on the same day as he did and became 
the wife of protest supporter Evert Heugs.81 Redelinkhuijs’‎mother‎Johanna‎Hermina‎
de Vries was a sister of Abraham de Vries, who was married to Cornelia Gesina 
Duuring, a sister of Daniel Nicolaas Duuring, one of the other teachers who supported 
the protest movement.82 
 
Table ‎6-5: Burgher teachers, Cape Town 1779 










Daniel Nicolaas Duuring 1770 Yes 5 4 
Job Jacobsen 1754 No 5 6 (3) 
Albert Joosten 1776 No  6 
George Knoop 1772 Yes 5 9 
Petrus Johannes Meijer 1764 Yes 10 6 
David Hendrik Mellet 1765 Yes 5 8 
Johannes 
Henricus 
Redelinkhuijs 1777 Yes  6 (9) 





This chapter aimed to show that the burgher protests of 1779 were led by a faction of 
wealthy farmers and urban entrepreneurs, who had done well for themselves and 
even had links to the VOC administration. In order to protect their interests they 
needed to get more control over economic and political structures. That control was in 
the hands of a faction of rich burghers with close associations to key VOC personnel, 
which had managed to exclude others and had nestled itself close to the centre of 
power at the Cape. From the middle of the 1770s the protest faction began to try and 
gain access to the political and economic power centre. Firmer bonds between farmers 
and well-placed urban entrepreneurs were formed and widespread networks of 
support were built up. The urban entrepreneurs welcomed the assistance to get more 
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advantages for their skills and trade ventures. The efforts of the challengers came to 
an outburst in 1779 and a formal Memorie was presented to the directors of the 
Company. It asked for certain economic reforms, but was careful not to attack those 
systems which formed the basis for the financial success of the protest leaders, e.g. the 
meat pacht or even the alcohol pacht. The Memorie alleged that the burgher 
community was in a deplorable state and burgher rights were trampled on. It blamed 
VOC officials exceeding their authority while colluding with some wealthy burghers. 
However while the protest leaders tried to portray themselves as champions of a free 
burgher community, they were in fact ready to take the place of the burghers in the 
ruling faction. Thus when they wrote in Article 17 of the third part of the Memorie that 
‘in general the delivery of all products from the Cape to the Company should be 
contracted to burghers’‎without‎any‎Company interference, they meant that they 














In the middle of the seventeenth century the directors of the VOC reluctantly agreed 
to the establishment of a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope. This sentence 
summarises the most often used manner in which early Dutch presence at the Cape is 
described. Even though the directors had given in to settlement at the Cape, they did 
not want it go much further than that. There were even early plans to literally cut the 
Cape off from the African continent by digging a canal.1 The initial hesitation soon 
changed to resolve and determination, although it may be argued that the VOC 
leadership were following economic and social realities rather than steering 
developments. VOC employees asked for permission to be released from their 
contracts and be settled as free burghers. Some stayed in town to ply their trades and 
crafts, others went to the rural areas as farmers and as they moved further inland so 
did the Cape frontiers. In Cape Town the wooden fort built by Commander Van 
Riebeeck was replaced by an impressive stone structure known as the Castle. No 
visitor to Cape Town today can look at this massive building and have any doubts 
about the intentions of the early Dutch settlers. No more wavering, they came to stay. 
 
With settlement came government and organisation, which could facilitate the aims of 
the settlers. For the VOC the Cape station would only be attractive if it could be cost-
effective and served its intended purpose as a half-way post. The burghers wanted to 
be able to make a living and survive. To achieve these goals the Cape settlers started 
organising their settlement in ways that were known to them, because they did not 
come to the Cape to start a new utopian or unique society. It was obvious that not 
everything could be exactly the same as in the Republic. After all, the Cape was not a 
traditional Dutch city, but a VOC governed settlement. Therefore the Company had to 
make sure it stayed in control and it designed the government in such a way that it 
would‎serve‎this‎objective.‎The‎Company‎needed‎the‎burghers’‎co-operation, but it 
also intended for the burghers to be subject and obedient to Company rule. Besides 
this, not all burghers came from the Dutch Republic, but they came from various parts 
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of Europe where they were used to different circumstances. Notwithstanding these 
challenges and differences the Cape settlers set out to create their version of European 
Dutch society with many of the same or similar social, political and judicial aspects. 
 
Over time the burghers developed their own identity and emphasized their burgher 
status within Cape society. The view that the Cape settlement was part of the Dutch 
empire and the Dutch Republic prevailed among the burgher population and came to 
the fore during protests at the Cape at the end of the 1770s. The protests were 
undertaken by burghers and they made clear from the outset that they were burghers 
of a colony belonging to the United Netherlands. According to them this meant that 
they had the same status and rights as burghers of cities in the Republic. Despite 
attempts by the VOC administration to claim otherwise, a comparison between 
practices surrounding Cape and Dutch burgerschap (chapter 2) demonstrates that this 
was a justifiable standpoint. Burgerschap at the Cape was obtained in very similar 
fashion to cities in the Republic, the Cape burghers swore the same burgher oath as 
Dutch burghers with the one variation that they also swore loyalty to the VOC, and 
Cape burgerschap offered much the same economic, political, judicial and social 
advantages as Dutch burgerschap. It must be acknowledged that there were 
differences, but then it must also be pointed out that even within the Dutch Republic 
itself burgerschap practices differed from city to city depending on local 
circumstances. Despite the unity, there was no uniformity, but this made the case of 
the Cape burgher protesters even stronger, because it showed that the Cape had 
developed its own identity within and as part of the Dutch empire. 
 
An important aspect of Cape burgerschap was that it was a first-rate status which 
could be obtained by all residents, no matter whether they were from European, Asian 
or African descent. The main determinant was not race, but that one had to be born 
free. Thus free blacks could not become burghers, because in most cases they were 
freed during their lifetime, but their children could. Even here the Cape situation was 
not essentially different from that in the Dutch fatherland, where many cities opened 
their doors to foreigners from other European nations, especially in cases where the 












from Dutch cities: at the Cape one could also apply for burgerschap if one had fulfilled 
a contract with the VOC. It seems that eighteenth-century Cape society, despite being 
subject to rather strict rules of engagement, was much more open to social mobility 
than many have assumed.  
 
A further indication of the resemblance between the Cape and Dutch cities was the 
manner in which the protest actions of the late 1770s were undertaken. They followed 
a procedure which was customary and tested in the Dutch Republic as well as in the 
overseas settlements over a period of almost two centuries. The burgher protesters 
organised themselves and submitted petitions, after which a lengthy process of 
negotiations between protest movement and authorities ensued. This was a well 
developed, established and accepted practice. 
 
This had important implications for the nature of the Cape burgher protest movement. 
This was not a revolutionary movement of burghers aiming to overthrow the VOC 
administration and establish a new form of government. Even though the first 
documents spread around Cape Town in 1778 may have wanted to call the burghers to 
an uprising to break the chains of oppression (chapter 1), this initially did not find 
fertile ground among the burgher population. There is no denying that the protesting 
burghers stood up for their rights, but they did so according to a long-standing 
tradition and without attacking the authority of the VOC administration or Dutch 
government. On the contrary, they clearly wanted to demonstrate that they were loyal 
subjects, who were committed to the common good of the community (chapter 3). 
They did not attack the VOC government en bloc, but expressed that they only 
criticised the behaviour of certain individuals within that administration. This was most 
apparent from the fact that they did not lay any complaint against the governor, the 
highest authority of the VOC at the Cape, to show that they had no intention of 
wanting to replace the rightful government of the Cape. 
 
This furthermore illustrates that the burghers involved in the protest movement were 
not a desperate, uninformed and disorganised band of residents at the bottom of Cape 












restrained movement, which managed to have a considerable impact on both the 
political landscape as well as social life at the Cape. It is therefore more likely that the 
protesters were found among the middle and higher layers of the burgher population. 
This is confirmed by a more in-depth investigation into the individual protesters in 
comparison to the rest of the burgher population (chapter 3). Financial data clearly 
show that a majority of the protesting burghers were relatively well-off. And at the 
forefront of the protest movement was a considerable section of the burgher elite in 
the form of Burgher Councillors, heemraden, high officers of the burgher militia and 
other members of the various administrative colleges present at the Cape. These 
burghers were likely to be familiar with the well established manner of protesting used 
in the Dutch Republic and it was in their interest to keep matters as peaceful as 
possible. Here again one finds a connection with the Dutch Republic, where many 
protests occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but these were 
generally reserved and non-violent. 
 
This similarity is of great significance to the understanding of and insight into the 
conflict at the Cape. In cities in the Dutch Republic there were often clashes between 
networks or factions consisting of leading burghers with close family and business 
relations. What was at stake for the various factions was economic and political 
control in their cities. Factions dominated political life in the Netherlands. It was 
almost unavoidable that this Dutch practice of faction forming and conflict was copied 
at the Cape, where there were so many parallels with the Dutch political world. The 
investigation into the networks and connections of the Burgher Councillors (chapter 4) 
confirms that there were two different and opposing groups among these prominent 
burghers. The one group had established long-term bonds of kinship and enterprise 
with leading VOC officials. Their main business interests were located in Cape Town 
itself. And because the burgher members of this faction were so connected and 
dependent on this association, they did not protest against the administration. The 
protesting burgher councillors, Cornelis van der Poel, Christiaan George Maasdorp and 
Gerrit Hendrik Meijer, were also linked to the ruling establishment, but at the same 
time they were members of a network of burghers which was primarily based in the 













During the 1770s the three above-mentioned burgher councillors had not only made 
an administrative career, they also rose through the ranks of the burgher militia. The 
militia were set up, like so many other institutions in the Cape, according to Dutch 
example. Three aspects of the militia were particularly relevant to the Cape situation. 
Firstly, as an organising force they played a major role in shaping burgher identity to 
the extent that being a militia member was synonymous with having burgher status. 
Secondly, city governments had not much to fear from the burgher militia as long as 
they managed to keep them under control, but the militia could turn into a powerful 
opposing force if they fell in the wrong hands. And lastly, the leaders of the burgher 
militia were the same burghers which were recruited by the Dutch patriciate (and the 
VOC) to serve in the city administration. The combination of these factors regularly 
resulted in a volatile situation in times of political trouble in Dutch cities as well as 
overseas settlements and the Cape proved to be no exception, as is described in 
chapter 5. It is demonstrated that the officer corps of the burgher militia was 
dominated by members with various kinship connections to the protest faction. And 
the case of Jan Willem Lutsche illustrates that the consequences for a burgher who 
was not on the side of the protesters could be devastating, because they could be 
ostracised from their support network within the burgher community. 
 
By the late eighteenth century Cape politics were dominated by an intriguing and 
highly developed complex of networks and two different and opposing factions. What 
is not yet evident is why burghers, belonging to the highest echelons of Cape society, 
would be in conflict with each other and with members of the VOC administration, on 
which they were to a high degree dependent. Clarity on that is only obtained by a 
further examination of the protesters, which reveals that many belonged to major 
farming families, like the Van Reenens, Meijburghs, Van Bredas and De Waals (chapter 
6). Even though these families had done well for themselves, they were excluded from 
certain trade and economic advantages by the ruling faction consisting of leading 
urban burghers and VOC officials. During the 1770s they tried to gain access to the 












entrepreneurs. Some leading alcohol pachters were crucial in these attempts, but so 
were other trades- and craftsmen in the city. 
 
By the end of the 1770s the various pieces began to fall in place for the protesting 
farming families. They had forged close kinship ties with key urban entrepreneurs. 
Their main allies and representatives had obtained top positions in city administration 
as well as burgher militia. The central figure in the ruling faction, Jacobus Alexander La 
Febre, was losing his fight against disease. The challengers were ready to make their 
move, and then the VOC administration made a huge mistake by arresting Carel 
Hendrik Buijtendag in January 1779. Suddenly the opportunity presented itself to 
exploit a lingering undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the government among the 
burghers and use it to their advantage. To gain the support of the burgher population 
the protest faction combined their economic demands with appeals for strengthening 
and extension of burgher rights.  
 
In the end, the protesters were not very successful in their endeavours, because the 
VOC directors denied most of their demands. Besides the fact that most of these went 
against official VOC mercantile policy, this could also very well be attributed to their 
lack of connections with powerful allies in the Republic. The major official within the 
VOC, First Advocate Frederik Willem Boers, was a cousin of a fierce Cape opponent of 
the protesters, Independent Fiscal Willem Cornelis Boers. Other leading figures within 
the VOC and the Republic, although perhaps sympathetic to the cause of the 
protesters, rather aligned themselves with a group of wealthy and influential farmers 
and businessmen at the Cape. Some of these were not on the side of the protest 
faction, because they had connections with VOC officials and had access to economic 
and social advantages. Despite their considerable support at the Cape, the protesters 
could not gain ultimate political and economic control without vital assistance in the 
Republic itself. However the political turmoil did lead to the removal of certain VOC 
officials and a weakening of the ruling faction. 
 
What the events surrounding the burgher protests of the late 1770s demonstrate is 












population had increased tremendously and many families had been at the Cape for a 
number of generations. This also meant that more and stronger connections had been 
formed between burghers and between burghers and VOC officials. The basis for these 
connections could no longer be reduced to a single defining factor like religion, 
occupation, race or nationality. What‎had‎become‎important‎for‎one’s‎place‎in‎Cape‎
society‎was‎one’s‎status.‎Even‎though‎it must be acknowledged that the various groups 
were stratified, as burgher one belonged to a first-rate status group and as such one 
had at least the possibility to have access into the intricate complex of relationships 
formed by kinship and marriage. These networks again were based on a common 
interest in economic and personal advancement. 
 
In this regard the Cape was not unlike cities in the Dutch Republic here burghers had 
formed the same kind of networks and belonging to these was crucial to survival. What 
was perhaps different about the Cape settlement was that here there was less 
distinction between the urban environment of Cape Town and the surrounding rural 
areas with regards to burgerschap. Cape burgerschap was not limited to city residents, 
but included those rural dwellers who qualified for burgerschap. This may have 
facilitated the relative ease with which bonds were formed between members of 
farming families and urban entrepreneurs, which resulted in the major protest 
movement as it occurred at the Cape. 
 
The Cape settlement must be acknowledged as an integral part of the Dutch Republic 
and empire. And developments in Cape Town and indeed the Cape settlement in the 
eighteenth century should be regarded from the perspective of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century history, both of the Cape as well as of the Dutch Republic. Only by 
doing so one fully appreciates and understands the social and political dynamics of 
that period. At first glance this may seem a logical observation, but in the context of 
South African historiography, where especially the protest movement of the late 1770s 
is often looked at from a nineteenth or twentieth century viewpoint, this is certainly 
not a gratuitous statement. When the proper historic perspective is applied, the 
protests change from a freedom struggle with Patriotic overtones to a rather regular 












Dutch Republic. The protests can then also be distinguished from a second wave which 
occurred later in the 1780s, when they had a more distinct ideological aspect with 













Appendix 1: the 404 signatories of the May 1779 Petition1 
 
First Name Last Name Further 
Description 
Function Notes 
Cornelis Van Der Poel  Burgerraad  
Christiaan George Maasdorp  Burgerraad  
Gerrit Hendrik Meyer  Burgerraad  
Philippus Albertus Meijburg  Heemraad  
Jan De Villiers Jan Pietersz Heemraad  
Joost Rijnhard Van As  Heemraad  
Hendrik Louw  Heemraad  
Jan Daniel Wieser  Capitein  
Pieter Soermans  Capitein  
Albert Van Der Poel  oud Capitein  
Johannes Albertus Meijburg  oud Heemraad  
Gerhardus Munnik  oud Heemraad  
Thomas Fredrik Dreijer  Ouderling  
Harmanus Van Wullig  Lieutenant  
Dirk Van Reenen  Lieutenant  
Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen Pietersz Vaandrig  
Arend Van Wullig  Brandmeester  
Pieter Van Breda  Burger  
Johannes Jacobus Tesselaar  Burger  
Daniel Verweij  Burger  
Jan Hendrik Munnik  Ritmeester  
Pieter Laubscher  oud Heemraad  
Johan Willem Hurter  oud Commissaris  
Michiel Casparus Eksteen  Vaandrig  
Pieter De Waal  Cornet  
Fokke Hendriks  Commissaris  
Johannes Verweij  oud Diacon  
Pieter Gerhard Van Der Bijl  Cornet  
Nicolaas Laubscher  oud Lieutenant  
Jan Gijsbert Van Reenen  Burger  
Servaas De Kok de Jonge Burger  
Christiaan Pieter Brand  Burger  
Gijsbert Verweij  Burger  
George Hendrik Bunding  Burger  
Jan Adam  Hartman  Burger  
Johan Hendrik Vos  Burger  
Jacobus Heuning  Burger  
Servaas De Kok de Oude Burger  
Daniel De Waal  Burger  
Johan Hasse  Burger  
Cornelis Verweij  Burger  
Johannes Henricus Verlee  Burger  
                                                          
1
 WCARS, C 2665, p. 2-9. This is a transcription of the original written version of the petition. All the 
names are recorded in the order, manner and spelling they appear in this document. The only change 












Hendrik Olweg  Burger  
Simon Petrus De Kok  Burger  
Dirk De Jong  Burger  
Barend Hendrik Toutte  Burger  
Gerrit Jacobus Romond  Burger  
Johannes Andries Grundeling  Burger  
Matthijs Pieter Toutte  Burger  
Petrus Johannes Meijer  Burger  
Martinus Lourens Smith  Burger  
Johan Pieter Voges  Burger  
Paul Bester  Burger  
Gerrit Coetsee  Burger  
Frans Bestbier  Burger  
Godlieb Andries Willer  Burger  
Franciscus  Jurgens  Burger  
Pieter Le Roes de Jonge Burger  
Johan Roode  Burger  
Hendrik Heijns  Burger  
Siebert Jacobsz Wiid  Burger  
Michiel Adriaan Smits  Burger  
Johannes Henricus Redelinghuis  Burger  
Christiaan Michiel Akkerman  Burger  
Adriaan Smuts  Burger  
Andries Smith  Burger  
George Knoop  Burger  
Jacobus Johannes Vos  Burger  
Johannes Pietersen  Burger  
Servaas Van Breda  Burger  
Diederik Keppeler  Burger  
Hendrik Brand  Burger  
Floris Brand de Jonge Burger  
Paulus Heuning  Burger  
Johannes Henricus Frank  Burger  
Jacobus Tesselaar  Burger  
Johannes Jurgens  Burger  
Jeremias Auret  Burger  
Tobijas Mostert Cornelisz Burger  
Michiel Smuts  Burger  
Jacobus Hegter  Burger  
Simon Johannes Vaasen  Burger  
Jan Van Coeverden  Burger  
Daniel Duuring  Burger  
Michiel Pents  Burger  
Christiaan Valentijn Berning  Burger  
Fredrik Simon Berning  Burger  
Johannes Roep  Burger  
Johan Jacob Meijer  Burger  
Johannes Casparus Lotter  Burger  
Gregorius Pents  Burger  
Johan Hendrik Ehlers  Burger  
Fredrik Bota  Burger  












Hans Diederik Mohr  Burger  
Dirk Van Schalkwijk  Burger  
Harmanus Pieter Van Harrenstee  Burger  
Johannes Jacobus Le roes  Burger  
Johannes Henricus Coetzee  Burger  
Christoffel Luster  Burger  
Harmanus Van der Schijff  Burger  
Hendrik Lambertus Warneken  Burger  
Hendrik De Jong  Burger  
Nicolaas Van Wulligh  Burger  
Andries Daniel Grovee  Burger  
Frans Jordaan  Burger  
Hendrik De Waal  Burger  
Fredrik August Reedel  Burger  
Casper Holtman  Burger  
Willem Wijdeman  Burger  
Pieter Terron  Burger  
David Hendrik Mellet  Burger  
Hermanus Eijkenstroom  Burger  
Ferdinand Christiaan Geijer  Burger  
Luder Jonkhoff  Burger  
Johannes Brink Andriesz Burger  
Willem Godfried Lotter  Burger  
Johannes Jacobus Le Roes de Jonge Burger  
Everd Heug  Burger  
Hendrik Smuts  Burger  
Marcus Aegidius  Burger  
Matthias Van Eijssen  Burger  
Johannes Visser  Burger  
Jacobus Jordaan  Burger  
Johan Casper Morgendaal  Burger  
Jacob Grijffenstein  Burger  
Jan Geert Bantjes  Burger  
Michiel Vlotman  Burger  
Barend Akkerhuijsen  Burger  
Johannes Knoets  Burger  
Johannes Zeederlouw  Burger  
Johan Georg Kramert  Burger  
Pieter Rijno Laubscher  Burger  
Johan Christiaan Ende  Burger  
Harmen Fredriks  Burger  
Johan Valentijn Weeber  Burger  
Johan Otto Uslar  Burger  
Coenraad Luijt  Burger  
Dirk Weesberg  Burger  
Jan Jacob Schreuder  Burger  
Andries Heijns  Burger  
Hendrik Lodewijk Sies  Burger  
Carel Willem Tielman  Burger  
Louis Mostert  Burger  
Johannes Theodorus Vlotman  Burger  












Jacobus Van Laar  Burger  
Hendrik Johannes Nieustadt  Burger  
Johannes Laros  Burger  
Cornelis Hagedoorn  Burger  
Christiaan Adolph De Wit  Burger  
Johannes Stephanus Joubert  Burger  
Willem Deeg  Burger  
Sebastiaan Lijbrand  Burger  
Johannes Michiel Wolfaard  Burger  
Abraham a de Haan  Burger  
Jacob Eksteen  Burger  
Johan Michiel Elser  Burger  
Coenraad Werner  Burger  
Frans Sabresser  Burger  
Abraham Schiettekat  Burger  
Daniel Russouw  Burger  
Pieter Zeeman  Burger  
Johannes Braun Olkers  Burger  
Carsten Muller  Burger  
Hendrik Vos  Burger  
George Willem  Hoppe  Burger  
Johannes Andries Bam  Burger  
George Hendrik Teubes  Burger  
Christiaan Fredrik Herbst  Burger  
Joseph Wolmerands  Burger  
Daniel Rood  Burger  
Fredrik Lubenberg  Burger  
Johannes Cotze  Burger  
Hendrik Oostwalt Laubscher  Luijtenant  
Hendrik Harmanus Bos  Burger  
Casper Hofman  Burger  
Johan Fredrik Wiesner  Burger  
Adriaan De Nikker  Burger  
Dirk Coetzee  Burger  
Godfried Mokke  Burger  
Johannes Lavekade  Burger  
Johannes Martinus Hartman  Burger  
Johannes Combrink  Burger  
Nicolaas Prinsloo  Burger signed with x 
Jan Gijsbert Olivier  oud Diacon  
Pieter De Villiers Davidsz oud Diacon  
Pieter Strijdom de Oude oud Diacon  
Albertus Petrus Mijburg  Burger  
Abraham Russouw  Burger  
Jacobus Louw Adriaansz oud Diacon  
Cornelis De Waal  Burger  
Jacobus Grundeling  Burger  
David De Villiers Pietersz Burger  
Pieter Jacob De Villiers  Burger  
Cornelis Van Nieukerk  Burger  
Hendrik De Nikker  Burger  












Stephanus Malan  Burger  
Melt Van Der Spuij  Burger  
Johannes Van Nieukerk  Burger  
Jan Jurgen Cotze  Burger  
Nicolaas Van Nieukerk  Burger  
David Malan Davidsz Burger  
Adriaan Louw Adriaansz Burger  
Matthijs Greef  Burger  
Albert Van Nieukerk  Burger  
Anthonij Vlotman  Burger  
Hendrik Albertus Van Nieukerk  Burger  
Gerardus Cornelis Mos  Burger  
Philippus Le Roux  Burger  
Godlieb Rudolph Opperman  Oud Cornet  
Christiaan Gunter  Burger  
Thomas Knusen  Burger  
Jan Van Schoor  Burger  
Johannes Mattheus Hertzog  Burger  
Jacobus Bierman  Burger  
Jan Ernst Heijdenreich  Burger  
Barend De Klerk  Burger  
Johannes Lambregts  Burger  
Hendrik Nicolaas Cotze  Burger  
Arnoldus Basson  Burger  
Reijnier Basson  Burger  
Johannes Basson Jansz Burger  
Johannes Van Schalkwijk  Burger  
Johannes Mostert Jansz Burger  
Johannes Mostert  Burger  
Pieter Mostert  Burger  
Arend Jacobus Keulder  Burger  
Hendrik Engeler  Burger  
Albertus Johannes Meijburg  Luijtenant  
Johannes De Waal  Luijtenant  
Petrus De Villiers Abrahamsz Burger  
Johannes De Villiers  Burger  
Johannes Jacob Hendriks  Burger  
Hendrik De Leeuw  Burger  
Harmanus Bosman  Burger  
Harmanus Bosman de Jonge Burger  
Stephanus Francois Joubert  Burger  
Daniel Bosman  Burger  
Jacobus Roud  Burger  
Abraham De Villiers Jansz Burger  
Hendrik De Vries  Burger  
Johan George Seijffert  Burger  
Pieter Sellie  Burger  
Josua Le roux  Burger  
Roelof Andriesz Zuidhof  Burger  
Johannes Christiaan Roode  Burger  
Johan Christiaan Dennert  Burger  












Stephanus Jordaan  Burger  
Jacobus Jonker  Burger  
Francois De Toit de Oude oud Heemraad  
Jacob De Villiers de Oude oud Heemraad  
Jan De Villiers de Oude oud Heemraad  
Jacob de Marais  oud Heemraad  
Pieter De Villiers  oud Diacon  
Francois Du Toit  Burger  
Jacob Marais de Jonge Burger  
Pieter Eduard Houman  Burger  
Jan Roux  Burger  
Ignatius Marais  Burger  
Johannes Nieuwoud  Burger  
Adriaan Louw Jacobsz Burger  
Johannes Stephanus Du Toit  Burger  
Jacob De Villiers Jansz oud Diacon  
Johannes De Villiers  Burger  
Andries Stephanus Du Toit  Burger  
Willem Petrus Van Nieukerk  Burger  
Jacob De Villiers Jacobsz Burger  
David De Villiers Jansz Burger  
Sijbrand Vermeulen  Burger  
Daniel Krijnouw  Burger  
Johannes Minnaar de Jonge Burger  
Petrus Johannes De Villiers  Diacon  
Pieter Marais Pietersz Burger  
Johannes Hercules Viljoen  Burger  
Willem Marais  Burger  
Johannes Nicolaas Buijs  Burger  
Johannes Jacobus De Goede  Burger  
Jan Minnaar de Oude Burger  
Pieter Jonker  Burger  
Philippus Minnaar Jansz Burger  
Johan Georg Kilian  Burger  
Francois Roos  Burger  
Johannes Roos  Burger  
Jan Sellie  Burger  
Johannes Arnoldus Ruijgrok  Burger  
Johannes De Villiers Jansz Burger  
Carel Christoffel Frik  Burger  
Guilliam Du Toit  Burger  
Philippus Bernardus Wolfaard  Burger  
Stephanus Du Toit Andriesz Burger  
Josua Charel Sellie  Burger  
Philip Minnaar  Burger  
Francois Du Toit de Jonge Burger  
Daniel Retief  Burger  
Petrus Jacobus Malherbe  Burger  
Pieter Sellie  Burger  
Gidion Malherbe  Burger  
Daniel Malan Davidsz Burger  












Andries Lategaan  Burger  
Benjamin Weijght  Burger  
Gabriel Johannes Hauptvlies  Burger  
Daniel Le Roux Pietersz Burger  
Charel Du Plessies Jansz Burger  
Francois Rossouw  Burger  
Francois Retief de Jonge Burger  
Jacob De Villiers Abrahamsz Burger  
Marthinus Akkerman  Burger  
Hendrik Andries Truter  Burger  
Jan Guilliam Van Helsdingen  Vaandrig  
Johannes Dreijer  Burger  
Pieter Swart  Burger signed with x 
Jacobus Smit Jaspersz Burger  
Pieter Jacobsz Danielsz Burger  
Hans Jurgen Du Preesz Jansz Burger  
Schalk Willems Van der Merwe  Burger  
Carel Van Heeren  Burger  
Jacob Pieterse  Burger  
Johan Adam Meij  Burger  
Pieter Willemse Van Heeren Willemsz Burger  
David Van der Merwe  Burger  
Jacobus Johannes Pienaar Jansz Burger  
Petrus Van der Merwe  Burger  
Schalk Willems Van der Merwe Pietersz Burger  
Jan Willem Warnik  Burger  
Isaac Van der Merwe  Burger  
Nicolaas Van der Merwe  Burger  
Joachim Wilke  Burger  
Louis Cotze  Burger  
Jan Theron  Ouderling  
Petrus Prenaar  Burger  
Pieter Du Plessies  Burger  
Francois De Wet  Burger  
Willem Lubbe  Burger  
Jochim Hendrik Maartens  Burger  
Willem Du Toit de Oude Burger  
Fredrik Hendrik Coenradi  Burger  
Willem Louw  Burger  
Jacobus Petrus Kriel  Burger  
Hendrik Van Asweegen  Burger  
Johannes Conterman  Burger  
Pieter Jacob Minnaar  Burger  
Adriaan Louw Jansz Burger  
Johannes Morgendaal  Burger  
Johannes Louw Pietersz Burger  
Paul Retief  Burger  
Frans Retief  oud Ouderling  
Charel Marais  Burger  
Gabriel Du Toit  Burger  
Casper Rijneken  Burger  












Jacob Van Leeuwen  Burger  
Jacob Momberg  Burger  
David De Villiers Jan Pietersz oud Heemraad  
Coenraad Eb  Burger  
Willem Oudshoorn  Burger  
Floris Visser de Jonge Burger  
Johannes Mostert Louisz Burger  
Johannes Bartholomeus Kreuger  Burger  
Johannes Le Roux de Jonge Burger  
Nicolaas Diderik Muller  Burger signed with x 
Cornelis Brits  Burger  
Cornelis Jacob Brits  Burger  
Johan Georg Steijtler  Burger  
Christiaan Liebenberg  Burger  
Mosis Davids  Burger  
Engelbertus Felix  Burger signed with x 
Marx Nicolaas Mohr  Burger  
Jacob Mostert Louisz Burger  
Claas Jonasz  Burger  
Jan Christiaan Bam  Burger  
Jan Jacob De Bessner  Burger  
Bartholomeus Schonken  Burger  
Johan George Sousman  Burger  
Johan Andries Heijsse  Burger  
Dirk Mostert  Burger  
Harmanus Barend Van Der Schijff  Burger  
Jonas Albertus Van Der Poel  Burger  
Carel Fredrik Reijmers  Burger  
Jacob Fredrik Bek  Burger  
Michiel Dursling  Burger  
Jacobus Johannes Mos  Burger  
Lucas Hegter  Burger  
Frans Hendrik Stapelberg  Burger  
Jan Hendrik Thomas  Burger  
Barend Hendrik Elderbroek  Burger  
Daniel Hugo Danielsz Burger  
Petrus Jacobus Du Toit  Burger  
Bartholomeus Van Der Vijver  Burger  
Gerrit Hendrik Catenbrink  Burger  
Pieter Coenradi  Burger  
Gerrit Victor  Burger  
Gerrit Van Der Bijl  Burger  
Andries Christoffel Van Der Bijl  Burger  
Jan Laubscher  Burger  
Paul Roux  Burger  
Adriaan Van Brakel  oud Capitein Senior 
Adriaan Van Brakel Junior Burger  
Salomon Johannes Cats  Burger  
Gerardus Jacobus Willemsen  Burger  
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C – Council of Policy 
C 131:   Resolutions, 1753 
C 132:   Resolutions, 1754 
C 141:   Resolutions, 1763 
C 143:   Resolutions, 1765 
C 144:   Resolutions, 1766 
C 146:   Resolutions, 1768 
C 148:   Resolutions, 1770 
C 150:   Resolutions, 1772 
C 151:   Resolutions, 1773 
C 152:   Resolutions, 1774 
C 153:   Resolutions, 1775 
C 154:   Resolutions, 1776 
C 155:   Resolutions, 1777 
C 156:   Resolutions, 1778 
C 157:    Resolutions, 1779 
C 158:   Resolutions, 1780 
C 159-160:  Resolutions, 1781 
C 161-162:  Resolutions, 1782 
C 165:   Resolutions, 1783 
C 166:   Resolutions, 1784 
C 168:   Resolutions, 1785 
C 171:   Resolutions, 1786 
C 174:   Resolutions, 1787 
C 177:   Resolutions, 1788 
C 184:   Resolutions, 1789 
C 1101:   Petitions and Nominations, 1739-40 
C 1118:   Petitions and Nominations, 1751 
C 1151:   Petitions and Nominations, 1769-70 
C 1155:   Petitions and Nominations, 1772 
C 1166:   Petitions and Nominations, 1776 
C 1168:   Petitions and Nominations, 1777 
C 1171-1172:   Petitions and Nominations, 1778 












C 1180:  Petitions and Nominations, 1782 
C 1184:  Petitions and Nominations, 1783 
C 2282:  Proclamation (Plakkaat) Books, 1745-53 
C 2283:  Proclamation (Plakkaat) Books, 1754-60 
C 2285:  Proclamation (Plakkaat) Books, 1766-75 
C 2661:  Oath Books, 1692-1748 
C 2662 - 2664:  Oath Books, 1748-1795 
C 2665:  Burgher Complaints, 1716-82 
C 2673:  Burgher Complaints, 1777-79 
C 2674:  Burgher Complaints, 1779-84 
C 2689 – 2696:  Cape Disputes (Kaapsche Geschillen) I-IV, 1779-1785 
C 2716:  Lease Conditions, 1762-64 
C 2721 - 2729:  Lease Conditions, 1775-95 
 
BKR – Burgher Military Council 
BKR 2:   Minute Book, 1767-93 
BKR 5:   Papers Received, 1712-95 
BKR 8:   Diverse Papers, 1768-95 
BKR 9:   Diverse Muster Rolls, 1780-95 
 
BRD – Burgher Council 
BRD 1:   Minute Book, 1769-85 
BRD 13:  Letters Received, 1707-81 
BRD 24 :  Tax lists, 1773, 1783 
BRD 25 :  Tax lists, 1787-95 
BRD 41:  Diverse Papers, 1711-1800 
 
J – Returns for Taxation Purposes 
J 210-211:  Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, 1777-79 
 
M – Miscellaneous Documents 
M 41:   Funeral Notices 
 
MOOC – Master of the Supreme Court 
MOOC 6/1, vol.1-3: Death Register, 1758-97 
MOOC 14/62:  Estate & Distribution Accounts, 1784-1785 
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